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1.1 Motivation
For many years, distributed computer systems have been dominated by the client-server
paradigm. Certain dedicated entities (servers) in the network provide services which other
entities (clients) can use by connecting to those special entities. A simple example for this
paradigm is the World-Wide-Web, where content can be accessed by clients which connect
to dedicated web-servers. However, around 1999 a new approach for distributed systems
has appeared: Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing. In networks based on this novel paradigm,
all entities are considered equal and provide equivalent services to other entities. At
the same time, all entities can use services from all other participants of the network.
Examples for popular and widely used P2P-systems are Skype (a P2P-based multimedia
communications network) [6], BitTorrent (P2P-based file-sharing) [3], or PPlive (a P2P-
based video streaming service) [16]. P2P applications contribute a significant part to the
overall traffic on the Internet, to the extent that properly handling the huge amounts of
traffic generated by P2P applications is a major concern for Network Service Providers
[236].
Compared to client-server systems, P2P-computing offers the advantages of load-
balancing, resilience to failure of participating nodes, and scalability [158] [43]. However,
securing such systems imposes new research challenges. To better understand why P2P-
computing cannot simply re-use existing and well-understood security approaches from
the client-server world, consider the following important differences between client-server
and P2P-based systems:
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1. P2P-systems lack a central, persistent authority in the network which can provide
security services such as authentication of entities.
2. P2P-systems are characterised by constant fluctuation in membership (so-called
churn), which implies that a single entity may use the same service from different
entities over time.
3. The entities a service is used from cannot be considered trustworthy, whereas in
client-server systems security solutions often rely on the assumption that a server
is non-compromised and follows a protocol in a non-malicious way.
These differences have important implications when considering security. For instance,
the security of many client-server applications is based on credentials which have been
exchanged between clients and servers a priori. Consider pre-installed TLS [107] certifi-
cates in web-browsers as an example. These certificates enable authentication of Hyper
Text Transport Protocol (http) [115] servers as well as confidentiality and integrity of http
traffic (i.e. https [214]). In contrast, P2P-systems are characterised by a high-degree of
membership fluctuation. As a consequence, entities may connect each time to a different
network participant for a single service, rendering solutions infeasible which are based on
persistent credentials with the entity that is providing the service.
In addition, peers offering services may in principle act maliciously. This opens the
door for attacks on availability of the P2P-application where participants refuse to follow
the P2P-protocol, disrupting overall functionality. In summary, the decentralised nature
of P2P-computing calls for new approaches in order to ensure confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and availability in such systems.
More recently, researchers have proposed Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs), e.g. Chord
[266], CAN [210], Pastry [223], or Tapestry [293]. DHTs essentially constitute a dis-
tributed database with formally proven properties regarding scalability, load balancing,
and robustness against failure of nodes. P2P networks based on DHTs are often referred
to as Structured Overlay Networks1 [158]. DHTs enable new kinds of P2P applications
because they can offer reliable decentralised storage and retrieval of data items: Given
that a data item is stored in the network, DHTs can guarantee retrieval of the data item
as well as an upper bound on the necessary number of messages to locate the desired
data item in the DHT.
Several of these new kinds of P2P applications use a DHT to locate services offered
by entities in the network. As an example, a fully decentralised replacement of the
Domain Name System (DNS) [179] [180] has been proposed [99] [207] [196], where the
resolution of hostnames is facilitated by a DHT-based P2P-network. As another example,
locating multimedia communication—e.g. Voice-over-IP (VoIP)—users with a DHT has
been investigated by researchers [252] [78] and is currently being standardised by the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [140]. This approach is commonly referred to
as P2PSIP, because technically a P2P-based version of the session establishment part of
1In the literature, the terms P2P network and Overlay Network are often used interchangeably,
especially when referring to Structured P2P networks [266] [158] [159].
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the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [222] is being envisioned. We refer to these kinds
of P2P-applications as Decentralised Service Location because these applications use the
P2P-network solely for locating services: Once the node offering the desired service has
been located (e.g. a web-server in the case of decentralised DNS, or a VoIP terminal in the
case of decentralised VoIP), communication takes place in a client-server fashion directly
between the initiator of the DHT lookup request and the desired host offering the service.
Decentralised Service Location, i.e. finding an application communication endpoint
based on a DHT, is a fairly new concept. The precise security implications of this ap-
proach have not been studied in detail. More importantly, a detailed analysis regarding
the applicability of existing security solutions to this concept has not been conducted.
As highlighted above, in many cases existing client-server approaches to security may not
be feasible. In addition, to understand the necessity for such an analysis, it is key to
acknowledge that Decentralised Service Location has some unique security requirements
compared to other P2P applications such as filesharing or live streaming.
First, in contrast to other DHT-based applications, Decentralised Service Location
means that a location-binding, i.e. the binding between a service and a location in the
network, is stored in the DHT. This implies that location-bindings are stored at arbi-
trary, non-trustworthy nodes in the network. Hence, particular attention must be paid
to the protection of the integrity of these bindings. Without proper integrity protection,
man-in-the-middle attacks or impersonation attacks (e.g. on VoIP identities) are feasible.
Second, Decentralised Service Location has soft real-time requirements [44]. This means
that the answer for a location query is expected to be retrieved from the DHT within a
certain amount of time (e.g. in the order of several seconds for a VoIP call establishment
or a DNS request). Maintaining availability of the DHT lookup service in the presence
of attackers is hence of particular importance for this type of application. Third, consid-
ering specifically the case for multimedia communication session establishment, unique
application requirements need to be considered such as Spam prevention, reachability of
emergency services, or the possibility to conduct Lawful Interception by law enforcement
agencies.
Studying and understanding in detail the aforementioned security requirements for
Decentralised Service Location is a core motivation for this thesis. In addition, a main
objective of our work is to develop innovative security solutions for addressing those
requirements identified which are not sufficiently addressed by existing solutions.
1.2 Research Questions and Goals
This thesis concerns the security challenges for Decentralised Service Location. As out-
lined above, the goals of our work are on the one hand to precisely understand the security
requirements and research challenges for Decentralised Service Location, and on the other
hand to develop and evaluate corresponding security mechanisms.
One simple and straightforward way to secure P2P-networks would be to add cen-
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tralised components (e.g. a Certificate Authority to authenticate nodes or identities).
Indeed, many existing P2P-networks use exactly this approach to fulfil application secu-
rity requirements, e.g. Skype [6]. However, from a research perspective, adding a central
component is a rather trivial solution. It can therefore not be considered a research
challenge. More importantly, adding a central authority does not lie in the true spirit
of P2P-computing because with this approach, systems cannot be considered pure P2P
anymore. True P2P networks are per definition decentralised, and each node offers the
same functionality. In particular Distributed Hash Tables—the focus of our work—are
fully decentralised structures in the sense that functionality is evenly distributed among
nodes in the network, with no specific entity playing a central or special role. The pri-
mary objective of this thesis is therefore to develop—as much as possible—decentralised
solutions in response to the security challenges derived.
It is important to realise that completely decentralised security solutions for P2P-
systems may not be possible in all cases. Douceur has shown that completely preventing
forged entities in distributed systems is not possible without a central authority [109]. It is
an open research question whether a central authority is necessary to completely prevent
other important attacks on P2P-networks. Intuitively, it seems that security must be
bootstrapped at some persistent, trustworthy entity. Consequently, the urging research
question is rather how to decentralise security solutions for pure, fully-decentralised P2P-
systems best, with as few centralised security service dependency as possible. This thesis
investigates this research question for Decentralised Service Location.
The goals of this thesis can be summarised as follows:
1. Security Analysis for Decentralised Service Location A first goal is to anal-
yse the security challenges for Decentralised Service Location. From this analysis,
security requirements for this class of applications will be derived. This analysis
will be driven by the example application of Voice-over-IP (VoIP).
2. Examination and Analysis of Existing Solutions A further goal of this
thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of existing solutions to secure Decentralised
Service Location based on the security requirements identified. The objective is to
carve out the remaining research challenges by assessing to what extent existing
mechanisms are insecure, inefficient, or based on centralised components.
3. Investigation and Assessment of Innovative, Decentralised Security
Solutions The primary objective of our work is to develop innovative decentralised
security mechanisms and assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The goal is
to design effective security solutions which rely on as few central components as
possible. The proposed solutions shall be evaluated qualitatively as well as quanti-
tatively regarding the security, the performance, and the degree of decentralisation
they offer.
The underlying research questions to be answered are the following:
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Can the security requirements for Decentralised Service Location be fulfilled with fully
decentralised security mechanisms? If not, to what degree is the decentralisation of se-
curity solutions possible? For each security requirement, our goal is to develop a decen-
tralised solution, i.e. relying on as few central entities as possible. It is an open research
question to what extent decentralised solutions can secure the individual security chal-
lenges. For instance, is it technically possible to design fully decentralised solutions for
all security challenges? If such solutions cannot be found in response to all challenges, it
is natural to ask to what extent decentralisation is possible. In other words, for each case
(i.e. challenge) we are interested to investigate with how few centralised components we
can design an adequate solution.
What is the effect on application-level performance of such solutions? Is there a trade-
off between decentralisation, performance, and security? In other words, an interesting
research question is what the implications of decentralisation are regarding application
performance. For instance, is it possible not only to secure Decentralised Service Location
with decentralised solutions, but can these solutions still provide location of a service
within a reasonable amount of time? Further, we are interested in investigating if there
are cases where decentralisation and performance are potentially conflicting goals. If yes,
an interesting question would be to analyse the trade-off between different application
objectives and requirements.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organised as follows. First, fundamentals are explained and the scope of
the thesis is defined. Chapter 2 provides fundamentals for the scope of our work. It
explains the necessary background information—regarding P2P networks and IP-based
multimedia communication systems—to understand the technical challenges and corre-
sponding solutions presented in this thesis. Further, Decentralised Service Location is
defined and P2PSIP is explained technically as a prototypical example. Chapter 3 de-
fines the scope of this thesis. A security analysis for P2PSIP is presented. Based on this
security analysis, security requirements for Decentralised Service Location and the cor-
responding research challenges—i.e. security concerns not suitably mitigated by existing
solutions—are derived.
Second, several decentralised solutions are presented and evaluated to tackle the se-
curity challenges for Decentralised Service Location. Chapter 4 presents decentralised
algorithms to enable availability of the DHTs lookup service in the presence of adver-
sary nodes. These algorithms are evaluated via simulation and compared to analytical
bounds. In Chapter 5, a cryptographic approach based on self-certifying identities is
illustrated and discussed. This approach enables decentralised integrity protection of
location-bindings. A decentralised approach to assess unknown identities is introduced
in Chapter 6. The approach is based on a Web-of-Trust model. It is evaluated via
prototypical implementation.
For the requirement of Lawful Interception, a satisfactory technical solution seems very
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difficult to design. Instead, Chapter 7 provides a technical analysis of Lawful Interception
in P2PSIP systems. Potential technical solutions are outlined and discussed. Chapter
8 presents a prototype implementation of a security-enhanced P2PSIP system. Several
of the security techniques proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 have been evaluated with this
prototype. The results of these experiments are presented and discussed.
Finally, the thesis closes with a summary of the main contributions and a discussion
of open issues. Chapter 9 provides this reflection of the main contributions and contrasts
them with the original goals of our work. Further, it discusses open issues and possible
future work based on the results obtained through this thesis.
This thesis also contains several appendices. A considerable part of this thesis includ-
ing figures has been originally published in scientific conferences and journals or by other
means [189] [203] [235] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [246] [247] [248]. Appendix
A lists these associated publications which have been published prior to the publication of
this thesis and explains how they relate to this thesis. In Appendix B, details about sim-
ulations, prototypical implementations, and the setup of experiments conducted during
the course of our work are provided.
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Figure 2.1: Different Layers in a P2P System
2.1 Peer-to-Peer Networks
Peer-to-peer networks follow a different paradigm than client-server based systems. A
key underlying attribute is that each node participates in the network by offering and
using services at the same time. There is no central control and the network organizes
itself in a dynamic way. Another key characteristic is that P2P networks are constructed
at the application layer: The P2P network uses the underlying network (e.g. a TCP/IP
network) for transporting messages between nodes which have a direct link at the P2P-
layer. Thus, a direct link on the overlay layer may imply several hops on the underlying
network layer. Figure 2.1 [241] shows the different layers in a typical P2P network. Note
that nodes na and nb in the figure are directly connected on the P2P overlay layer, but
on the underlying IP-network several routing hops exist among these nodes.
There exists a vast amount of literature, proposed algorithms, and deployed systems
in the field of P2P computing. Here we try to give an overview on different kinds of
P2P systems. Instead of providing an exhaustive listing of existing P2P systems, we
will outline key approaches and survey important types of applications which have been
deployed.
While the term P2P network refers rather to a certain network topology and the term
P2P system is usually used to describe a complete system (which provides an application
or an overall functionality besides routing of messages), the distinction between these
two terms is not always clear in the literature and they are often used non-discriminable.
We will use the notation P2P network preferably to refer to a network topology where
routing of messages is important; we will use the notation P2P system preferably when
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we refer to an overall communication system which provides a specified functionality (in
the sense of an upper-layer application) other than topology-based routing of messages
to participating nodes. It should be clear from the context what a certain usage of one of
these terms refers to. As a more general term which comprises both P2P networks and
P2P systems, we will sometimes use the term P2P computing. Because P2P networks
are built at the application layer and use the underlying network for the exchange of
messages, P2P systems are also called overlay networks by many researchers. We follow
this usage and use the terms P2P network and overlay network interchangeably in this
thesis.
2.1.1 Defining Peer-to-Peer Computing
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing is not easy to define and various definitions exist in the
literature. We first cite some existing definitions for P2P computing and then define P2P
computing for the course of this thesis.
A very imprecise definition is given in [281]:
In a short word, P2P is a special distributed system on the application layer,
where each pair of peers can communicate [with] each other through the rout-
ing protocol in P2P layers. [281]
Still, this definition highlights two important characteristics of P2P-systems: P2P
systems are formed at the application layer and P2P networks define a specific routing
protocol to communicate which each other on the application layer. Hence, P2P-routing
refers to application-layer routing. Lua et al. [158] give a long and also somewhat impre-
cise definition of P2P networks, which they refer to as P2P overlay networks :
Peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay networks are distributed systems in nature, with-
out any hierarchical organization or centralized control. Peers form self-
organizing overlay networks that are overlayed on the Internet Protocol (IP)
networks, offering a mix of various features such as robust wide-area rout-
ing architecture, efficient search of data items, selection of nearby peers, re-
dundant storage, permanence, hierarchical naming, trust and authentication,
anonymity, massive scalability, and fault tolerance. Peer-to-peer overlay sys-
tems go beyond services offered by client-server systems by having symmetry
in roles where a client may also be a server. It allows access to its resources by
other systems and supports resource sharing, which requires fault-tolerance,
self-organization, and massive scalability properties. Unlike Grid systems,
P2P overlay networks do not arise from the collaboration between established
and connected groups of systems and without a more reliable set of resources
to share. [158]
An important aspect of this definition is the distinction between P2P networks and
GRID-systems. In [155] a peer-to-peer (P2P) system is defined as follows:
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are distributed systems without any centralized
control or hierarchical organization, where the software running at each node
is equivalent in functionality. [155]
This definition (and also the previous definition by Lua et al. [158]) defines pure P2P
architectures only. Yet many networks are also considered P2P even though they employ a
central authority (so-called hybrid P2P systems) or use nodes that offer more functionality
than others (so-called super nodes). There are more general definitions of P2P networks
which try to include such subclasses. For instance, according to Shirky [250], what makes
P2P systems distinctive is the fact that P2P applications take advantage of the resources
at the edge of the Internet:
Peer-to-peer is a class of applications that take advantage of resources (stor-
age, cycles, content, human presence) available at the edges of the Internet.
[250]
This definition is very general, but includes hybrid systems as well as P2P-systems
with supernodes. It rather focuses on the key property of P2P computing. Androutsellis-
Theotokis et al. give a similar definition of P2P systems [43]:
Peer-to-peer systems are distributed systems consisting of interconnected nodes
able to selforganize into network topologies with the purpose of sharing re-
sources such as content, CPU cycles, storage and bandwidth, capable of
adapting to failures and accommodating transient populations of nodes while
maintaining acceptable connectivity and performance, without requiring the
intermediation or support of a global centralized server or authority. [43]
However (compared to the definition by Shirky [250]), their definition also includes
the properties of failure-adaptation and handling transient node populations by self-
organisation. In addition, they demand acceptable connectivity and performance, a rather
imprecise property.
This thesis focuses on fully decentralised, structured1 P2P networks. Self-organisation
and the ability to handle frequent joining and leaving of nodes (so-called churn2) are key
properties of such systems. Further, resiliency to node failures is an important part
of self-organisation in fully decentralised P2P systems. However, the extent to which
such systems provide connectivity and performance should not be part of a general P2P
definition. In fact, many unstructured3 P2P networks cannot guarantee either of these two
properties. Therefore, connectivity and performance are left out of our general definition
of a P2P network below.
1Structured peer-to-peer networks are defined in Subsection 2.1.2.
2Churn describes the degree of node fluctuation caused by nodes leaving and entering the network.
3Unstructured peer-to-peer networks are defined in Subsection 2.1.2.
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Thus—based on the previously listed definitions found in the literature ([158] [155]
[250] [43])—for the course of this thesis we define a P2P network (and a fully decentralised
P2P network as a special case of a P2P network) as follows:
Definition 1 (P2P network): A P2P network is a scalable distributed sys-
tem consisting of interconnected nodes with the purpose of sharing resources
such as content, CPU cycles, storage, or bandwidth which is able to self-
organise into a network topology such that the network is capable of adapting
to node failures and able to handle joining and leaving of participating nodes.
Definition 2 (Fully decentralised P2P network): A fully decentralised
P2P network is a P2P network according to Definition 1 without any cen-
tralised control or hierarchical organisation, where the software running at
each node is equivalent in functionality, so that each node can be considered
resource provider and resource consumer at the same time.
The extent to which a P2P network is able to handle node failures and churn is
determined by its structure, e.g. whether it is an unstructured or structured network and
by the properties of this structure (see further Subsection 2.1.2). But even unstructured
P2P networks are characterised by the property that nodes can frequently join or leave
the network (or fail) while overall network functionality can be provided. Therefore, these
properties are included in Definition 1.
2.1.2 Unstructured vs. Structured P2P Systems
In general, P2P networks can be classified into Unstructured and Structured [158]. Below
we describe the main characteristics of each type of P2P system.
Unstructured P2P networks Early systems (e.g. the original Gnutella [226]) used
flooding for message routing in the network. Any node receiving a search request will
broadcast this message to all its neighbours. The message has a time-to-live (TTL) value
which is reduced at every hop to prevent messages from being routed in the network
forever. Such unstructured systems cannot give any formal guarantees that a message
in the network will reach its destination. Furthermore, broadcast messages impose an
unnecessary traffic burden on the network.
Example 2.1: Figure 2.2 [158] shows the flooding approach used for search of data items
by Gnutella. In the example, node Peer_1 sends out a query to all its neighbours. The
neighbours in return forward the query to all of their neighbours. Eventually, Peer_5
responds with a message saying that it has the desired content. Peer_2 forwards this
response message to Peer_1 so that it can start downloading the content from Peer_5.
It can be observed that this approach is not very effective and causes heavy traffic loads.
11
Figure 2.2: Flooding in a Gnutella Network
More importantly, it cannot be guaranteed that a data item which is stored in the network
will always be found with this approach: If the query does not reach a target node which
stores the requested resource within the TTL, the query ends without success.
Lv et al. characterise unstructured P2P networks as not having “any precise control
over the network topology or file placement” and in that “the placement of files is not
based on any knowledge of the topology (as it is in structured designs)” [159]. They
observe that in unstructured P2P networks “The most typical query method is flooding,
where the query is propagated to all neighbors within a certain radius” and conclude that
such “search mechanisms are extremely unscalable, generating large loads on the network
participants” [159]. Similarly, Lua et al. describe unstructured P2P systems as follows:
“An unstructured P2P system is composed of peers joining the network with some loose
rules, without any prior knowledge of the topology. The network uses flooding as the
mechanism to send queries across the overlay with a limited scope.” [158].
Structured P2P networks To improve lookup time for a search request, so-called
Structured Overlay Networks4 have been proposed by researchers. These networks pro-
vide load balancing and efficient routing of messages. Structured overlay networks offer a
substrate on which different applications can be built rather than a separate P2P network
for every application (like most unstructured P2P file-sharing systems). The overlay pro-
vides content distribution and search for content to an application using it. Specifically,
given a key (as a search request inserted by a participating node into the network), the
network returns the node responsible for storing data belonging to that key. This key-
based routing of structured P2P networks is based on so-called Distributed Hash Tables
(DHTs): Routing as well as node responsibility for keys is based on a hash function.
In many cases, node-IDs and key-IDs are computed using the same, system-wide hash
function. The node which has the ID closest to a certain key-ID is responsible for storing
data for this key-ID.
4For structured P2P networks researchers often use the term Structured Overlay Networks. We follow
this notation and use the terms Structured Overlay Network and structured P2P network interchangeably.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of P2P Networks
Lv et al. define structured P2P networks by the fact “that the P2P network topology
(that is, the set of connections between P2P members) is tightly controlled and that
files are placed not at random nodes but at specified locations that will make subsequent
queries easier to satisfy. In systems with tight structure, the structure of the P2P network
and the placement of files is extremely precise and so subsequent queries can be satisfied
very efficiently.” [159]. Lua et al. define structured in the context of P2P networks as
follows: “The technical meaning of structured is that the P2P overlay network topology
is tightly controlled and content is placed not at random peers but at specified locations
that will make subsequent queries more efficient.” [158].
Today, unstructured P2P networks are very common on the Internet due to their
simple routing algorithms and low overhead [158]. In addition, many types of appli-
cations (e.g. file-sharing) do not need the formal guarantees offered by structured P2P
networks. DHT-based (i.e. structured) P2P systems are heavily studied by researchers
and have started to appear as real applications on the Internet. One example is the
distributed tracker used in BitTorrent file-sharing networks, which is technically based
on the Kademlia DHT [263]. In this thesis we focus on structured P2P systems, and in
particular on Chord [267]: The types of applications we consider, i.e. service location,
require guaranteed lookup success; a property which unstructured P2P networks cannot
offer.
Figure 2.3 shows a time-lime which displays the year of appearance for selected P2P
systems, focussing on DHTs and DHT applications. Unstructured P2P Networks are
displayed in grey ellipses. DHTs are displayed in filled black boxes; DHT applications
are displayed in black boxes with white background. It can be observed that unstruc-
tured P2P networks appeared prior to structured ones. Famous and widely used unstruc-
tured P2P-systems include BitTorrent (filesharing) [3], PPLive (live streaming) [16], BBC
IPlayer 5 (live streaming) [2], BitCoin (a digital currency using a P2P network) [185], and
BitTorrent Live (live streaming) [4]. Skype [6] is a very popular P2P-based multimedia
communication software. If or to what extent Skype uses DHT technology as part of
its session establishment procedure remains a secret [62] [69]. The most famous DHTs
(Chord [267], CAN [210], Pastry [223], and Tapestry [293]) all were proposed at roughly
5The original IPlayer used P2P technology for content distribution. Later versions have been client-
server based.
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the same time, namely in 2001. Some of the first DHT applications that appeared were
application-layer multicast [211] [85] [296], distributed file storage [110] [215] [103], and
decentralised DNS [99]. Later, DHT-based Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [117] and
multimedia communications (P2PSIP) [252] have been proposed. A DHT-based BitTor-
rent tracker is widely used which spreads the tracker functionality among peers (so-called
trackerless BitTorrent). More recent DHT applications include the use of Kademlia by
the Storm Botnet [132] and YaCy, a DHT-based search engine [27].
2.1.3 Distributed Hash Tables
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) provide the substrate used by Structured Overlay Net-
works to provide efficient storage and location of data items with formal guarantees. A
Distributed Hash Table essentially is a hash table that is distributed among the nodes
participating in the network. Each node stores only a small part of the whole hash table
for which it is responsible. Most DHTs use consistent hashing [147], which has the ad-
vantageous property that only a small fraction of data items has to be re-assigned each
time a node enters or leaves the network. Thus, the network is capable of handling nodes
entering and leaving the network at a high frequency without having to redistribute large
amounts of data among nodes.
The two basic primitives provided by a DHT are store (key, data), and lookup (key)
= data, similar to a regular hash table. Using the lookup primitive, any node can query
the DHT with a key and the DHT returns the data item that corresponds to that key.
Each node stores only a small part of all the data items. The DHT provides rules that
specify which node is responsible for which part of the keyspace. The DHT protocol is
designed in such a way that a message querying a particular key can be routed efficiently
to the node responsible for that key and will always succeed in reaching the responsible
node (in the absence of attackers).
Further, DHTs are capable of handling nodes entering and leaving the network at a
high frequency. The design is such that it can guarantee consistent data storage and load
balancing even when nodes enter and leave the network at a high frequency. Specifically,
each DHT defines a join and a leave operation. These operations take care of the re-
assignment of key responsibility among nodes, and of updating routing tables at nodes,
in the case that nodes join or leave the network (where node failure can be seen as a
special kind of leave).
For the purpose of our work we define a DHT as follows:
Definition 3 (Distributed Hash Table): A Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
is a distributed system that provides consistent distributed storage and re-
trieval of data items using one or more hash functions. Data is stored as
(key, value) pairs. The DHT provides two basic functionalities which are
distributed among all participating nodes and available to all participating
nodes: store (key, data) to store a data item for a given key, and lookup
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(key) = data to retrieve a data item for a given key. In the absence of mali-
cious nodes or large amounts of failures, a DHT can guarantee efficient data
retrieval that scales with the number of participating nodes.
2.1.3.1 DHT Structure, Components, and Routing
For the course of this thesis we specify certain components of a DHT more formally6.
A DHT consists of several structural elements and can be characterised by the elements
and functions presented below. We use this formalisation to analyse the DHT we use
in our work (Chord), categorise threats on DHTs, and to precisely specify our proposed
extensions to Chord in an unambiguous representation.
A DHT consists of the following components:
 Participating Nodes: A DHT consists of participating nodes, which are all equal
with respect to the functionality they offer to other nodes in the DHT. Nodes
can send and receive messages based on the underlying network structure, e.g. a
TCP/IP network. A node is thus a unique entity participating in the DHT which
is able to send and receive messages and to provide routing of messages to other
nodes. Each node has a node identifier n ∈ I, where I is an m-bit node identifier
space.
 Node Identifier Space: In order to distinguish nodes, a unique external identifier
eID ∈ E is used, where E is an external identifier space. For instance, if the IP-
address is used as an external identifier eID, the external identifier space E would
be all possible IP-addresses, i.e. E = [0 . . . 255].[0 . . . 255].[0 . . . 255].[0 . . . 255]. In
order to uniquely identify participating nodes in the system, nodes get assigned a
node-ID n ∈ I, based on their external identifier eID ∈ E.
 Node-ID Mapping: A DHT provides a node mapping function fnode−mapping:E →
I for mapping an external identifier eID ∈ E onto a node identifier n ∈ I. Thus,
fnode−mapping(eID) = n ∈ I. We denote with ni the node-ID with the value i in
decimal representation, assuming that I ⊂ N or that I can be mapped onto a subset
of N. We will use n (without any index) to denote a node with a node-ID which is
of no particular importance in the context. Usually, fnode−mapping is a one-way hash
function hnode() such as SHA-1 [28]. Hence, an external identifier gets hashed to
obtain the corresponding m-bit node-ID n ∈ I. The possible set of input values for
this hash function hnode()—i.e. its domain, domain(hnode())—defines the external
identifier space E. In the literature, the mapping from external identifier to node-
ID is also referred to as node-ID assignment. Some DHTs let nodes chose their
node-ID, e.g. CAN [210]. Other DHTs provide strict limitations on the external
identifier to use and on node-ID assignment. For instance, Chord [267] computes
the node-ID n of a participating node x by hashing the node’s IP-address with a
predefined hash function hnode() such that n = hnode(IP−address(x)). In this case,
the node identifier space I is determined by the range of the hash function hnode().
6Our model is in part an extension of the model presented in [261].
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 Key Identifier Space: In order to provide distributed storage of data items, a
key is used to index data items. A key ∈ KS is a string used to uniquely identify
a data item stored in a Distributed Hash Table, where KS is the keyspace which
defines the set of possible keys. A key for a specific data item gets mapped onto
a key-ID by hashing its value. More generally, a mapping function is used to map
keys onto key-IDs. A DHT provides a function fkey−mapping:KS → K for mapping
a key ∈ KS onto a key-ID k so that fkey−mapping(key) = k ∈ K, where K is an
l-bit key identifier space. We denote with ki the key-ID with the value i in decimal
representation, assuming that range(fkey−mapping) ⊂ N or that range(fkey−mapping)
can be mapped onto a subset of N. We will use k (without any index) to denote
a key where the key-ID is of no particular importance in the context. Usually,
fkey−mapping is a one-way hash function hkey() such as SHA-1 [28]. Hence, a key
gets hashed to obtain the corresponding l-bit key-ID k ∈ K. The possible set of
input values for this hash function defines the keyspace KS.
 Data Responsibility: In order to enable reliable storage and retrieval of the data
item for a given key, a data placement function is needed to map keys onto the
node-ID space. Further, a function is needed to define which node is responsible for
which key. A DHT provides a function fdata−placement : K → I that maps a key-ID
k ∈ K onto the node-ID space I. A responsibility function fresp : I → I states
which node n ∈ I is responsible for storing fdata−placement(k) for a given key k ∈ K.
Thus, the data item for key k is stored at node n = fresp(fdata−placement(k)). For
any given key-ID k, the node n ∈ I which is responsible for storing data items for
k is called the root node for key-ID k, denoted rootk:
rootk = fresp(fdata−placement(k)) (2.1)
For reliability, data items are redundantly replicated for each key k. A replication
function freplicate : I → Ir−1 maps each key k onto r − 1 other nodes which store
the data for k as well (besides rootk). Hence, for each key overall r redundant data
items are stored in the DHT (one at rootk and r−1 ones at the other replica roots).
 Routing Structure and Routing Scheme: Any node participating in the DHT
can invoke store(key-id, value) and lookup(key-id)=value. To facilitate this
functionality which is provided to upper layers, a DHT uses a routing structure
(e.g. a Cartesian space or a virtual ring) and a routing scheme (i.e. a set of rules
that specify how routing takes place). The routing structure specifies the distance
between nodes in the DHT. The routing structure of a DHT provides a distance
function dist : I × I → ZM that enables to calculate the distance between any two
nodes ni and nj in the DHT. For unidimensional DHTs, dist : I × I → Z (i.e.
M = 1). For multidimensional DHTs M is the dimension of the DHT. Since the
routing structure determines the topology between nodes in the DHT, we will use
the terms routing structure and DHT structure interchangeably. Each node stores
locally routing tables with links to other nodes. A routing table Tr at each node
n contains t links to nodes at some distance in the ID-space. Further, a second
routing table Ts at each node n contains s direct neighbours in the DHT structure.
Thus, each node stores a routing table Tr with links to t participating nodes in the
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DHT and a second routing table Ts with links to s direct neighbours in the routing
structure. A routing table function frouting−table : I → I t determines which t nodes
are in the routing table Tr(n) of any node n in the system. A neighbourhood
function fneighbor−table : I → Is determines for each node n in the system which
s nodes are in its routing table Ts(n). For some DHTs, the size of the routing
tables Tr and Ts are constants t and s, respectively, that depend on the size of the
node identifier space I. In order to decide which nodes are placed in the routing
tables, the functions frouting−table and fneighbor−table depend on the distance function
provided by the routing structure. A routing function determines how to route a
message which a node receives for a certain key. This routing function froute : I → I
specifies which entry a routing table returns upon receiving a message (lookup or
storage) for key-ID k. Usually, DHTs route greedy :
froute(fdata−placement(k)) =
(ni ∈ Tr|dist(ni, fdata−placement(k)) ≤ dist(nj, fdata−placement(k))∀nj ∈ Tr ∧ j 6= i)
(2.2)
In other words, it is routed to exactly the node in the routing table that is closest
to the node storing the data in the node identifier space.
 Functions for Join, Leave, and DHT Maintenance: Each DHT defines a
set of rules for joining and leaving of nodes, and to maintain the routing tables
of other nodes during such joining and leaving operations. These rules enable the
DHT to handle the dynamic nature of P2P systems, so-called churn. Since we do
not examine joining and leaving of nodes in our work, we do not define rules for
handling churn formally.
 State: Since the system is dynamic, its state changes constantly. Σ denotes the
set of possible states. At any state σi ∈ Σ we have a set of nodes in the system,
N (σi) (where N (σi) ⊆ I). The set of all |N (σi)| = N nodes, their routing tables
Tr and Ts, and all the data items stored in the system define the current state σi.
We will analyse the system at a certain state σi ∈ Σ. We do not consider node joins
and leaves. For simplicity, we will denote N (σi) with N , given a specified state σi.
Similarly, we will denote the number of nodes in the system at state σi, |N (σi)|,
simply with N .
Example 2.2: Consider the following example for key-ID mapping: If a P2P-system
would be used to replace the centralised Domain Name System (DNS) with a distributed
DHT-based solution, the URL of a website would be the key for a lookup. Assuming
that a predefined hash function hkey() is used as fkey−mapping, any participating node in
such a system could request the current IP-address for a given URL, u, by invoking
lookup(hkey(u)) = lookup(key-ID(u)) in the DHT.
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Figure 2.4: Classification of Distributed Hash Tables based on their Routing Structure
2.1.3.2 DHTs Proposed in the Literature
Several different DHT algorithms have been proposed, e.g. Chord [267], CAN [210], Pastry
[223], Tapestry [293], or Kademlia [171]. Each of these DHTs provides its own routing
scheme and can give formal guarantees (upper or lower bounds) on the number of hops
needed for a search request to succeed.
Figure 2.4 shows a classification of some well-known DHTs based on their routing
structure. As described previously, a multidimensional DHTs is characterised by the fact
that the range of the distance function has more than one dimension, i.e. dist : I×I → ZM
where M is the dimension of the DHT. CAN [210] is an example of a multidimensional
DHT. Unidimensional DHTs can be further classified into being either multidirectional
(examples are Pastry [223], Tapestry [293]) or unidirectional (examples are Chord [267],
Kademlia [171]). Unidirectional routing means that in the node-ID space “For any given
point x and distance d > 0, there is exactly one point y such that d(x, y) = d” [158],
where d() is the DHT distance function (dist() in our model, compare 2.1.3.1).
Below we provide an overview of the architecture and routing scheme for some popular
and well-studied DHTs: CAN [210], Pastry [223], and Chord [267]. Chord is the DHT
we will examine closely in this thesis, and for which we will provide routing extensions.
Thus, our description of Chord is more detailed than for CAN and Pastry. Other DHTs
that have proposed in the literature are Kademlia [171], Viceroy [165], Bamboo (based
on Pastry) [216], or Accordion (based on Chord) [154]. For a more exhaustive tutorial
on Distributed Hash tables and details of other DHT algorithms, the reader is referred
to [158] [43] [164] [264].
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CAN CAN (Content-Addressable Network) is a multidimensional DHT that uses a d-
dimensional Cartesian coordinate space as the DHT node-ID space (I) and key identifier
space (K) [210]. Each node is responsible for a zone in the coordinate space. Nodes
randomly select a point p in the multidimensional node identifier space (i.e. p ∈ I) as
their node-ID. When a new node nnew joins with randomly selected node-ID pnew, it
contacts the node which is currently responsible for pnew in the CAN network. Then, the
zone of the currently responsible node gets split into two halves, and one half is assigned
as a new zone to the joining node. Keys are mapped to the coordinate space using a
hash-function, i.e. fkey−mapping() = hCAN(), where hCAN() is the chosen hash function for
a given CAN DHT. Nodes are responsible for storing data items for the key-IDs within
their zone.
Example 2.3: Figure 2.5 shows a 2-dimensional CAN network with a coordinate space of
[0, 1]× [0, 1] and six zones (i.e. 6 nodes). Three data items are stored in the network. If a
new node nnew with randomly selected node-ID (0.44, 0.33) would join, the node currently
responsible for zone [(0.0, 0.5); (0.0, 0.5)], nz1, would split its zone and would assign the
new zone [(0.25, 0.5); (0.0, 0.5)] to nnew. Further, nz1 would transfer the data item for
key-ID (0.43, 0.09) to nnew.
Each node n has a routing table, Tr, with links to the nodes responsible for the zones
adjacent to the node-ID of n in the ID-space. Routing is greedy: nodes route via the
link in Tr which is closest to the desired key. The average lookup path length in CAN is
O(n
1
d ); the size of each node’s routing table Tr is 2d on average [210]. Hence, increasing
the dimension of the coordinate space reduces the average routing path length at the
price of increasing the size of the routing table maintained at each node. Application-
level multicast is one example of a distributed application that has been built on top of
CAN [211]. For a more detailed introduction to CAN the reader is referred to [210] [164]
[158].
Pastry Pastry [223] is a unidimensional DHT that uses prefix based routing. Pastry
assumes that each node is assigned a random, 128-bit node-ID. Node-ID space and key-ID
space are the same and viewed as a circle ranging from 0 to 2128 − 1. Node-IDs and key-
IDs are expressed as a sequence of digits with base 2b (b is a design parameter normally
set to 4). The node with the ID closest to a key in the ID-space is responsible for that
key. Pastry uses three routing tables. In a routing table Tr, each node n maintains
log2bN × 2b− 1 entries to other nodes (where N is the maximum number of nodes in the
network): Each row a (a = 1, . . . , log2bN) in Tr(n) contains 2
b − 1 links to other nodes
that share exactly the first a − 1 digits with n in the node-ID space. In a so-called leaf
set Ts, each node maintains links to l (typically set to 2
b or 2 × 2b) closest nodes in the
ID-space. In each routing hop, the query is forwarded to a node in Tr(nc) which shares
at least one more digit in its prefix with the key than the current hop node nc. If the key
k is within the leaf set of the current hop node (i.e. k ∈ Ts(nc)), the root node for the
key is found and the query is forwarded to the root node. Additionally, each node n has
a neighbour set which contains links to m (typically set to 2b or 2× 2b) nodes which are
close to n not in the ID-space but according to a network proximity metric (e.g. IP-hop
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Figure 2.5: Example of a 2-dimensional CAN Network
distance or IP-layer round-trip-time). The neighbour set enables optimizations such as
proximity neighbour selection [86], where during DHT join or maintenance operations the
links in the normal routing table Tr are filled preferably with nodes that are close on the
underlying routing structure.
Example 2.4: Figure 2.6 shows an example for a routing table Tr of a Pastry node with
a 16-bit node-ID 2201; b = 2, N = 256. In each row, entries share at least a − 1 digits
with node 2201. Further, each column contains nodes with a specific digit at position a
which is different than the digit at position a of node 2201. The nodes in parentheses
(2202), (2203) in the fourth row are supposed to indicate that there might not be such
nodes with the required node-ID in the network (e.g. in case there are currently less than
256 nodes in the network).
Routing in Pastry succeeds after a maximum of log2bN hops [223]. Applications based
on Pastry which have been suggested include large-scale distributed file storage [110], a
publish/subscribe system [224], a cooperative messaging system [178], and application-
level multicast [85]. Tapestry [293] is a DHT which has certain similarities to Pastry,
e.g. routing is prefix based. Applications built on top of Tapestry include a large-scale
distributed file storage system (called Oceanstore) [215], application-level multicast [296],
and a decentralised spam-prevention system [295].
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Figure 2.6: Routing Table Tr of a Pastry Node with Node-ID 2201 in a Network with
256 Nodes
Chord Chord [267] uses the IP-address of a node as its external identifier (eID). A
predefined, cryptographic hash function hChord() (i.e. SHA-1 [28] as suggested in [267],
but in principle other collision-resistant hash functions could be used) maps any eID
onto an m-bit node-ID n and also any key onto an m-bit key-ID k, n = hChord(eID)
and k = hChord(key). Thus, for Chord we have: I = K (m = l) and fkey−mapping() =
fnode−mapping() = hChord() = SHA-1(). SHA-1 has the property of collision-resistance.
This property of the hash function is needed to guarantee load balancing for consistent
hashing [147] with high probability [266]. A virtual ring is the structure for the node
identifier space I. In this ring the nodes are ordered clockwise from 0 to 2m−1 according
to their node-ID n. Each node in the ring is responsible for storing the content of all
key-IDs that are equal to or less than its own identifier but larger than the identifier of the
node’s direct predecessor in the Chord ring. For reliability against node failures, the data
for k is also stored at r− 1 nodes directly succeeding rootk in the ring. When nodes join
or leave the network, data items get re-assigned by neighbouring nodes in the node-ID
space (through a so-called stabilize function which is frequently executed by nodes).
Formally, we have for Chord:
fdata−placement(k) = k, ∀k ∈ K (2.3)
since I = K and fkey−mapping() = fnode−mapping() = hChord(). Further, the root node
for a given key with key-ID k is defined as follows:
rootk = succ(k) (2.4)
where
succ(x) =
{
no ∈ N| (no ≥ x ∧ (¬∃np ∈ N|no > np ≥ x)) ∃no ∈ N|no ≥ x
no ∈ N| (no ≤ x ∧ (¬∃np ∈ N|no > np)) otherwise
(2.5)
succ() returns the successor node for any node or key in the Chord ring. The successor
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can informally be described as “If identifiers are represented as a circle of numbers from
0 to 2m...1, then successor(k) is the first node clockwise from k.” [267]. Note that the
clockwise successor of a node or key is defined across 2m− 1 in the ring, i.e. the successor
of a node or key clockwise closest to 2m− 1 in the ID-space is the node with the smallest
node-ID in the ID-space (compare definition 2.5).
In its routing table Tr each node n stores links to m succeeding nodes in the ring.
The jth entry in Tr contains the IP-address of the first node that follows n by at least
2j−1 in the virtual ring:
frouting−table(n) =[
succ((n+ 20)mod 2m), succ((n+ 21)mod 2m), ..., succ((n+ 2m−1)mod 2m)
]
(2.6)
The first entry in Tr is the node directly succeeding n. The last entry in Tr contains
a link to a node at least 2
m
2
away from n in the ring. Routing is greedy : nodes forward
messages to the node with the highest ID in their routing table that is smaller than the
key-ID. Routing succeeds when the direct successor of a node has a larger ID than the
key-ID k. This successor node is responsible for the key with key-ID k, i.e. this node is
rootk. In Chord, ϑ =
1
2
logN is the mean hop length of a routing path [164].
Additionally, each node keeps a link to its direct predecessor in the ring. Further,
each node keeps a list of its s direct successors, Ts, to handle node failures. It is precisely
specified how routing tables are filled, making routing tables in Chord constrained. This
protects against certain attacks on routing tables [84] [251]. We will examine these attacks
and how Chord protects against them closer in Chapter 4.
In Chord, any lookup has to pass the predecessor of the node storing the content
for the key looked up. This is also referred to as the shield problem [184] [246] and a
consequence of unidirectional greedy routing. We denote the predecessor of rootk with
shieldk for any key k. We will look into the shield problem in more detail in Chapter 4.
Chord can route iteratively or recursively. With iterative routing a contacted node
ni returns the closest node to the key k from its routing table, node nj, to the querying
node. The querying node then contacts nj to iteratively get closer to the key. With
recursive routing a query is forwarded directly from ni to nj. nj continues to route the
query recursively, until it reaches rootk.
Example 2.5: Figure 2.7 shows iterative routing in a Chord network of size m = 6
[246]. In the routing tables displayed the rightmost column shows to which other nodes in
the DHT links exist. The two leftmost columns point out how to compute precisely which
node is in the particular routing table entry, i.e. determining the value where the first node
‘succeeding’ this value in the ring must be in that routing table entry. In this example, a
query node with node-ID 8, n8, starts a lookup for key-ID k = 57. It starts an iterative
lookup by sending a message to the node in its routing table that has a node-ID closest
to but not larger than k which is n46 in this example 〈1〉. n46 replies by returning to n8
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Figure 2.7: Iterative Routing in Chord
the node with the highest node-ID from its routing table not larger than the key-ID which
is n55 in this example 〈2〉. n8 sends out a query message to n55 〈3〉. n55 determines that
the first node in its routing table, i.e. its direct successor in the ring, has a node-ID (59)
which is higher than the key-ID (57). n55 concludes that this node must be responsible for
key-ID 57, i.e. it must be root57, and returns n59 to the query node n8 〈4〉. To retrieve the
data item for key-ID 57, n8 contacts n59 〈5〉 which answers by sending the corresponding
data item to n8 〈6〉.
Many different applications have been proposed on top of Chord. For instance, an
approach for using Chord to build a decentralised version of the Domain Name System
(DNS) has been suggested in [99]. A distributed file-system built on top of Chord has
been proposed in [103]. Other examples of applications researchers have designed on top
of Chord are decentralised VoIP [252], a DHT-based version of the online citation index
CiteSeer [268], or a DHT-based version of the Usenet [257].
2.1.4 Security Challenges for Distributed Hash Tables
Our main focus is the security of structured P2P Systems, and more specifically Dis-
tributed Hash Tables. However, some general attacks on P2P systems are relevant to
DHTs as well. In principle, nodes in a P2P network must be regarded as not trustwor-
thy and attacker nodes may drop, modify, or misroute messages. This opens the door
to a broad range of attacks. Thus, in general it cannot be guaranteed that nodes in a
DHT-network behave according to the DHT-protocol. Douceur has shown that in any
distributed system without some form of a central entity for identity assertion, attackers
are able to create virtual, fake identities [109]. Thus, decentralised authentication of
participating nodes is a challenge for any P2P application. Further, due to the dynamic
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nature of P2P systems (e.g. nodes can join and leave the network frequently) and the
lack of central entities on routing paths, many existing security solutions are not (or at
least not directly) applicable to P2P networks.
Sit and Morris were one of the first to analyse the security challenges for Distributed
Hash Tables [256]. They classify attacks on DHTs into routing attacks, storage and
retrieval attacks, and miscellaneous attacks. For routing, they consider “incorrect lookup
routing”, where an adversary node forwards DHT routing messages to a false or non-
existing node. In addition, with “incorrect routing updates”, adversary nodes poison the
routing tables of other nodes by returning incorrect, malicious nodes when new nodes join
or during DHT maintenance messages. Further, Sit and Morris recognise that partitioning
attacks are possible, where a newly joining nodes gets fooled into joining a forged network.
Regarding the correct storage and retrieval of data items in the DHT, Sit and Morris
point out that in principle any node in the DHT can deny access to data items for keys
it is responsible for. In addition, nodes can return falsified data items for keys they are
responsible for. Other attacks they consider are targeted Denial-of-Service attacks on
single DHT nodes (e.g. through message flooding) or parts of the DHT (e.g. through fast
joining and leaving of adversary nodes, overloading DHT maintenance operations).
Wallach provides a study on P2P security challenges with a focus on DHTs [280].
Similarly to Sit and Morris [256], he mainly classifies the security challenges into routing
and storage and discusses similar attacks as in [256].
Castro et al. [84] show that in order to achieve a secure DHT routing service, one
must guarantee three properties: 1) Secure node-ID assignment, 2) Protection against
routing table poisoning, and 3) Secure message forwarding.
Below we explain the previously mentioned and other attacks on DHTs known in
the literature and discuss the corresponding research challenges. Further, we summarise
the most important existing approaches to mitigate these well-known attacks. For an
exhaustive survey of DHT security techniques presented in the literature, the reader is
referred to [278].
Sybil attacks and secure node-ID assignment In the absence of a central authority
in a P2P network, there is no authentication and nodes cannot trust each other. This
enables identity spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, or denial-of-service attacks. The
lack of a trusted authority enables a single adversary to control a large fraction of an
overlay network with only a few external identities, a so-called Sybil attack [109]. Thus,
one major DHT security challenge is to impede an attacker from gaining a large number
of virtual node-IDs in the network. A related problem is secure bootstrapping: how can
a node which joins the network be sure that the initial node it uses to join the overlay
(the bootstrap node) is not controlled by an adversary?
To counter Sybil attacks several mechanisms for secure node-ID assignment have
been proposed. Secure node-ID assignment has the goal to ensure “uniform random
distribution of node-IDs that cannot be controlled by an attacker” [84]. In addition,
secure node-ID assignment should prevent Sybil attacks by stopping an attacker from
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creating an extremely large number of node-IDs in relation to the number of external IDs
controlled by the attacker. Cuevas et al. present a centralised node-id assignment service
that uses a low discrepancy sequence (LDS) in order to provide random node identifier
assignment in a Chord DHT even under high churn [101]. However, their approach does
not provide any protection against Sybil attacks. Castro et al. suggest the use of a
public key infrastructure to ensure randomness of node-IDs and to prevent Sybil attacks
[84]. Certificate authorities issue random node-IDs along with node-ID certificates. To
prevent Sybil attacks, they propose to either charge for certificates or to bind certificates
to physical identities.
A more decentralised approach for secure node-ID assignment is to use computational
puzzles, as proposed e.g. by Baumgart [65] or Borisov [72]. Such an approach makes the
generation of valid node-IDs computationally very expensive, hence potentially mitigating
Sybil attacks. Danezis et al. present an approach that generates a bootstrap graph among
nodes that joined a DHT to protect against Sybil attacks [106]. They propose a technique
called diversity routing that tries to balance the number of times each node on the
bootstrap graph of a particular query node is used during DHT routing. Thus, this
approach tries to mitigate the effect of Sybil attacks by not using any node on the bootstrap
graph disproportionally high compared to other nodes.
Awerbuch and Scheideler consider so-called Join-Leave attacks [55]. Assuming that
the node-ID function fnode−mapping() of a DHT assigns node-IDs randomly on the node
identifier space I, attackers can still intensively populate a certain interval in I by re-
peatedly leaving and re-joining the DHT for every assigned node-ID which is not in the
desired interval. They show analytically that in principle it is possible to design dis-
tributed algorithms that can make fnode−mapping() of a DHT secure against Join-Leave
attacks [55] and further present some concrete algorithms [54] [227]. Fiat et al. consider
similar attacks they refer to as Byzantine Join attacks [114]. They present a concrete
decentralised extension to Chord to prevent such attacks.
Eclipse attacks and routing table poisoning Even if an attacker controls only a
certain fraction of nodes in the network, he can still aim at influencing DHT routing
disproportionate to the number of nodes he controls. For instance, an attacker can try to
populate other nodes’ routing tables disproportionately high with links to nodes under
his control. Singh et al. refer to such attacks as Eclipse attacks: “In an Eclipse attack,
a modest number of malicious nodes conspire to fool correct nodes into adopting the
malicious nodes as their peers, with the goal of dominating the neighbour sets of all correct
nodes” [251]. Sometimes, such behaviour is also referred to as routing table poisoning
[98] because essentially such attacks have the objective of maliciously influencing (hence
poison) the selection of routing table entries by non-adversary nodes.
Castro et al. suggest the use of Constrained Routing Tables against routing table
poisoning. They introduce an additional routing table T˜r to Pastry. In this constrained
routing table, T˜r, nodes are only accepted as entries if they are closest to a certain point
in the node-ID space I. Thus, routing table poisoning for the constrained routing table
T˜r is not possible with arbitrary node-IDs. Castro et al. provide modified algorithms for
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join and routing table maintenance operations with constrained routing tables.
Singh et al. propose a technique where nodes try to choose neighbours that do not
have significantly more DHT-links (inbound or outbound) to other nodes than the average
node in order to mitigate Eclipse attacks [251]. They show analytically and through
simulations that their solution called anonymous auditing can effectively protect against
Eclipse attacks.
Condie et al. propose a technique they refer to as induced churn against routing ta-
ble poisoning attacks [98]. Essentially, their technique combines a) periodic resetting of
routing-tables, b) unpredictable node-ID assignment, and c) a rate limit on routing-table
updates. They introduce a central entity called timed randomness service, which fre-
quently provides the system with a verifiable, random identifer. This frequently changing
nonce is included in the process of node-ID generation, i.e. as input to fnode−mapping().
Nodes are frequently required to obtain a new node-ID, hence the term induced churn.
By making node-IDs random and at the same time frequently changing them, attackers
cannot maintain a steady location in the node-ID space, I. This prevents attackers from
increasing their presence in other nodes’ routing tables over time (e.g. by using forged
DHT maintenance messages). The proposed mechanisms have been evaluated on top
of the Bamboo DHT [216], a modified version of Pastry. The results show that induced
churn effectively prevents attackers from conducting coordinated routing table poisoning.
It is noteworthy that Eclipse attacks are not a concern in DHTs which impose tight
constraints on node-IDs for routing tables entries, such as Chord or CAN [256] [84] [251].
These DHTs have constrained routing tables built-in within their design, and hence
routing table poisoning attacks are not a concern for these DHTs.
Secure DHT routing and message forwarding A core problem for any DHT under
attack is routing. In principle, an adversary node on the path from the query node to
some key can drop the message, alter the message, or route the message to another
adversary node. Secure routing techniques try to ensure that a message will reach the
root for a key, even in the presence of adversary nodes.
Srivatsa and Liu [261] provide a theoretical investigation of DHT routing attacks.
They present an analytical study as well as simulation results regarding the lookup success
of DHT routing for CAN and Chord. Their study provides insight into the effect of
independent routing paths, detection of invalid lookups, and result caching on protecting
DHTs against routing attacks.
Castro et al. enhance Pastry with multipath recursive routing [84]. In addition, they
introduce routing failure tests that can detect malicious nodes based on the density (in
the node-ID space) of node-IDs within routing tables. Their simulation results show that
their techniques can reach all replica roots for a given DHT key with a success rate of
0.999 in case of less than 30% attackers.
Baumgart and Mies suggest routing extensions to Kademlia that provide disjoint, and
thus independent, lookup paths [65]. Their simulation results show that their technique
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can achieve a lookup success rate of 99% in networks with up to 20% attackers.
Techniques for secure DHT routing in Chord have been proposed by Danezis et al.
[106], Artigas et al. [49], and Marti et al. [167]. We will inspect these works and the
methodologies used as evaluation closely in Chapter 4; we postpone a detailed description
of the mechanisms proposed in [167] [106] [49] to Section 4.5.
Attacks on storage/retrieval and security of data items Another problem DHTs
face is data integrity. Let us assume routing succeeds and the querying node receives
some data item as a result to a lookup for a key. How can the query node assure that
the data item is correct, i.e. that the data indeed belongs to the key and that it has not
been altered since storage?
Data integrity can be achieved by cryptographically signing data, either in conjunction
with a public key infrastructure or through self-certifying data. When data is signed,
nodes can cryptographically verify the integrity of data they received from the DHT.
With self-certifying data, integrity can be verified without relying on a trusted third
party. This property can be achieved by statically binding data items to a private/public
key pair, e.g. by representing data as the hash of a public key [50].
The general use of self-certifying data in DHTs has been suggested by Castro et al.
[84] and Sit and Morris [256]. Dabek et al. present CFS, a distributed file system based
on Chord which uses self-certifying path names [103]. A self-certifying URI-scheme for
DHT-based multimedia communication session establishment has been proposed in [239]
(we will present this scheme in detail in Chapter 5). Baumgart presents a scheme for
secure DHT node-ID generation based on self-certifying node-IDs [63].
Other threats and challenges Other attacks on DHTs include free-riding, i.e. nodes
using services without providing services to other nodes. Cuevas et al. investigate routing
fairness in Chord and present enhancements to increase the fairness of routing load among
Chord nodes [102].
A different security challenge for DHTs is lookup privacy, i.e. providing anonymous
communications regarding the initiator and target key of lookups which nodes perform.
McLachlan et al. present Torsk [173], a relay selection and directory service for the
Tor anonymity network [108]. Their design includes a mechanism for an anonymous
DHT lookup which is based on a randomly selected buddy node which performs the
lookup on behalf of the original query node. Panchenko et al. propose algorithms for
communication anonymity on top of iterative Chord routing [195]. By retrieving the
entire routing table at each iterative routing hop, the query node does not disclose the
lookup key to intermediate routing nodes, thereby hiding the target of lookups. Wang
and Borisov present Octopus, an anonymous DHT lookup scheme [283]. Their approach
is based on Onion routing [213] and additionally uses dummy queries to disguise the
target key of lookups. Fessi et al. present an approach for privacy-preserving DHT-based
real-time communication session establishment [112]. Their approach also uses Onion
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Routing [213] to establish tunnels to protect nodes’ and users’ privacy. The entry point
to such a privacy tunnel is stored as a data item in the DHT.
2.2 Session Establishment for Real-Time Communi-
cations
This section explains signalling for client-server based Multimedia Communications (also
referred to as Real-Time Communications). In particular, we will examine the session
establishment process for multimedia communication applications running over IP net-
works. First, a general introduction to IP-based multimedia communications and in
particular VoIP is given (2.2.1), highlighting the differences between packet-switched sig-
nalling and circuit-switched signalling (the latter being used in the PSTN, the Public
Switched Telephone Network). This introduction is followed by a more detailed descrip-
tion of how real-time communication and session establishment (the focus of our work)
can be facilitated with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [222] (2.2.2). Finally, we
list threats for client/server-based multimedia communication systems and provide a sur-
vey on the state of the art regarding research and approaches for securing such systems
(2.2.3).
Real-time requirements Multimedia communication applications—such as instant
messaging (text), Voice-over-IP (audio), or Video-over-IP (video)—often have real-time
requirements. Therefore, in the literature these types of applications are commonly sub-
sumed under the term Real-Time Communications [93]. We refer to multimedia commu-
nication applications with certain timing constraints as real-time communication appli-
cations, as described in [44] as follows:
“Many ... services, such as voice, video and other applications, will have strin-
gent real-time constraints and will demand not only high-bandwidths, but a
predictable quality-of-service (QOS) ... Traditional communication network
applications such as file transfer, electronic mail and remote login are exam-
ples of non-real-time applications for which the performance metrics of interest
are typically average message packet delay and throughput. The character-
istics of real-time communication applications differ significantly from those
of non-real-time applications. As in real-time computing, the distinguishing
feature of real-time communication is the fact that the value or utility of the
communication depends upon the times at which messages are successfully
delivered to the destination application. Typically, the desired delivery time
for each message across the network is bounded by a specific maximum delay
or latency, resulting in a deadline being associated with each message. ... this
delay bound is an application-layer, end-to-end timing constraint. If a mes-
sage arrives at the destination after its deadline has expired, its value to the
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end application may be greatly reduced. ... Without loss of generality, gen-
erally only the queueing delay is considered, as the packetization, switching
and propagation delays are assumed known and fixed.” [44]
Real-time communication applications are different from real-time computing even
though the term real-time implies some similarities. Real-time communication refers to
applications where instances need to communicate in real-time over a network. In short,
real-time communication applications can be characterised by two properties: First, a
maximum delay applies to communication messages sent across the network. Second,
this maximum delay is an application-layer, end-to-end delay. Real-time communication
applications can be further classified into soft or hard real-time communications: “Real-
time communication applications are commonly classified as either soft or hard real-time.
Soft real-time applications can tolerate some amount of lost messages, while hard real-
time applications have zero loss tolerance.”[44]. In this thesis we are only concerned with
soft real-time communication applications, i.e. lost messages are to some extent tolerable
and can be compensated for by resending messages. We therefore refer to soft real-time
communication applications simply as real-time communication applications.
Voice-over-IP as typical application A prototypical example of a popular and
widely deployed real-time communication application is Voice-over-IP (VoIP). In this
thesis, we use the term Voice-over-IP (VoIP) to comprise the transmission of digitised
voice over an IP-based network in real-time. The audio signal may be digitised and
encoded either before or concurrently with packetisation [122]. As other real-time com-
munication applications, VoIP has only soft real-time requirements [44]. We will use
VoIP as a prototypical real-time communication application in this thesis to illustrate
key concepts, signalling and session establishment for multimedia communications, and
the corresponding security threats. Further, we will frequently use VoIP and related
terms such as caller and callee to exemplify our proposed solutions. However, it is im-
portant to notice that the signalling and in particular the session establishment process
to set up multimedia communications is mostly independent of the actual communication
medium (such as audio/voice). Therefore, the concepts we explain below in this section
as well as the solutions we propose in the remainder of this thesis apply to any kind of
session-based multimedia communication application, not only VoIP.
We refer to systems where user-clients need dedicated servers to determine the location
of a multimedia communication partner as client/server-based real-time communication
systems. In contrary, there exist research proposals to locate the callee of a multimedia
communication with a P2P-network without any server involved in the process of de-
termining the address of the callee. We refer to this approach as P2P-SIP or P2PSIP
because such an approach solely affects the signalling part of real-time communications
(or other session-based multimedia applications) and SIP is the signalling protocol used
almost exclusively in research and standardisation efforts for this approach.
29
2.2.1 Introduction to IP-based Multimedia Communications
In recent years, the digitised transmission of audio signals over IP-based networks—
commonly called Voice-over-IP (VoIP)—has emerged to a widely used application. VoIP
is one example application for session-based communication with real-time constraints. In
addition, instant messaging (chatting) and user-to-user video calls (or video conferences
among multiple users) comprised of an audio and a parallel video stream are popular
real-time communication applications. Below we focus our introduction somewhat on
VoIP: The comparison of VoIP to traditional circuit-switched audio transmission makes
a good case for illustrating some key characteristics of IP-based real-time communications
(which also affect security). The general concepts described below regarding separation of
signalling and payload and the corresponding protocols apply to any kind of multimedia
communication.
For VoIP, in real-time usually is defined as the acceptable threshold for end-to-end
delay of audio packets sent between participants of a call being 400ms7 [29]. However,
this thesis is mostly not concerned with the exchange of audio packets but only with
signalling and more specifically the session establishment part of signalling. For VoIP
session establishment, in real-time refers to the timing constraint on the delay of a session
establishment request reaching the callee of a call after the caller has sent it off. This
delay is less stringent than the maximum end-to-end delay for audio packets. A call setup
delay in the range of several seconds is usually considered acceptable (e.g. 8s [30]).
In contrary to traditional telephone networks in the PSTN, VoIP traffic—because it
uses IP networks as the underlying technology—is transmitted not via circuit-switched
but packet-switched networks. Thus, audio signals get transported in single packets which
do not traverse a predefined route in the network between the sender and the receiver.
Additionally, one of the fundamental characteristics of VoIP is the separation of signalling
and media transfer. This means that the transmission of signalling messages (in order to
set-up a session, negotiate parameters, or terminate a session) and the transmission of
the payload (i.e. the actual transmission of digitised voice via IP-packets) is handled by
different protocols and can take different routes in the network.
In general, multimedia communication implies that audio or video signals are digitised
at some point in the network and then forwarded to the destination via IP-networks. How-
ever, neither the origin nor the destination must necessarily support digital audio/video
signals or have an IP-interface. Instead, gateways on the path between sender and receiver
can transform audio signals from digital to analog and vice-versa.
A signalling protocol is used to establish, negotiate, manage, and terminate a real-
time communication session. The most widely used signalling protocols are the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) standardised by the IETF [222] or H.323 [39] which is defined by
the ITU. Both protocols offer similar functionality. While H.323 is still widely deployed
7ITU-T Recommendation G.114 recommends one-way transmission time limits for connections with
adequately controlled echo as follows: 0 to 150 ms: acceptable for most user applications; 150 to 400 ms:
acceptable for international connections; 400 ms: unacceptable for general network planning purposes.
[29] [122]
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Figure 2.8: VoIP Layers and Protocols [111]
it seems that SIP is more and more preferred for new deployments and will dominate the
market [203]. SIP has been selected as the core signalling protocol in the ETSI/TISPAN
NGN [36] and in the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS) standardised by
3GPP [119] [31] [82]. For SIP, either TCP or UDP can be used as the transport pro-
tocol [222]. A detailed comparison of H.323 and SIP can be found in [122]. A detailed
description of how VoIP signalling can be facilitated with SIP is given in 2.2.2.
Once a session has been set-up, a different protocol is used for transmitting the actual
multimedia payload packets. Example protocols for transporting real-time multimedia
data and providing QoS feedback are the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) [232] or
the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) [234] which offers controlling the delivery of
streaming media. Due to the real-time requirements of multimedia communications, UDP
is the preferred transport protocol for the transmission of the payload.
Figure 2.8 shows the layering of several IETF protocols which are commonly used
for VoIP [111] (the same protocol stack can also be used for other real-time communica-
tion applications than VoIP). While RTP solely uses UDP as a transport protocol, SIP
messages can be transported via either UDP or TCP. SIP uses the Session Description
Protocol (SDP) [125] to select the type of media and to negotiate a codec for media
transmission. The Real-Time Control Protocol (RTCP) [232] is a control protocol for
RTP sessions.
Differences between Voice-over-IP and the PSTN VoIP networks and the trans-
mission of audio signals over these networks are characterised by some important differ-
ences if compared to the PSTN. In short, these differences are the following [203] [238]
[240]:
 Due to the nature of packet-switched networks, with VoIP audio signals that belong
to a single call can take different routes in the network and may traverse different
(or even a disjoint set) of intermediate hops. Circuit-switched networks, as used in
the PSTN, set up a route between participants of a conversation which is used for
all audio signals that belong to a call.
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 In the PSTN, signalling is done in a separate and closed network. With VoIP,
signalling is done in an open, highly insecure network (e.g. the Internet).
 Traditional telephones are simple devices with limited functionality. VoIP termi-
nals, on the other hand, are complex devices with their own TCP/IP stack.
 VoIP offers mobility: users can change their location and still use the same identity
in the network. A VoIP-user only needs access to the Internet. By contrast, in the
PSTN there is no mobility.
 Because there is no mobility in the PSTN, authentication is not necessary. Anybody
who has physical access to a socket in the wall can use that line. As VoIP can be
used from anywhere in the Internet, additional authentication must be utilised.
A more in-depth introduction to VoIP and the resulting research challenges can be
found in [122].
2.2.2 Signalling with SIP
Much of the evolution of VoIP to a now widely used application is owed to the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP). SIP is an IETF standard for signalling in multimedia com-
munications over IP [222], i.e. a signalling protocol for real-time communications. Here
we describe the basic elements of SIP and give examples of SIP operation to establish
communication sessions. For a more detailed description of SIP and an introduction to
advanced services with SIP the reader is referred to [255].
SIP Request Description
INVITE Initiates a call signalling sequence
ACK Acknowledge
CANCEL Used to cancel a request in progress
BYE Terminates a session
OPTIONS Queries an entity about its capabilities
REGISTER Used to register location information at a registrar
Table 2.1: SIP Requests
SIP messages SIP is a client-server protocol similar to HTTP. Signalling in SIP is
based on (ASCII compatible) text messages. A message is composed of a message header
and an optional message body. Messages are either requests or responses. The SIP
specification in RFC 3261 [222] specifies six types of requests: INVITE (initiates a call
signalling sequence), BYE (terminates a session), ACK (acknowledge), OPTIONS (querying
of capabilities), CANCEL (cancelling a request in progress), and REGISTER (used to register
location information at a registrar). When a SIP entity receives a request, it performs
the corresponding action and sends back a response to the originator of the request.
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Responses are three-digit status codes (as in HTTP/1.1), categorised into six classes
(e.g. 3xx for redirect messages). Examples for response codes are 180-ringing, 200-ok,
or 302-moved temporarily. Table 2.1 lists SIP requests; Table 2.2 lists classes for SIP
response codes.
Response Code Class
1xx informational
2xx ok
3xx redirection
4xx client error
5xx server error
6xx global failure
Table 2.2: SIP Response Codes
Addressing Addressing in SIP is done with Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs). A
SIP-URI is similar to an e-mail address and generally of the type sip:user@domain.
Users can register their location at a special SIP-entity (a so-called SIP registrar) by
sending a message that binds their SIP-URI to their current location (e.g. IP-address
and port). This binding gets stored by the registrar at a location server which can be
used for location lookup by other SIP entities. For locating the location server of a
domain, SIP relies on DNS [221]. The static SIP-URI of a user is called address-of-record
(for example bob@example.de). The current location of the user is also stored as a
URI, the so-called contact address (for example bob@192.168.2.1:5060). Generalising
this concept, we will denote the SIP address-of-record as the SIP-URI and the contact
address as the user location.
Listing 2.1: Example of a SIP INVITE Message [135]
INVITE s ip :7170 @ipte l . org SIP /2 .0
Via : SIP /2.0/UDP 195 . 3 7 . 7 7 . 1 0 0 : 5 0 4 0 ; rpor t
Max−Forwards : 10
From : ” j i r i ” <s i p : j i r i @ i p t e l . org>; t a g i=76 f f7a07−c091−4192−84a0−d56e91 fe104 f
To : <s i p : j i r i@ba t . i p t e l . org>
Call−ID : d10815e0−bf17−4afa−8412−d9130a793d96@213 . 2 0 . 1 2 8 . 3 5
CSeqi : 2 INVITE
Contact : <s i p :213 .20 .128 .35 :9315 >
User−Agent : Windows RTC/1.0
Proxy−Author izat ion : Digest username=” j i r i ” , realm=” i p t e l . org ” ,
a lgor i thm=”MD5” , u r i=”s i p : j i r i@ba t . i p t e l . org ” ,
nonce=”3cef753900000001771328f5ae1b8b7f0d742da1feb5753c ” ,
re sponse=”53 fe98db10e1074
b03b3e06438bda70f ”
Content−Type : app l i c a t i on /sdp
Content−Length : 451
v=0
o=jku2 0 0 IN IP4 213 . 20 . 128 . 35
s=s e s s i o n
c=IN IP4 213 . 20 . 128 . 35
b=CT:1000
t=0 0
m=audio 54742 RTPi/AVP 97 111 112 6 0 8 4 5 3 101
a=rtpmap :97 red /8000
a=rtpmap :111 SIREN/16000
a=fmtp :111 b i t r a t e =16000
a=rtpmap :112 G7221/16000
a=fmtp :112 b i t r a t e =24000
a=rtpmap :6 DVI4/16000
a=rtpmap :0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap :4 G723/8000
a=rtpmap : 3 GSMi/8000
a=rtpmap :101 te lephone−event /8000
a=fmtp :101 0−16
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Figure 2.9: Schematic View of SIP Session Establishment and Locating a Callee [203]
Example 2.6: Listing 2.1 shows an example of a SIP Invite message [135]. The mes-
sage contains several headers and a body with several SDP parameters. The From and
To headers state the SIP-URI of the caller and callee, respectively. The tag in the From
header is chosen by the caller’s user agent to uniquely identify the request. Similarly, the
call-id uniquely identifies the session.
SIP entities SIP designates different (logical) entities: user agent, proxy, registrar,
redirect server, and location server. A User agent is a terminal (hardware or software)
participating in SIP-communications. A user agent which sends out a SIP-request is
referred to as a user agent client (UAC) while a user agent which responds to a request is
referred to as a user agent server (UAS). A proxy receives messages and forwards them
to another SIP entity. A redirect server redirects the sender of the message to another
SIP entity instead of forwarding the message. Users can register their current location
(i.e. IP-address and port) with the registrar of their domain. This enables mobility: A
location server is used by a registrar to store the location of users (the binding of a SIP-
URI with a current IP-address). The location server provides a directory for other SIP
entities to look up the current location for a given SIP-URI.
Example 2.7: Figure 2.9 [203] shows how a callee of a VoIP call can be located with
SIP in a simplified schematic view. In this example, user agent A and B are in different
domains and have different proxies. First, the callee (user agent B) needs to register
with its local registrar (1) to be able to receive calls. The registrar stores the location
information at a location server (2). When user agent A wants to call user agent B, it
sends an INVITE-request to its local SIP-proxy (3) which passes on the request (possibly
after a DNS lookup) to the proxy of user B’s domain (4). The proxy in domain B needs
to look up the IP-address of user agent B at the location server (5, 6) before it can send
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Figure 2.10: SIP Messages Exchanged During Session Establishment
the request to user agent B (7). In this example, the response message for user agent
A takes the same route back (8, 9, 10), possibly for billing purposes. Note that all the
servers are necessary to facilitate mobility of the participating users. Once a session has
been established, the transmission of audio packets via RTP is started (11).
Example 2.8: The set up and cancellation of a voice connection between two users is il-
lustrated in Figure 2.10. It shows the SIP messages (requests and responses) that are being
exchanged if a user with SIP-URI alice@atlanta.com wants to initiate a session with a
user with SIP-URI bob@biloxi.com. In this example, two proxies are involved. The user
agent of alice@atlanta.com sends an INVITE request to the proxy of the atlanta.com
domain (1). The proxy sends back a 100-trying response message (2) and forwards the
INVITE request to the proxy of the biloxy.com domain (3). This proxy responds with
a 100-trying response message to the atlanta.com proxy (4) and forwards the INVITE
request to the user agent for bob@biloxi.com (5). The user agent bob@biloxi.com re-
sponds to the INVITE request first with a 180-ringing message (7), and eventually with
a 200-ok response after a user has picked up the phone (10). Both of these messages are
forwarded to user agent for alice@atlanta.com by the intermediate proxies (8,9,11,12).
Having received the 200-ok, the user agent for alice@atlanta.com can now request the
start of the media transfer by sending an ACK request directly to bob@biloxi.com (not
shown in the picture). Note that a proxy is not needed for this: After a session has been
established, user agents can communicate directly. At the end of the conversation, either
one of the user agents terminates the session by sending a BYE request to its counterpart
(not shown in the picture).
35
SIP Security Mechanisms The SIP standard as specified in RFC 3261 [222] includes
several security mechanisms:
 S/MIME : Because SIP is using MIME for message bodies, S/MIME [208] can be
used to send authenticated and encrypted messages between user agents.8
 Digest Authentication: SIP entities sharing a secret (e.g. a password) can authen-
ticate each other with a challenge-response mechanism. To prevent replay attacks,
this challenge-response authentication includes nonces.
 TLS or IPSec: Hop-by-hop security for SIP signalling can be achieved either on
the transport layer (TLS) [107] or on the network layer (IPsec) [149].
2.2.3 Security Challenges for Multimedia Communication Sig-
nalling
We will focus on VoIP as an application to illustrate attacks and countermeasures for IP-
based multimedia communications. However, as noted previously, the signalling of multi-
media communications is largely independent of the communication medium. Therefore,
most attacks and countermeasures we discuss in this section also apply to other real-time
communication applications.
Most security problems that VoIP faces arise from the significant differences to the
PSTN (see 2.2.1). This is especially true in the consumer market where phone calls
are carried out over the Internet. From the perspective of mobility and authentication,
VoIP is similar to mobile phone networks such as GSM. However, GSM differs from VoIP
because it uses smartcards in terminals and consists of a limited number of providers that
trust each other. Hence, VoIP has its specific security challenges.
Below we provide a non-exhaustive list of threats for multimedia comunication systems
(2.2.3.1). Our focus is on signalling and more specifically on client/server SIP. For a more
exhaustive list of threats to VoIP and SIP the reader is referred to [42] [152] [237] [290].
Further, we provide an overview of the corresponding research challenges and ongoing
work in the area of SIP security (2.2.3.2).
2.2.3.1 Threats for Client/Server-based Real-Time Communication Systems
SIP is an application layer protocol that uses underlying IP networks for setting up
multimedia communications. Thus, all threats that are well-known in IP-networks (e.g.
denial-of-service, spoofing, sniffing, and many more) are inherited. Furthermore, im-
plementation vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer overflows) are likely because SIP servers and
terminals are complex IP-devices [203].
8Even though envisioned by the authors of the SIP specification, S/MIME in conjunction with SIP
is hardly deployed.
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It is well known that the SIP protocol, without any dedicated security mechanisms,
can be attacked in several ways. The SIP specification acknowledges five possible attacks
(cf. [222], pp. 232-236 and [203]):
 Registration hijacking : Registration authorization in SIP is implemented by the reg-
istrar, which checks the FROM header field in the registration message to determine
if the sender is allowed to modify registrations for the identity in the TO header.
As the FROM header field in a SIP-message can easily be altered by any user agent,
malicious registrations are possible if no additional mechanisms are used by the
registrar to authenticate the request.
 Impersonating a SIP server : Attackers can impersonate any SIP server and forge
answers. For instance, any redirect server can impersonate another SIP-server by
forging answers to requests from a user agent to this other server, thereby redirecting
future calls to itself, or to any other SIP server.
 Tampering with message bodies : Any intermediate SIP entity (e.g. proxy server) on
the route from one user agent to another user agent can read messages and also
modify headers as well as message bodies.
 Tearing down sessions : An attacker capable of sniffing and sending packets on
an IP-network can also tear down SIP-sessions by sending forged BYE or CANCEL
messages to either of the participating parties. This can be done by forging the
FROM header field, thus claiming the message is coming from one of the participants
of the session.
 Denial of service: The availability of any SIP-server or user agent can be threatened
by an exorbitant number of requests coming from an attacker, eventually exhausting
the capacity of the targeted server/client to answer requests.
In addition, among others, the following threats arise on the SIP layer [203] [237]:
 Call hijacking : Having seen the contents of an INVITE request, an eavesdropper can
inject a spoofed 200-ok or 302-moved temporarily response, thereby redirecting
calls to another user agent or server. Potentially, this can result in a hijacked call
[237].
 Client impersonation: A malicious attack on a client could install a Trojan horse
which impersonates the client. Such an impersonated client can be used by the
attacker to send out (authenticated) calls or registrations from the client [203].
 Eavesdropping : If an attacker can sniff packets on the network, he has also access
to the content included in the header and body of a SIP-packet, unless encryption
is used [203].
 Spam: Spam-messages (also called SPIT for Spam-over-IP-Telephony) are possible,
where an attacker sends out automatically generated packets to user agents [203]
[220].
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 Billing fraud : Several attacks exist where an attacker tries to charge phone calls to
some victim [292]. For instance, an attacker can modify and replay an intercepted
INVITE request, in order to bill a call to a victim user agent, thus avoiding to pay
for the call [237].
 Traffic logging and analysis : Any SIP-server (and any network node) on the route
between user agents can log the messages it receives during a session. Some users
might not want their connections to be traceable on the entire route from sender
to receiver. However, such logging might in part be necessary for billing purposes
[203].
2.2.3.2 Research Challenges and Approaches to SIP Security
Authentication and identity assertion One of the fundamental problems for SIP
security is end-to-end authentication of communication partners. SIP messages sent
via TLS may pass many application layer hops between sender and receiver, and some
intermediary entities may not be trustworthy. In addition, certificates bind identities
to key pairs—enabling authentication—but certificate verification does not necessarily
assure trustworthiness of the authenticated principals: For instance, a certificate will
usually not provide any assurance about the security policy or the protection against
malicious intrusion the authenticated principal has in place. In other words, mutual
authentication on the entire route between user agents does not guarantee a standard
of security functionality at proxies and redirect servers. Another example is spam (see
below): even authenticated parties might be the source for spam messages [203].
Figure 2.11: End-to-End VoIP Authentication with ZRTP [241]
The SIP community has realised that hop-to-hop security as offered by e.g. TLS is
insufficient for authentication in many cases. RFC 3325 [141] specifies a SIP header in
which a proxy of a domain can assert the identity used in a SIP message. However, this
assertion is not signed. Thus, “The use of these extensions is only applicable inside an
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Figure 2.12: Single-message Denial-of-Service attacks on SIP Devices [242]
administrative domain with previously agreed-upon policies for generation, transport and
usage of such information” [141]. RFC 4474 [201] provides two additional SIP headers
(Identity, Identity-Info). These headers allow a SIP proxy to assert proper authen-
tication of an identity by its domain, by signing such an assertion cryptographically
(so-called identity assertion).
A different approach to end-to-end VoIP authentication is ZRTP [297]. ZRTP is not
a solution on the signalling layer; it enables to securely authenticate communication end-
points after a session has been established, e.g. with SIP. ZRTP enables a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange over an RTP media stream. However, the key exchange is protected against
man-in-the-middle attacks through a short authentication string (called SAS ). Techni-
cally, the SAS is part of the hash of the parameters exchanged in the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. This short authentication string is displayed to the users which can compare
it (thereby detecting attacks) by reading it over the RTP stream. Thus, an attacker
would need to forge the voice of users in real-time in order to still launch an undetected
man-in-the-middle attack on the key exchange. Figure 2.11 shows an example of a key
exchange with ZRTP where two users compare the SAS (which is displayed in their VoIP
client) over a voice media stream. If the SAS is the same on both sides, the key exchange
was successful and secure. In this way, ZRTP offers authentication of a communication
partner (and key exchange) without using any certificate infrastructure [241].
Platform security of terminals and servers Because SIP devices are complex,
implementation weaknesses seem unavoidable. Vulnerabilities for SIP implementations
are found frequently [33]. RFC 4475 [206] describes various test messages that can be
used to torture a SIP implementation. Many simple tools exist to carry out tests on
SIP implementations [19]. More advanced tools offer the construction of sophisticated
test-cases for SIP [24] [270] [286] [40].
As an example of the many works on testing SIP implementations, in [242] SIP phones
have been tested regarding their proper authentication of CANCEL and BYE messages.
Without such message authentication, an attacker may terminate a session while it is
39
being establised or may end an existing session. To distinguish between different sessions,
SIP uses so-called dialog identifiers. A SIP dialog ID is composed of the Call-ID, the
From-tag (contained in the From-header) and the To-tag (contained in the To-header)
[242]. Figure 2.12 [242] shows the establishment of a SIP session including the dialog-ID
components sent between the entities. The Call-ID and the From-tag are set by the caller
and the To-tag by the callee. These tags remain in every SIP message throughout the
dialog, and if a message does not match an existing dialog it should be discarded [243].
Figure 2.12 shows how an attacker Mallory could carry out Cancel and Bye attacks.
However, she would have to know several components of the corresponding dialog in
order to succeed. In [242] and [243] it has been shown that many SIP implementations
do not properly authenticate CANCEL and BYE messages; these implementations can thus
be attacked without having previously sniffed the dialog-ID of an ongoing session.
Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) There are several reasons why Spam over
Internet Telephony (SPIT) can be considered a possible problem for VoIP. Automatic
generation of SIP-based phone calls is feasible and cheap. In addition, VoIP Spam will
be much more intrusive than e-mail Spam is today: A phone will actually ring with each
SPIT occurrence (possibly in the middle of the night). VoIP deals with real-time audio
signals. Thus, many countermeasures which have been successful in fighting e-mail spam
may not work for SPIT.
A comparison to e-mail spam and an overview on possible solutions against SPIT in
SIP networks can be found in [220]. Researchers have proposed innovative algorithms
against SPIT [58] [205]. Also, SIP extensions for feedback on SPIT detection and pre-
vention have been suggested [187] [188] [277]. A prototype for an anti-SPIT solution has
been described in [228] [245]. In [204], the authors describe a holistic solution against
SPIT.
Lawful Interception Most countries legally allow for authorized wiretapping of tele-
phone calls by law enforcement agencies, so-called Lawful Interception. Depending on
the use case and national law, Lawful Interception legislation may apply to VoIP. How-
ever, Lawful Interception for VoIP is much harder than in the PSTN for several reasons.
First, the SIP provider and the Internet Service Provider (ISP) may be different. Second,
signalling and payload usually take a different route; traffic is only linked in terminals.
And third, the signalling and payload of the conversation may be encrypted.
Several scientists have realised the potential problems of Lawful Interception for VoIP.
They have made a proposal arguing that the benefit of Lawful Interception for VoIP may
be outweighed by the negative consequences for society [66]. An analysis of Lawful
Interception for VoIP and potential technical solutions can be found in [209].
Other challenges Users would like to have the privacy of their communications pre-
served. However, some headers of SIP messages must contain information about the
sender’s identity (e.g. contact header). Thus, any SIP-server can log information about
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connection requests and connection termination. Although users might accept this on
some proxies (e.g. for billing purposes), it can be done by any SIP-server on the route
of a SIP-request [203]. A potential solution for providing privacy of SIP messages is
a pseudonymity service [200]. Such a service replaces sensitive headers before passing
messages on; it acts as a transparent user agent in both directions [203].
Emergency calls are another technical challenge for VoIP [233]. Most importantly,
a VoIP identity (e.g. a SIP-URI) cannot be statically allocated to a physical location.
The IETF ECRIT (Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies) working
group is working on technical solutions for using Internet technologies to determine the
geographical location of a user and to conduct reliable call routing in case of emergencies
[127] [271].
2.3 Decentralised Service Location
2.3.1 Service Location as Part of Communication Session Es-
tablishment
In computer science, a service is characterised by a certain functionality it offers. The
syntax of a service is specified by its interfaces. Further, a service usually has a rather
informal associated semantic, e.g. a natural language description of what functionality
the service is supposed to provide. Fischer and Hofer define a service as a “collection of
functionality which is offered via well-defined interfaces” [116]. Similarly, the W3C Web
Services Glossary defines a service as follows: “A service is an abstract resource that
represents a capability of performing tasks that form a coherent functionality from the
point of view of providers entities and requesters entities.” [23].
Tanenbaum and van Steen note that “in distributed systems, services are generally
specified through interfaces” which “specify precisely the names of the functions that are
available together with types of the parameters, return values, ...” [273]. Further, they
note that the semantics are often specified informally “by means of natural language”
[273]. According to this distributed systems perspective, OASIS defines a service as “A
mechanism to enable access to one or more capabilities, where the access is provided
using a prescribed interface and is exercised consistent with constraints and policies as
specified by the service description.” [160]. Our work concerns distributed systems (in
particular the Internet). In this thesis, the term service is therefore seen in the context
of distributed systems. For the course of our work we define a service as follows:
Definition 4 (Service): A Service in a distributed system is a collection
of functionality with an associated semantic which is offered via well-defined
interfaces.
In data communications, a session describes several messages that are exchanged in
an end-to-end connection between communicating entities [153]. For instance, in SIP a
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session is defined as the exchange of data between an association of participants [222].
We refer to a session as an active, temporary connection among two or more entities in
a distributed system in which communication data is exchanged among these entities.
To accesses a service in a distributed system, a session has to be established, so that
a service consumer can access a given service via its interface. Session establishment
thus refers to the process which enables participating entities (i.e. service consumers and
service providers) to establish a session. For real-time communications (see 2.2), sessions
are being established for exchanging content of one communication medium (such as
audio, video, or text) or several such media in parallel. In the case a session is being
set up for real-time communications, we refer to multimedia session establishment or
communication session establishment.
Service Location To establish a (communication) session in a distributed system, the
location of the destination on the network needs to be determined by the initiator of the
session. In computer networks, addresses are used to specify a certain location on the
network [262]. Computers use addressing so that a source of data communications can
“indicate the identity of the intended destination” [262]. In practise, on the Internet, the
combination of an IP address and a port number is used for addressing. Humans cannot
easily remember long numerical addresses. Name resolution can resolve human-readable
names to addresses: Given a string-like identifier, it returns the corresponding address.
When the address being resolved is the location of a service, we refer to the name resolu-
tion process as service location. We can define service location as part of communication
session establishment:
Definition 5 (Service Location): Service Location is the sub-process of
the session establishment process which is responsible for determining the lo-
cation of a given service. It takes as input an identifier for a known service
and works on an Internet scale. It returns the location for the desired service.
This sub-process of session establishment is sometimes also called user location [222]
because for some applications (e.g. Voice-over-IP) the user’s mobility requires the frequent
necessity to determine the current end system to be used for communication. However,
from a technical perspective also for these applications it is the service of accepting and
answering to a session establishment request which is offered by the callee of a Voice-
over-IP phone call (this fact is also reflected by the SIP notion of a user agent server as
the SIP entity that receives communication requests from a user agent client).
Service location assumes that the initator of the session knows about the service and
has a corresponding identifier (e.g. a URL/URI). This distinguishes service location from
service discovery (see related concepts below). Internet scale means that service location
is not restricted to a single network or only works within an administrative domain.
For the process of service location as part of establishing a real-time communication
session, the real-time constraints might not be as stringent as for the actual data transfer
within an established session. For instance, for VoIP the maximum delay to establish a
session is considered to be 8s [30], while the maximum delay for an RTP packet to arrive
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within a session is 400ms [29]. Nevertheless, for most applications there is a maximum
delay (e.g. in the order of seconds) on session establishment and hence also on service
location. Thus service location has —in many cases—real-time requirements (i.e. “If a
message arrives at the destination after its deadline has expired, its value to the end
application may be greatly reduced.” [44]).
The Domain Name System (DNS) A typical example of a system for service lo-
cation is the Domain Name System (DNS) [179] [180]. Essentially, DNS constitutes a
“directory lookup service that provides a mapping between the name of a host on the
Internet and its numerical address” [262]. Many Internet applications use DNS to de-
termine the location of service endpoints. For instance, SIP uses DNS to locate the SIP
server in the domain of the callee [221].
DNS is an application-layer client-server protocol [153]. A hierarchical name-space is
used, based on the concept of domains. A domain describes a group of hosts that are
under the same administrative control [262]. Domains are organized in a hierarchical
tree. For instance, amazon.com is a subdomain of the .com domain. Name servers are
used to resolve hostnames to locations. So-called DNS root servers are responsible for
the top-level domains. Other name servers are responsible for a certain sub-domain. The
name server which stores the actual hostname-to-location binding for a given hostname
is called the authoritative name server for that hostname.
Mappings are stored in so-called Resource Records (RRs), e.g. the mapping between
a hostname (e.g. a URL) and its current location (e.g. its IP-address). Depending on
the type of a Resource Record, it stores the actual location for a hostname (Type=A), or
a mapping to an authoritative name server for a domain (Type=NS)9. The latter type is
used to traverse the domain hierarchy towards the authoritative name server for a given
domain.
To resolve a hostname, typically a query to a local name server is sent. If this name
server is not authoritative, the query is forwarded according to the domain hierarchy until
it reaches the authoritative name server. Name servers use caching extensively to be able
to respond to queries directly without the need to forward them. For a more detailed
description of how the Domain Name System works the reader is referred to [262] [153].
DNS is a distributed system: the hostname-to-location bindings are distributed among
name servers all around the world. However, the domain hierarchy implies that certain
nameservers are more important to its overall function than others. In fact, there have
been attacks on the DNS root servers [37], exemplifying that these root servers form a
single point of failure within the DNS. Thus, the DNS —as used today on the Internet—is
not a fully decentralised system. From the perspective of decentralisation, it is merely
a distributed database; request routing follows the client-server paradigm with central
entities playing a major role.
9Other RR types exist; we omit the description of these for brevity.
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Related concept: service discovery A related—but different—concept to service
location is service discovery. Service discovery targets the automatic detection and dis-
covery of not precisely defined services. Moreover, service discovery is—not necessarily
per definition, but de-facto—limited to local area networks because underlying techniques
and assumptions are not supported or valid on an Internet scale. Service location, on the
other hand, assumes that a given identifier (e.g. a URI/URL) is used to determine the
location (e.g. network address) of a particular service. In contrary to existing approaches
for service discovery (which in practise only work in local area networks, due e.g. to the
fact that they are based on IP-multicast), service location has the objective to function
on an Internet-scale.
Several protocols for service discovery in local area networks exist. The Service Loca-
tion Protocol (SLP) [124] enables the discovery of network services in local area networks
(LANs): “Traditionally, users have had to find services by knowing the name of a net-
work host (a human readable text string) which is an alias for a network address. SLP
eliminates the need for a user to know the name of a network host supporting a ser-
vice. Rather, the user supplies the desired type of service and a set of attributes which
describe the service. Based on that description, the Service Location Protocol resolves
the network address of the service for the user.” [124]. Different to our definition of
service location, SLP hence aims at discovering loosely-defined services that are being
announced in the network, instead of locating a particular service based on an accurate
identifier. Further, SLP targets local networks and does not work on an Internet scale
(“SLP is intended to function within networks under cooperative administrative control.
Such networks permit a policy to be implemented regarding security, multicast routing
and organization of services and clients into groups which are not be feasible on the scale
of the Internet as a whole.”[124]).
Bonjour is a so-called zeroconf protocol that enables to discover services on a local
area network without explicit identification of such services by the user (so-called Service
Instance Enumeration or network browsing [91]). It is technically based on so-called
multicast DNS [92] and DNS based service discovery (DNS-SD) [91]. Multicast DNS
enables name resolution without a DNS server by having requests being sent to a multicast
address. The corresponding host answers with its IP-address. A similar approach is Link-
Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) [41]. DNS based service discovery (DNS-SD)
uses DNS records (e.g. multicast DNS records in the case of Bonjour) to announce services.
A client (looking for instances of a given type of service) provides the type of service it is
looking for, as well as a domain; in return, the client receives “a list of named instances of
that desired service” [91]. Hence, a Bonjour client (using DNS-SD) queries for a type of
service using multicast DNS. Any host on the local network that provides a service of the
given type answers to the multicast DNS request, so that eventually the client will have
received a “list of named instances” [91]. Bonjour offers thus functionality comparable to
SLP [124]: Querying for a certain service type, the client receives a list of all services with
this service type that are running in the local network. The Simple Service Discovery
Protocol (SSDP) [120] is a solution very similar to Bonjour which uses IP-multicast but
http (instead of DNS) to announce services in a local network.
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2.3.2 Locating a Service on the Internet without Servers
Researchers have made proposals for fully decentralised service location. These proposal
are almost exclusively based on Distributed Hash Tables10; the DHT is used to locate
services offered by entities in the network. Compared to other DHT applications, service
location has some unique aspects and requirements (see also [93]): Most importantly, the
guaranteed and timely retrieval of the data items stored in the DHT, i.e. the location
for a service, is important. In addition, the DHT stores more sensitive information, i.e.
location-bindings, than e.g. in filesharing applications. Hence, service location has unique
security requirements.
Several reasons make DHTs the suitable choice for decentralised service location.
First, DHTs naturally offer a distributed, fully decentralised database which is necessary
for storing identifier-location bindings. Second, unlike unstructured P2P networks, DHTs
can guarantee that a data item stored in the network will be found (at least in the absence
of attackers). Third, also unlike unstructured P2P networks, DHT can offer upper bounds
on the number of hops a lookup will take. The fact that DHTs cannot only guarantee
reliable storage and retrieval of data items, but that in addition also retrieval within a
certain amount of routing hops is ensured, is important for service location. It enables
to guarantee to find the location of a service within a certain amount of time, fulfilling
the real-time requirements of service location. In summary, only structured, DHT-based
P2P networks are fulfilling the requirements for service location.
As an example, several proposals exist for a fully decentralised replacement of the Do-
main Name System (DNS), where the resolution of hostnames is facilitated by a DHT-
based P2P-network [99] [207] [196]. As another example, locating real-time communi-
cation users with a DHT is investigated by researchers [252] and currently being stan-
dardised in the IETF [79]. We refer to these kinds of P2P-applications as Decentralised
Service Location because these applications use the P2P-network solely for locating ser-
vices: Once the node offering the desired service has been located (e.g. a web-server in
the case of decentralised DNS or a VoIP terminal in the case of decentralised VoIP),
communication takes place directly between the initiator of the DHT lookup request and
the desired host offering the service. In other words, the DHT is only used for service
location. Being based on a DHT makes service location decentralised, as there are no
servers or centralised entities involved in locating a service.
We will examine DHT-based real-time communication session establishment as a typi-
cal example in order to investigate the security challenges of decentralised service location.
Most approaches for DHT-based real-time communication session establishment combine
a DHT-underlay for service location with SIP for overall session establishment. These
approaches are commonly subsumed as P2PSIP. We consider these approaches a pro-
totypical example of decentralised service location: As highlighted previously, the DHT
is only used for the service location part of session establishment. In 2.3.3, we describe
in detail how such an approach works technically. In Section 3.1 we will examine the
10One notable exception is the unstructured P2P approach for SIP proposed in [90] which focusses on
mobile scenarios.
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corresponding security challenges which are the main motivation for our work.
2.3.3 P2PSIP as a Prototypical Example of Decentralised Ser-
vice Location
Several researchers have proposed the use of a Distributed Hash Table for SIP registration
and user location as an alternative to SIP servers. The first publication which proposed
such an approach to SIP-signalling was by Singh and Schulzrinne [252], followed by Bryan
et al. [78]. These publications contain proposals to use a Distributed Hash Table—namely
Chord—to support mobility in SIP communications. The general approach of using a
P2P network for locating users in SIP is commonly referred to as P2PSIP (or P2P-
SIP). With P2PSIP, all central components used for locating the callee in a session
establishment attempt in SIP (e.g. proxy server, registrar, location server) are replaced
with a structured P2P network and SIP user registrations are stored distributedly in a
DHT. Technically, P2PSIP enables the establishment of any kind of real-time user-to-user
multimedia session (e.g. voice, video, instant messaging).
2.3.3.1 General Architecture
To use a DHT for locating SIP identities, users register their location (i.e. the IP-address
through which they are reachable and intend to receive calls) not at a central server.
Instead, the locations for SIP-URIs are stored distributedly in a Distributed Hash Table.
The SIP-URI is the DHT key and any node can compute the key-ID for a particular SIP-
URI by computing the hash-value for the SIP-URI. Any node can request the current
location (e.g. IP-address and port) for a SIP-URI by inserting a key lookup request into
the network. The network routes this lookup request to the node responsible for the key.
This node delivers the content to the requesting node.
Example 2.9: Figure 2.13 [241] shows an example of a P2P-SIP network using a DHT
for locating the callee of a multimedia communication. In the example a Chord [266]
network is displayed. In the simplified example network eight nodes are in the network,
including two users Alice (with node-ID 33) and Bob (with node-ID 220). Further, some
nodes store data items for keys they are responsible for (e.g. node 170 stores data for
key-ID 137). In the example, Bob has stored his SIP user registration (i.e. the binding
between his current IP-address and his SIP-URI) in the network. Assuming the hash of
Bob’s SIP-URI is 210, node 215 is responsible for the key-ID of Bob’s SIP-URI and stores
the corresponding location. When Alice tries to call Bob, she sends a lookup request for
key-ID 210 to the closest node to the key-ID she has in her local routing table, node 170
(1). This node forwards the request in the same manner11 (2). Finally, the request reaches
the node responsible for key-ID 210, node 215, and it gets routed back to the query node
11This example uses recursive routing where a lookup request gets forwarded until it reaches the node
responsible for the key-ID.
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Figure 2.13: Locating the Callee of a VoIP Session with P2PSIP [241]
(not displayed in the figure). At this point, the query node can contact node 215 directly—
without using the overlay network (depicted with a dotted line in the figure)—in order to
receive the corresponding content, i.e. Bob’s current location (4). Subsequently, Alice
contacts Bob directly peer-to-peer to establish a SIP session with regular SIP signalling
(5).
Note that after the callee has been located, normal SIP signalling as in client/server
SIP takes place. Only the service location part is different in P2PSIP compared to
client/server SIP.
2.3.3.2 State of the Art
At the time of writing quite some work on P2PSIP as well as several prototype implemen-
tations for P2PSIP exist. Additionally, the IETF has formed a P2PSIP working group
which has the goal of defining an IETF protocol for P2P-based SIP signalling [79]. Below
we provide a short summary of the history and current developments regarding research
and standardisation of P2PSIP systems.
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Research approaches The first works on P2PSIP [252] [78] proposed SIP [222] as the
protocol for DHT operations. With such an approach—sometimes called P2P-over-SIP
[254]—DHT routing primitives are expressed as SIP messages (e.g. INVITE, REGIS-
TER). This approach, however, was later rejected because SIP messages were regarded
to incur too much overhead for DHT routing [145]. Later works follow a design where any
DHT protocol can be used to locate SIP identities—also called SIP-using-P2P [254] [76].
The research community (as well as the standardisation community) has accepted this
approach where the process of finding a location for a SIP-URI (i.e. the service location
process) does not use the SIP protocol itself.
More recent research focusses on the application of P2PSIP in specific scenarios, e.g.
mobile networks [170] [151]. Several proposals argue for a hierarchy of multiple DHTs for
P2PSIP to enable interconnection among different P2P networks [249] [169]. In [113] an
approach for combining client-server SIP with P2PSIP is presented.
Another area of research has been on security and privacy concerns for P2PSIP [235].
Fessi et al. present a solution to preserve location privacy and user-interaction privacy for
P2PSIP [112]. Other studies consider availability [248] or secure node-ID generation [63]
for P2PSIP. Security is the main focus of our work, and we will examine related, existing
security approaches for P2PSIP during the course of our work.
Several prototype implementations of P2PSIP exist. One of the first proof-of-concept
implementations of P2PSIP was SIPDHT [18], an open-source software using Chord or
CAN as the underlying DHT. In [64], a P2PSIP prototype implementation has been
connected to an emulation framework. In [265], P2PSIP has been implemented on top of
a flexible transport overlay system. OpenVoIP [61] is an open-source implementation of
P2PSIP based on the p2pp protocol [60]. An experimental system of OpenVoIP is running
with around 1000 peers on approximately 300 planetlab [14] nodes [59]. The OpenVoIP
prototype has implemented Kademlia, Chord, and Bamboo [216] as underlying DHTs.
Standardisation efforts The IETF has formed a P2PSIP working group for standar-
dising a P2PSIP protocol. The charter of the working group defines its goals as follows:
“The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Session Initiation Protocol working group (P2PSIP
WG) is chartered to develop protocols and mechanisms for the use of the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) in settings where the service of establishing
and managing sessions is principally handled by a collection of intelligent
endpoints, rather than centralized servers as in SIP as currently deployed. A
number of cases where such an architecture is desirable have been documented
... P2PSIP peers manifest a distributed name space in which overlay users
are identified and provides mechanisms for locating users or resources within
the P2PSIP overlay ...” [79]
Several originally separate and different proposals (e.g. [60] [143] [166]) for a P2PSIP
protocol have been merged into a single approach called REsource LOcation And Discov-
ery (RELOAD) [140]. The P2PSIP WG has agreed on RELOAD as its core peer protocol
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[79]. RELOAD is a generic protocol which can be used by various applications. There-
fore, the specification of RELOAD has been split into a generic baseline document [140]
and a document specifying how SIP can be used in conjunction with RELOAD [139].
RELOAD has chosen Chord [266] as its underlying DHT and is essentially specifying
a protocol for the exchange of Chord messages among peers. User identities are authen-
ticated at an enrolment server which serves as a certificate authority. The role of the
enrolment server is to secure node-ID assignment. Further, the integrity of location-
bindings stored in the DHT is protected by certificates issued by the enrolment server.
RELOAD requires an implementation of Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE)
[218] for NAT traversal.
Other ongoing work in the P2PSIP WG concerns alternative DHT routing modes
[299] [300], discovery of specific services which certain nodes may offer [162], and dynamic
adaptation of nodes to changes in operating conditions [163]. In addition, the working
group has agreed to define a specification for the collection of diagnostic information (e.g.
for network monitoring or fault detection) [258].
Our work is orthogonal to the ongoing standardisation of P2PSIP because we do not
focus on protocol details. Further, we study solely the service location part of session
establishment. Thus, our research targets a generic P2PSIP architecture (as depicted in
figure 2.13) where the process of locating a communication partner (steps 1-3 in figure
2.13) is not using SIP as the message protocol and can be investigated separatedly from
the following negotiation of session parameters (steps 4-5 in figure 2.13, likely using SIP).
2.3.3.3 P2PSIP vs. Skype
An existing P2P-based multimedia application with a large user community is Skype [6].
Skype offers service location: Given a unique identifier (a user name), Skype establishes
a communication session with the current location of that identifier. Multimedia sessions
(audio, video) among Skype nodes take place directly peer-to-peer (with the exception
of relaying in case of NAT/Firewall traversal [150]). However, Skype uses a proprietary
protocol and closed source code [69]. The details of how service location is executed
exactly are therefore hard to determine. Skype uses a central login server; in addition,
several nodes play a more important role in the network than others (so-called super
nodes) [62]. Because of these conditions it is unknown and hard to infer how the service
location process works in detail and to what extent it is decentralised.
Skype’s security model is based on two principles:
 Central login server : Nodes authenticate themselves at the Skype login server; it
stores user names and passwords [62].
 Security-by-obscurity paradigm: Skype follows a security-by-obscurity scheme re-
garding the communication protocol and peer software [62]: Communication be-
tween peers is encrypted and the peer software is only available in binary code.
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Even further, obfuscated code makes reverse engineering of the Skype algorithms
hard [69].
Under these constraints, researchers have analysed Skpye through (mostly passive)
measurements in order to derive a view into Skype’s architecture and interior functioning
[62] [133] [89] [94]. Also, researchers have tried to understand the role of super nodes in
Skype and their relaying of traffic [150] [123] [288]. Given that Skype traffic is encrypted,
several works present algorithms for merely detecting that traffic is related to Skype [269]
[70] [71].
Reverse engineering of Skype’s software has been performed in detail by Biondi and
Desclaux [69]. This study revealed that Skype’s code uses obfuscation techniques to make
reverse engineering of the software difficult. Further, the reverse engineering analysis
showed that Skype uses RC4 [17] for encryption of messages. Unfortunately, however,
the results of such studies are quickly outdated as Skype updates its code frequently. It
is therefore unknown, to what extent the results obtained in [69] still hold for the latest
version of Skype in use today.
From a security research perspective, Skype is not suitable for investigating secure
distributed algorithms for communication and data storage in P2P-based multimedia
communication systems: Its closed source code and security-by-obscurity paradigm forbid
a thorough analysis of its interior algorithms. Moreover, Skype’s obfuscated binary code
and encrypted messaging make it infeasible for researchers to conduct experiments with
novel algorithms. In particular, the service location process applied within Skype is a
secret, and it is therefore almost impossible for researchers to investigate novel alternatives
or to conduct practical, reproducible experiments with new algorithms.
In contrary to Skype, P2PSIP resembles an open-specification paradigm. All research
proposals for P2PSIP openly describe the chosen architecture and routing algorithms.
The corresponding IETF standardisation work targets an open specification of P2PSIP,
and all intermediate designs are publicly available [13]. Hence, P2PSIP enables the
research and experimental application of new algorithms. Most importantly for our work,
the service location process is decentralised and well-defined. We therefore choose P2PSIP
as a suitable prototypical example of decentralised service location for our study of the
security issues and the investigation of corresponding decentralised solutions.
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3.1 Security Analysis of P2PSIP
The initiators of P2PSIP claim higher robustness (against failure) as well as easier config-
uration and maintenance as the main motivation for P2PSIP. To analyse the advantages
and business model of P2PSIP is outside the scope of our work. We consider P2PSIP as
a decentralised alternative to client-server SIP and solely look at the security issues.
Obviously, a peer-to-peer setting imposes new security threats to SIP communications.
For instance, the lack of a central authority makes authentication of peers a hard problem.
Our goal is to look at known results on security of P2P networks and identify if and to
what extent these results hold for P2PSIP. We will distinguish between threats on the
DHT Routing layer (i.e. security issues regarding the functionality offered by the DHT)
and threats on the DHT application layer (i.e. security issues regarding multimedia session
establishment offered by SIP if run over a P2P network)1.
1Parts of this chapter (including figures) have been previously published in [235]. See also Appendix
A.
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3.1.1 Security on the DHT Routing Layer
Castro et al. identify three requirements for secure DHT routing [84]: secure node-ID
assignment, secure routing table maintenance, and secure message forwarding. We ex-
amine attacks on these requirements in the context of P2PSIP, looking first at node-ID
assignment and then on overlay routing (i.e. routing table maintenance and message
forwarding).
3.1.1.1 Attacks on Node-ID Assignment
Douceur showed in [109] that without a trusted agency which certifies identities, adversary
nodes can control a large fraction of an overlay network. Much of the security of structured
overlay networks is based on the assumption that joining nodes are assigned IDs at
random. To analyse node-ID generation in P2P-SIP2, we take the model from [227]:
“At any time t we have n honest nodes and e × n adversary nodes in the
Chord ring (e < 1). A malicious entity owning multiple nodes can control
the Chord ring by launching join-leave attacks: The attacker joins and leaves
the network with its nodes until a sequence of O(log n) adversary nodes is
reached. The goal is to find a joining-strategy that prevents an adversary
from gaining such a sequence. In that case, it can be guaranteed that any
message reaches its destination (though at a high performance cost) by simply
routing each message to O(log n) nodes directly following in the ring.”[227]
This model focuses on availability of the network; the goal is to guarantee that a
message will reach the responsible node. It also gives a lower bound for a routing strategy
that will provide availability (if the joining strategy of the overlay prevents an attacker
from gaining sequences) by using multiple lookup paths.
With IPv6 vast numbers of IP-addresses can be available to an attacker to form
such join-leave attacks on a P2PSIP Chord network. But even with IPv4, join-leave
attacks on node-ID generation are possible when an attacker gets assigned IP-addresses
dynamically (e.g. by its ISP). Some early proposals for P2PSIP (e.g. [75]) suggested to
generate node-IDs by hashing [IP-address:Port] of the participating node. Clearly,
such an approach is not desirable from the perspective of secure node-ID assignment and
join-leave attacks: An attacker can try ports at will until the hash of [IP-address:Port]
matches the desired value. In general, note that an attacker does not have to actually
join and leave the network: Because node-ID assignment in Chord is deterministic by
hashing the IP-address, attackers can compute node-IDs in advance.
Scheideler suggests using a rotation joining strategy to perturb nodes frequently [227],
resulting in random node-ID assignment and making join-leave attacks hard for an at-
tacker. Another way to prevent join-leave attacks would be to make the join-operation
2We exemplify our analysis with Chord. Nonetheless, the revealed attacks are also possible on other
Distributed Hash Tables and our general results apply for other Distributed Hash Tables as well.
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in some way costly for the joining node. For example, computational puzzles or micro-
payment systems can make it costly for an attacker to repeatedly join the network (or
to pre-compute node-ID values). However, these strategies cannot be used for P2P-SIP
unless nodes can be forced to change their IP-address or node-ID generation will be based
on something different than the IP-address (for example by adding a timed randomness
service [98]).
Any node wanting to join the overlay needs to know at least one node that already
participates in the overlay. Possible options for such bootstrapping are: static (persistent)
nodes, cached nodes, or broadcast mechanisms (e.g. SIP-multicast). In any case, if the
initial bootstrap node is malicious, the joining node can easily be attacked. Without a
pre-established trust relationship with the bootstrap node, secure bootstrapping is an
open question.
Without a central authority, another open problem for P2PSIP is identity enforce-
ment. The overlay network has to prevent duplicate IDs. This applies to node-IDs (i.e.
what happens if two IP-addresses hash to the same value) as well as to key-IDs (two
SIP-URIs hashing to the same value).
3.1.1.2 Attacks on Overlay Routing
Any malicious node within the overlay can drop, alter, or wrongly forward a message
it receives instead of routing it according to the overlay protocol. This can result in
severe degradation of the overlay’s availability. But further: Confidentiality and integrity
cannot be provided for P2PSIP registration and location lookup messages by the overlay.
In P2PSIP this means that an attacker cannot only prevent access to location information,
but also forge responses to SIP-messages.
Attackers can also use DHT maintenance operations in order to infiltrate routing table
entries with links to attacker nodes. In [251] such attacks and possible countermeasures
are studied in the context of Pastry [223] as the DHT. Chord uses constrained routing
tables (i.e. it is precisely defined which nodes can occupy certain routing table entries).
Therefore, routing table infiltration attacks are not a considerable threat in Chord [251].
Srivatsa and Liu observe in [261] that Chord nodes can check the results of routing
queries as follows: The node looking up a key in the network exploits the fact that
with any routing hop it should get closer to the Node-ID responsible for the key. Thus,
detecting certain invalid lookups is possible in P2PSIP networks if iterative routing is
used: A requesting node simply hashes the IP-address it receives as a response for the
next routing hop from the DHT. It then checks if that hash value is closer to the key-ID
than the node-ID it received on the previous hop. However, an attacker can still perform
an undetected man-in-the-middle attack if he can place itself close enough to the desired
target key (using attacks on node-ID generation described previously). In this case it is
likely that the attacker is the last node before the node responsible for the key in the
Chord ring.
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Figure 3.1: Man-in-the-middle Attack on P2PSIP
Example 3.1: Figure 3.1 shows an example of a man-in-the-middle attack on P2PSIP.
The nodes with ID 80 and ID 119 conspire to form an attack on the content of key-ID
107. The (honest) node responsible for the key is node 1083. Because node 119 could
also be responsible for the key, the initiator of the key lookup (node 32) cannot detect the
attack. Note that messages (2) to (5) are not necessary to form the attack. However,
obtaining the real location for key-ID 107 can be useful information for the adversary
nodes 80 and 119 (perhaps to perform further man-in-the-middle attacks on the media
stream). In the example recursive routing is used. It can be observed that with iterative
routing node 80 would not be able to perform the attack (node 32 would get suspicious if
node 80 redirected it directly to node 119 because it assumes there exists some node with
an ID lower than 1074). To perform a man-in-the-middle attack with iterative routing
the adversary has to place itself close to the targeted key-ID (e.g. between node 105 and
108 in our example).
In any P2P system there is a risk of so-called free-riding : Nodes use services but
fail to provide services to the network. Certainly, in a P2PSIP setting there is a risk
of free-riding: nodes use the overlay itself for registration and location service but drop
messages from other nodes. A huge amount of nodes that ride free would eventually
result in reduction of the overlay’s availability.
3For simplicity, in this example we denote node x as the node with Chord-ID x.
4Remember that in Chord a node can only route to a node with higher ID than the key-ID if this node
is the first in its routing table; otherwise it must route to the node with highest ID below the key-ID.
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3.1.2 Security on the DHT Application Layer
Some security issues for client-server SIP are presumably even harder to solve for P2PSIP.
Below we examine P2PSIP security considerations on the SIP-layer.
Integrity of data items stored in the DHT One of the main security problems of
using SIP in a peer-to-peer setting is the authentication of content stored in the DHT:
How can a node which retrieves SIP registrations, i.e. the binding of SIP-URI and user
location, verify the integrity in the absence of a central authority? Without a central
authority, authentication of location-bindings stored in the P2P network is a non-trivial
task. However, without authentication of the content stored in the network the service
offered by such a network is of little use: Nodes cannot verify that messages they receive
from the overlay have not been altered on some (overlay-) hop by an adversary node.
Anonymity With P2PSIP, any node in the overlay can keep track of location lookups
that it routes5. Moreover, any P2PSIP node can keep a profile of registrations and
lookups for SIP-URIs the node is responsible for. Furthermore, using join-leave attacks,
an adversary can place itself intentionally at any location in the Chord ring to log access
to a particular SIP-URI. In SIP, anonymity for SIP-messages can be achieved by using
anonymous values in SIP-headers. However, certain headers must contain information
about the sender/path of a message to successfully route response-messages back to the
sender; the same requirement holds for P2PSIP.
Reliable and secure emergency services It is desirable to specify a dedicated iden-
tifier for emergency services (comparable to e.g. 911 in the US or 110 in Germany used for
such purpose in the PSTN). For client-server SIP, “successful delivery of an emergency
service call ... requires both an association of the physical location of the originator with
an appropriate emergency service center and call routing to deliver the call to the center”
[157]. Thus, in the context of P2PSIP, two challenges arise: a) reliable signalling for
emergency calls in an overlay network, b) ascertaining the physical location of users in
real-time. Given the distributed nature of P2PSIP, these problems seem harder to solve
than for client-server SIP and possibly cannot be solved with existing mechanisms.
Lawful Interception Lawful Interception (LI) is the process of legally authorised wire-
tapping of communications carried out by law enforcement organisations. Regular SIP
signalling can use a different path in the network than the RTP payload. Further, there is
no predefined route for RTP traffic, making Lawful Interception of such traffic in real-time
5Note that such attacks are also possible in Skype: In a Skype network any node with a public
IP-address that is not behind a middlebox (e.g. Nat/Firewall) eventually becomes a super node. Super
nodes in Skype are used for routing of content for Skype users who are located behind a middlebox.
Though Skype traffic is encrypted, logging of traffic data (who called whom for how long) is possible
[150].
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technically challenging. With P2PSIP, there is not even a predefined route for signalling
traffic (SIP), due to the highly dynamic nature of P2P-networks. Thus, any Lawful Inter-
ception solution needs to dynamically determine an appropriate location in the network
for intercepting SIP messages and then to correlate SIP signalling with interception of
RTP traffic. Further, P2PSIP allows for a fully decentralised system. Thus, there may
not be trustworthy legal entity as reference point for Lawful Interception requests. In
summary, P2PSIP implies several new challenges for Lawful Interception.
Spam prevention Spam-over-Internet-Telephony (SPIT) is not a serious problem in
VoIP networks yet. However, several characteristics possibly make VoIP highly attractive
for marketers to use this technology for unsolicited calls [204]. With P2PSIP, Spam-
prevention can only be implemented at the receiving user agent: Due to the highly
dynamic nature of an overlay, the node responsible for a key and the routing path vary
over time and may therefore not be relied on for spam-filtering. To be decentralised,
such Spam-prevention mechanisms residing in terminals must not rely on centralised
components.
3.2 Existing Work and Remaining Challenges
We have identified several security challenges for P2PSIP. We will now assess to what
extent existing mechanisms can be used to mitigate the aforementioned security problems
or to what extent research work has specifically addressed these issues. The remaining
research gap, i.e. the challenges which have not been sufficiently addressed by researchers,
are the motivation for our work and confine our goals.
Our overall goal is the design and evaluation of mechanisms which not only mitigate
P2PSIP security issues, but which constitute decentralised security solutions. We will
therefore pay particular attention to what extent existing solutions are decentralised.
If solutions for certain problems exist, yet these solutions rely largely on centralised
components, we regard such solutions insufficient and still consider a research gap.
Secure DHT routing There exists quite some work on secure DHT routing (see 2.1.4).
In particular, several solutions for secure node-ID assignment have been proposed, some
of which are decentralised [98]. In fact, for Chord (the DHT we mostly consider in our
work), several decentralised solutions for secure node-ID assignment have been proposed
[227] [114]. Therefore, we regard the problem of secure, decentralised node-ID assignment
sufficiently addressed by researchers and in principle solved. We will not investigate
alternative solutions, but assume this property for our work.
Chord has very constrained routing tables. Therefore, routing table poisoning—so-
called Eclipse attacks [251]—are not a serious threat in Chord [251]. We consider Chord
sufficiently protected against this threat. For other DHTs, partially decentralised coun-
termeasures against routing table poisoning have been proposed [251] [98]. We regard
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existing countermeasures sufficient and assume secure routing table maintenance, or at
least that routing table poisoning attacks have a negligible effect on DHT routing.
The properties of secure node-ID assignment and secure routing table maintenance
assure that attackers cannot control a disproportionately high amount of nodes in the
network or fractions of routing tables, respectively. However, attackers nodes can still
severely attack the availability of the DHT routing layer, e.g. by dropping messages or
routing messages wrongly. Such attacks on message forwarding and on the availability of
the DHT routing layer have insufficiently been addressed for Chord. As we will see (in
detail in Chapter 4), existing work is one the one hand flawed, and one the other hand
cannot effectively guarantee DHT lookup success in the presence of adversary nodes that
mis-route messages. Hence, there is a need for algorithms which can achieve high lookup
availability despite attacks on message forwarding. We consider the design and analysis
of such algorithms—in particular the design of decentralised solutions—a core challenge
for our work.
Considering DHT routing challenges in summary, we regard the challenges of secure
node-ID assignment and secure routing table maintenance sufficiently addressed by pre-
vious work, in particular for Chord. The major remaining DHT routing challenge is to
guarantee message forwarding, i.e. lookup availability, in the presence of attackers.
Integrity of data items stored in the DHT An obvious solution to protect the
integrity of location-bindings stored in the DHT is to rely on a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI): A centralised certificate authority (CA) issues certificates which nodes can use
to sign location-bindings. Indeed, researchers have proposed such a solution for P2PSIP
[76]. However, such an approach can hardly be regarded as decentralised. All nodes in
the system would need to agree on a single root-CA as being trustworthy.
The semantics of integrity in the context of SIP registrations stored in a P2PSIP
network need to be defined. Further, there exists no design of a completely decentralised
mechanism specifically suited to protect the integrity of P2PSIP location-bindings. We
hence consider addressing these challenges part of our work.
Anonymity Several mechanisms can in principle provide pseudonymity with respect to
using the location service provided by P2PSIP. If recursive DHT routing is used, an option
to ensure anonymity within the overlay would be to replace the source of messages at
every hop in the overlay: This disguises the originator of the request. A similar approach
would be to use a friend-to-friend model where nodes only exchange messages with other
nodes they consider trustworthy and reliable. A message can be delivered anonymously
between two nodes that do not trust each other: If a transitive trust path exists, the
message can be sent indirectly using hops between friends that trust each other. These
friends hide each other’s origin before passing on messages in the network.
As with client-server SIP, privacy could also be achieved by using a pseudonymity-
service which acts as a back-to-back user agent (B2BUA) [203]. Such a B2BUA would
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be placed as a node in the overlay and would provide services to user agents within or
outside of the overlay. It replaces SIP-headers in both directions in order to disguise
message origin.
Fessi et al. present an approach for a privacy-preserving P2PSIP signalling protocol
called Pr2-P2PSIP [112]. Their approach relies on a central login server to provide
secure node-ID assignment and authentication of SIP-URIs. Essentially, Pr2-P2PSIP
uses Onion Routing [108] to establish tunnels to protect nodes’ and users’ privacy. The
entry point to such a privacy tunnel is stored as data item in the DHT.
In summary, several approaches exist for protecting the privacy of SIP location-
lookups in P2PSIP. Pr2-P2PSIP [112] is the most advanced of these approaches and
specifically targeted at P2PSIP. Although Pr2-P2PSIP is not completely decentralised6,
we regard the issue of privacy for P2PSIP as sufficiently addressed by previous work. We
will thus not investigate the design of novel solutions to provide privacy for P2PSIP in
our work.
Emergency services The technical challenge of mapping the physical location of a de-
vice to a responsible emergency service is considered in the IETF Emergency Context Res-
olution with Internet Technologies (ecrit) working group [157]. The Location-to-Service
Translation protocol (LoST) [127] defines mechanisms to translate the combination of a
service identifier (e.g. Uniform Resource Names (URNs) for emergency services [231]) and
location information (e.g. civic location information [274]) to a corresponding SIP-URI
which is to be used for emergency services. These mechanisms can be used to determine
the target SIP-URI of the appropriate emergency service for a given location.
The problem of mapping a location to an emergency service SIP-URI is similar in
P2PSIP to client-server SIP. LoST [127] is in principle applicable in a P2PSIP setting.
However, the LoST protocol uses servers to resolve queries. Though interesting research,
we regard the design of a decentralised, P2P-based version of LoST (or similar approaches)
of doubtful usefulness: the critical importance of emergency services demands a highly
dependable and highly secure service. It is questionable if a fully decentralised, P2P-based
service can fulfil these stringent requirements.
The second challenge for P2PSIP emergency services is reliable signalling for emer-
gency calls. This challenge technically boils down to message forwarding and availability
of the lookup service provided by the DHT. We specifically address this challenge in the
context of secure DHT routing (see above). Our solutions for DHT lookup availability
in the presence of attackers are applicable in the context of emergency services and can
enable reliable signalling in a P2PSIP network.
6The authentication server in Pr2-P2PSIP serves two purposes: a) secure node-ID assignment, and b)
authentication of user identities. As highlighted previously, decentralised approaches for secure node-ID
assignment exist. We will investigate decentralised authentication for SIP-URIs in our work. Thus, in
principle Pr2-P2PSIP could be modified towards a decentralised solution based on existing approaches
and our work regarding decentralised integrity protection of location-bindings.
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Lawful Interception There are significant technical challenges for conducting Lawful
Interception in a P2PSIP network. Further, the problem is more complex than in client-
server SIP systems. Thus, existing approaches for Lawful Interception of multimedia
communications traffic (targeting client-server SIP) are most likely not applicable. No
publicly available work has addressed the technical challenges of Lawful Interception in
a P2PSIP system. We therefore regard a technical analysis of Lawful Interception in
P2PSIP as well as studying potential solutions an important challenge to be addressed
in our work.
Spam prevention P2PSIP Spam-prevention must reside in terminals and not rely
on central entities. These constraints imply that most existing mechanisms for SPIT
prevention are not applicable to P2PSIP because they are positioned at SIP servers. In
addition, those mechanisms which can potentially run on terminals [245] often rely on SIP
servers to function properly. It is thus a challenge to develop decentralised mechanisms
for SPIT detection which solely run at terminals. We consider the development of such
solutions an important goal of our work.
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In this chapter we analyse how malicious nodes can attack the availability of a DHT
lookup and investigate how to prevent such attacks with decentralised mechanisms1.
Focusing on Chord [267] as the DHT, we show analytically that a small fraction of
adversary nodes can severely attack the availability of the DHT’s lookup service (Section
4.2). Consequently, our goal is to derive novel decentralised solutions, i.e. solutions which
rely on no or only a few centralised components, and to demonstrate their effectiveness.
We present mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of malicious nodes on lookup
availability (Section 4.3) and assess the proposed algorithms analytically and through
simulations (Section 4.4). Further, we compare our approach with existing solutions
and discuss related work (Section 4.5). A thorough analysis of existing approaches for
lookup availability in Chord reveals that these approaches are insufficient to address
the problem. Further, we reveal several methodological flaws in related publications of
existing approaches. This chapter concludes with a summary of results and the main
contributions (Section 4.6). Throughout this chapter we use the notation and definitions
introduced in Chapter 2.
4.1 Rationale
4.1.1 Defining Lookup Availability
A DHT lookup can consist of many routing attempts from the query node to the key.
Thus, a lookup can use several different paths and is finished if either it succeeds, a
threshold th (limiting the number of hops used in the lookup) is reached, or all possible
paths between the query node and the node responsible for storing the corresponding
data item (i.e. rootk) have been tried without success. We define a path in a DHT as
follows:
Definition 6 (Path): A path p(nq, k) ⊆ N from a query node nq ∈ N for
key k ∈ K is any set of nodes such that routing from nq for key k will pass
through these nodes including rootk. Two different paths are called alternate
if at least one node (other than nq and rootk) is on both these paths and
independent if they share no common node other than nq and rootk.
If at least one adversary node is on a path, the root node for the desired key might
not be reached via this path. Thus, adversary nodes may degrade the availability of the
key lookup service which a DHT essentially provides. We define the availability of a DHT
1Parts of this chapter (including figures) have originally been published in [246] and [247]. See also
Appendix A.
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lookup service as follows:
Definition 7 (Lookup Availability): The Availability of the Lookup Ser-
vice (or Lookup Availability for short) is the probability that the correspond-
ing, unmodified data item is returned by the DHT after a node has invoked a
lookup for an arbitrary, existing key.
Note that our definition of lookup availability explicitly contains a notion regarding the
integrity of data items: only unmodified data items are considered. From the perspective
of the query node, only the retrieval of a correct data item constitutes a successful lookup.
Looking solely at the DHT lookup service, a data item can be considered correct if it has
not been altered since (or during) storage. Any kind of data origin authentication [121]
to determine if the data is also coming from the correct source must be performed by
higher application layers. For lookup availability, we hence consider a data item returned
by the DHT as correct if it has not been modified (not even by the originator itself) since
the originator has stored it (or during the storage process itself).
Since a DHT does not offer a modify(key) primitive, the only way for an originator
to alter previously stored data is to store a new version of the data item for the key.
In practise, data items can contain timestamps (or expiration dates) to express which
is the latest, correct data item (e.g. to overwrite an existing data item). Thus, in a
strict (low-level) sense, even the owner of a data item cannot modify it directly once it
has been stored in the DHT. We abstract from such details (e.g. timestamps); without
loss of generality, we assume that a query node always retrieves the latest data item for
a key and that there is no need for an originator to modify already stored data items.
Therefore, any unmodified data item can be considered correct, and it suffices to consider
only completely unmodified data items as correct.
One important implication of considering only unmodified data items in our definition
of lookup availability is that a query node must have a way to verify that a data item it
retrieved has not been modified, in order to determine if a lookup was successful or not.
In this chapter, we assume that query nodes have this ability. We provide a concrete
solution for nodes to verify the integrity of data items in Chapter 5. Also, we will define
data integrity in the context of a DHT lookup more precisely in Chapter 5.
Note further that Definition 7 already implies a metric for lookup availability: the
degree to which arbitrary lookups are successful. The success-rate of a random lookup
is hence the metric we use for analysing (and measuring) lookup availability in a DHT.
Consequently, we define the success-rate ρ as the probability that an arbitrary lookup
will succeed in a given DHT:
Definition 8 (Lookup Success-Rate): The success-rate ρ of a DHT
lookup service is the probability that in a given DHT a lookup for an arbi-
trary, existing key will return the corresponding, unmodified data item.
Formally, we can define ρ as follows:
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ρ = P (∃p(nq, k)|∀ni ∈ p(nq, k) : ni is good) (4.1)
where nq is a random query node and k is a random key.
Further, we denote the mean hop count for a series of lookups with χ, defined as
follows:
Definition 9 (Mean Hop Count): The mean hop count, χ, is the arith-
metic mean of the number of hops each lookup needed to succeed in a series
of lookups.
We can derive χ as follows:
χ =
∑l
i=1 c(i)
l
(4.2)
where l is the number of lookups and c(i) is the hop-count for each individual lookup
i = 1 . . . l. If a lookup did not succeed, the hop-count of this lookup is either determined
by trying all possible paths paths between query node and root node or by a hop threshold,
th, which limits the number of total hops for each lookup.
4.1.2 Choosing Chord as the Prototypical DHT
For our investigation, we choose Chord [267] as the prototypical DHT. There are several
reasons why Chord is an adequate choice for our investigation of security for decentralised
service location:
 We use VoIP as the prototypical application for studying the security of service
location2. Chord has been chosen by the IETF P2PSIP working group [79] for
standardising a P2PSIP protocol [140]. Thus, it is likely that most P2P-based
VoIP implementations will be using Chord as the underlying DHT protocol. In-
deed, several current P2PSIP prototype implementations are based on Chord [161]
[294]. Therefore, choosing Chord brings more relevance to our analysis and security
improvements because our results will be directly applicable to the main industry
standard for P2P-VoIP.
 Among all DHTs, Chord is the one which has been studied the most by researchers.
For instance, in the CiteSeer statistics on Most Cited Articles in Computer Sciences
[20] the original research paper describing Chord [266] is listed as the fourth most
cited Computer Science paper within the period from 1990 to 2012. There are three
important consequences:
2see Chapter 3
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1. Chord is formally well-understood and has been analysed in-depth [102] [291]
[191]. We can use such results for our work and to verify that the security
solutions we propose do not violate key properties of Chord.
2. A lot of previous work regarding security exists for Chord. Some of these
solutions fulfil a subset of the security requirements for decentralised service
location we derived in 3. We can thus build (at least to a certain extent) on
existing work to fulfil our goal of securing decentralised service location.
3. A multitude of applications has been suggested on top of Chord (e.g. [104]
[103] [80]. This implies that the security solutions we derive are applicable to
many existing applications.
 Compared to other DHTs, Chord offers some advantageous security properties:
1. Chord is by default protected against routing table poisoning attacks [251].
This is due to the fact that in Chord it is precisely specified for each routing
table entry to which DHT-node it has to contain a link. This property is
often referred to as constraint routing tables. Thus, unless attacker nodes can
forge their node-ID, routing table poisoning attacks are no significant threat
in Chord [251].
2. There exist several decentralised solutions which can guarantee secure node-ID
assignment for DHTs [53] [98] and specifically for Chord [114]. Since this secu-
rity challenge has been addressed sufficiently by researchers, we can assume the
property of secure node-ID assignment for Chord. This property guarantees
that attacker nodes are distributed uniformly over the node-ID space. Further,
it implies that attacker nodes cannot forge their node-ID. Hence routing table
poisoning attacks are a negligible threat for Chord (see above).
 Chord is a unidirectional DHT [158]. This enables caching of content along routing
paths because all lookup paths for a key converge on the unidirectional routing
structure. For service location such caching can be beneficial because data items
for popular keys can be cached and thus retrieved with less routing hops.
4.1.3 Goals
While there has been work on improving lookup availability for non-unidirectional DHTs,
we will show that no sufficient solution for increasing DHT lookup availability in Chord
has been proposed. Given the advantages of Chord for security as well as its particular
suitability for service location and our prototypical application (real-time communications
session establishment), our goal is to extend Chord in such a way that lookup availability
can be achieved even in the presence of adversary nodes.
The main security weakness of Chord compared to other DHTs is that—due to its
unidirectional routing structure—only a single routing path between query node and
root node exist. As we will show, this makes Chord susceptible to attacks on lookup
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availability because a single adversary node on this routing path can prevent a lookup
from succeeding.
The main goal of our work in this chapter is therefore to extend Chord in a way that
lookup availability is increased while maintaining its advantageous security properties.
Our intention is to extend regular Chord as little as possible so that formal properties
and existing analyses still apply to our extensions. Further, extensions being minimal
ensures that our solutions will be applicable to a large number of Chord applications.
Following our overall thesis goal, we envision decentralised enhancements to Chord
which do not require a central authority. Moreover, we intend to design DHT algorithms
where query nodes can retrieve a data item for a given key without relying on other
nodes’s assessment. Thus, our objective is to enable a node which starts a DHT lookup
to make routing decisions entirely autonomously, i.e. neither relying on a central authority
nor on the advise or assessment of other nodes.
4.1.4 Attacker Model and Assumptions
General assumptions We assume that the integrity of data items (which are stored
in the DHT) can be verified through the application using the DHT (e.g. by using self-
certifying data3 [103] [239]). This implies that nodes can check if a lookup resulted
in receiving correct data from the DHT (through calls to the upper-layer application).
Consequently, we leave the problem of data integrity to higher layers on top of the DHT
(and refer to Chapter 5 for a corresponding solution). Further, we assume that secure
node-ID assignment against Sybil attacks [84] [98] and prevention techniques against
Eclipse attacks4 [84] [251] are used. We expect the use of such techniques as a basis for
our extensions. More precisely, we assume that fnode−mapping() and frouting−table() return
correct nodes (as defined by Chord) even in presence of attacker nodes.
Under these assumptions, attackers cannot control a disproportionately high fraction
of nodes relative to the number of attacker nodes in the network. However, attackers can
still degrade the availability severely through attacks on message forwarding (i.e. froute())
of the DHT. We concentrate on these attacks and secure algorithms for froute().
Attacker model We consider the following attacker model: a network of originally
only good nodes is infiltrated over a certain period of time by attacker nodes which either
join the system or compromise good nodes. After this period, the network is infiltrated
and has reached a certain state σi ∈ Σ where the system contains Na = f ×N adversary
nodes and Ng = (1− f)×N good nodes, where f < 1. The set of adversary nodes, N a,
and the set of non-adversary nodes, N g, are disjoint, i.e. N a ∩N g = . We look at this
state σi where f ×N attacker nodes are distributed uniformly over the node-ID space I.
That is, with high probability, any part of the node-ID space I consists to a fraction f
3Note that we propose such a solution for P2PSIP in Chapter 5.
4Chord has tightly constrained routing tables. Therefore, Eclipse attacks are not a serious threat in
Chord.
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of adversary nodes and to a fraction 1− f of good nodes. The assumption that attacker
nodes are distributed uniformly over the node-ID space holds because we presume secure
node-ID assignment (see above).
All adversary nodes in the network may collude (e.g. because they are controlled
by a single external identity): the f × N adversary nodes in the system are aware of
each other and share information. Note that this is a strong attacker model because all
nodes colluding is the worst case from the perspective of the good nodes in the network.
Thus, any mechanism that will work under this assumption will also work (probably even
better) if only g ×N < f ×N of the f ×N adversary node collude.
Adversary nodes route exclusively to adversary nodes and do not drop messages:
∀ni ∈ Na : froute(k) = nj ∈ Na (i.e. adversary node suppress existing good nodes in their
routing tables); good nodes route to good and adversary nodes: ∀ni ∈ Ng : froute(k) =
nj ∈ N . In principle, adversary nodes could also drop messages. However, this would
result in a less severe attack on lookup availability because this behaviour can easily be
detected through time-outs. In contrary, by continuing to route amongst them (never
reaching the target data item) colluding adversary nodes can absorb more DHT routing
resources in vain. Thus, by expecting adversary nodes not to drop messages we consider
a stronger attacker model. Since nodes are protected against routing table poisoning, for
reasonable network sizes, at state σi the routing table of any good node in the system
contains with high probability f × d bad nodes and (1− f)× d good nodes, where d < S
is the number of distinct nodes in the routing table.
Additionally, we assume that any message sent on a single DHT-hop will arrive un-
changed (i.e. attacks on the IP-layer are out of scope). Exploring the interaction of
attacks on DHT routing with attacks on the underlying IP-layer is out of the scope of
our work.
This attacker model is reasonable for analysing attacks on message forwarding : The
state where all adversary nodes have joined the network and collude constitutes the worst
case scenario with respect to attacks on message forwarding. Further, by using variation
on f , our model is able to embrace different states of network infiltration by attackers.
4.2 Lookup Availability: Analytical Observations
To mathematically analyse lookup availability in Chord, we start by performing analytical
calculations. In particular, we are interested in the maximum success rate that can be
achieved in Chord if f is the fraction of uniformly distributed adversary nodes.
4.2.1 The Shield Problem
Consider a lookup for a random key k in a Chord DHT, invoked by a random query node
nq. In Chord any path that leads from nq to rootk has to pass the predecessor of rootk
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Figure 4.1: The Shield Problem in Chord
(unless nq = rootk). This is due to the fact that in Chord a node can only route to a
node with ID higher than the key-ID if it routes to its direct successor in the ring. This
direct successor must then be responsible for the key. We call the predecessor of rootk
the shield for key k and denote this node with shieldk:
Definition 10 (Shield Node): For a given key k, the shield node, denoted
shieldk, is the direct predecessor of rootk in the Chord ring.
We can define the shield for a key k formally as follows:
shieldk = pred(rootk) (4.3)
where
pred(nj) =
{
nk ∈ N| (nj > nk ∧ (¬∃nl ∈ N|nj > nl > nk)) ∃nk ∈ N|nk < nj
nk ∈ N| (nk > nj ∧ (¬∃np ∈ N|nk < np)) otherwise
(4.4)
Since in Chord any path to rootk has to pass shieldk, the shield can effectively deny
access to the data item belonging to key k. This is why we call this node the shield. If
the shield for a key is a passive attacker it simply drops any message with destination k.
If it is an active attacker (and rootk is not an adversary), it routes to the first adversary
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node that succeeds rootk in the ring
5. The querying node nq does not know which node
is rootk. Thus, it can be fooled into believing that the first adversary node in the ring
that succeeds rootk were actually rootk.
Example 4.1: Figure 4.1 shows an example Chord network. Adversary nodes are de-
picted grey. n55 is the shield for key 57. Thus, it can fool the query node n8 and return
another adversary node, n1, as root57 〈4〉. n8 has no means to determine per se if n1 is
indeed root57. Note that n1 might return a false data item for key 57, 57
′ 〈6〉. This can be
detected in our attacker model. However, the important thing to notice is that the lookup
will fail if shield57 is an adversary node, regardless if n1 returns data or not.
4.2.2 An Upper Bound on Lookup Success in Chord
When analysing the shield problem it becomes evident that any lookup in Chord can
only succeed if both the shield and the root node for a specific key k are non-adversary
nodes. We have seen that a lookup will never succeed if the shield is an adversary node.
Clearly, if the root node is an adversary, no lookup can succeed because the root node
can deny answering to any lookup request or reply with a forged value for the key.
Analytically, we consider a random lookup for a key. Our sample space Ω consists of
the root node and the shield node of such a random lookup each being adversary or not.
Our sample space implies that we only consider paths of length ≥ 2. Thus, our results
hold only for networks with N ≥ 16 (N ≥ 16 ⇒ ϑ ≥ 2) and lookups where nq 6= rootk.
We denote the following events for such a random lookup:
E = {“root node is good”} (4.5)
Φ = {“shield node is good”} (4.6)
Γ = {“root node is good and shield node is good”} (4.7)
Since nodes are distributed uniformly6, E and Φ are statistically independent. P (E) =
P (Φ) = 1− f by definition of f . Γ = E ∧ Φ. Thus, we have
P (Γ) = P (E)× P (Φ) (4.8)
P (Γ) = (1− f)2 (4.9)
Equation 4.8 holds since E and Φ are statistically independent. Equation 4.9 is the
probability that the root and the shield are both non-adversary nodes for an arbitrary
lookup. This is the minimum requirement for any lookup to succeed (note that a lookup
5Remember that adversary nodes only route to adversary nodes in our attacker model.
6This property is ensured through secure node-ID assignment which is part of our assumptions.
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f 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
(1− f)2 0.81 0.64 0.49 0.36 0.25 0.16 0.09 0.04
Table 4.1: Upper Bound on Lookup Success Rate in Regular Chord
can still fail if no path to the root exists where all other nodes on the path are non-
adversary nodes as well). Thus, equation 4.9 gives us an upper bound for the success
rate of an arbitrary lookup in Chord:
P (lookupsuccess) ≤ P (Γ) (4.10)
P (lookupsuccess) ≤ (1− f)2 (4.11)
Table 4.1 shows values for the upper bound on lookup success from equation 4.11 for
f = 0.1, . . . , 0.8. it can be observed that with increasing attacker rate f , the upper bound
on lookup success decreases drastically. For instance, if f = 0.5 attackers have infiltrated
the network, at most 0.25 of lookups can succeed.
The bound in equation 4.9 is specific to Chord and lower than previously published
bounds for DHTs. To show this, we compare our result with the bounds from [261]. In
[261], one can find the following generic bounds on the probability of lookup failure for a
DHT:
f i ≤ P (lookupfailure) ≤ (1− (1− f)ϑ)i (4.12)
where i is the number of independent (i.e. not having a single node in common)
paths from query node to root node. In Chord i = 1, since any lookup has to pass the
shield. Further, in Chord, ϑ = 1
2
logN is the mean hop length of a path [164]. We can
thus convert the upper bound on lookup failure in equation 4.12 into an lower bound on
lookup success or Chord by taking the opposite event as follows [246]:
1−
(
1− (1− f)( 12) logN
)
≤ P (lookupsuccess) (4.13)
We need to convert the upper bound on the success rate from equation 4.9 to a lower
bound for failure rate in order to compare it with the bounds in equation 4.12. The
opposite event in our sample space Ω of the event Γ (the upper bound for lookup success
rate) is a lower bound for lookup failure rate. We have the following event for a lower
bound on failure rate:
Π = {“root node is bad or shield node is bad”} (4.14)
Note that Π is the opposite event of Γ in our sample space Ω. Thus, we have
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P (Π) = 1− P (Γ) (4.15)
P (Π) = 1− (1− f)2 (4.16)
f ≤ 1− (1− f)2 ≤ P (lookupfailure) (4.17)
Equation 4.17 shows that the event Π has indeed a higher probability than the general
lower bound for lookup failure in DHTs from [261]. Thus, the opposite event, i.e. Γ from
equation 4.9, is lower than the general upper bound for lookup availability in DHTs. The
left inequality of equation 4.17 holds because f < 1 by definition. Note that our upper
bound on the success rate is only applicable to Chord whereas the bounds from [261]
apply to DHTs in general.
4.3 Algorithms for Increased Lookup Availability
In this section we describe our extensions to Chord for increasing lookup availability. In
principle, we combine three techniques:
1. We use the direct successor list of each node to accomplish independent (or alter-
nate) multipath routing.
2. To overcome the shield problem we directly route to replica roots.
3. We use density checks on each iterative routing hop to detect paths that contain
adversary nodes as early as possible.
Complete-knowledge iterative routing For all our techniques described in this
chapter we use the following general (global) extension to Chord: Each node in the
network must support iterative routing where at each routing hop the query node re-
ceives not only the next hop from the node it queried (as in regular Chord) but instead
the whole routing table Tr of the queried node and its list of direct successors Ts (a similar
extension to Chord has been suggested in [106]). Note that this extension only affects the
size of each iterative query response. In particular, it does not affect the total number
of links stored at each node because the additional information received at each iterative
routing step is only stored temporarily during the lookup.
We call this extension complete-knowledge iterative routing because at each iterative
routing hop the query node receives the complete information the hop node has about
the network. All other routing techniques we introduce are solely computed at the query
node (locally). Thus, it does not affect the success rate of a lookup if other nodes in the
network use these techniques or not.
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4.3.1 Chord Multipath Routing
In the case a lookup path has failed, we explore two techniques to let the lookup continue
(we refer to this as failover routing)7:
1. by starting a new independent path at the query node (independent restart)
2. by starting a new path at the closest node to the key received during the previous
path which has not been used in the lookup so far (backtracking)
For both of these techniques the query node maintains a temporary list Tm of nodes
it has used in the lookup so far. In each individual path it explores during a lookup
the query node only uses nodes it has not used before in this lookup, i.e. nodes not in
Tm. In regular Chord the direct successor list, Ts, is only used for redundancy (i.e. in
the case of node failures). We allow each node to use the list of direct successors, Ts,
on every routing hop. Since we use complete-knowledge iterative routing a query node
can in principle use for the next hop any node from the routing table Tr and the direct
successor list Ts it received from the node on the last hop. However, for our extensions
at each hop the nodes in Ts are only used in routing if all nodes from Tr have been used
previously in the lookup, i.e. if all nodes from Tr are already contained in Tm. nq (the
query node) always routes greedy (as in regular Chord): It always uses the node ni ∈ Tr
(or ni ∈ Ts if Tr ⊆ Tm) with the highest node-ID smaller than k, or the direct successor
of k if ni is the first entry in Tr (Ts, respectively) and ni is larger than k. This assures
that queries make progress towards the key. We refer to this general algorithm as Chord
Multipath Routing, CMR.
According to our definition, backtracking explores alternate and not independent
paths. Independent restart always explores independent paths. We refer to Chord Multi-
path Routing as Alternate Multipath Routing, AMR, if backtracking is used as the failover
routing technique. We refer to Chord Multipath Routing as Independent Multipath Rout-
ing, IMR, if independent restart is used as the failover routing technique.
Figure 4.2 shows the flow chart for our algorithm of Chord Multipath Routing (CMR).
The function closest_node_to_key(Ttemp) represents regular, greedy Chord-routing ap-
plied to the nodes in Ttemp (as described previously): It always returns the node ni in
Ttemp with the highest node-ID smaller than k, or the direct successor of k if ni is the
first entry in Ttemp and ni is larger than k. Note that smaller and larger have a semantic
according to the ring structure of Chord, i.e. using modular arithmetic. Similarly, in
figure 4.2 ≤ and ≥ are intended to include modular arithmetic so that routing across the
0 in the node-ID space is possible.
It can be observed that Tm serves as a memory list of nodes the query node nq has
already visited in the lookup. For independent restart, after a path has failed the lookup
continues (i.e. restarts) from the query node. Not resetting Tm at this stage ensures that
each path in the lookup is indeed independent for independent restart.
7Remember that in our model a lookup consists of several individual paths.
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Figure 4.2: Flow Chart for Chord Multipath Routing
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Further, note that CMR fails if the root node for the key, rootk, is adversarial. CMR
can thus help if intermediate nodes on the DHT routing path are adversary (in which
case regular Chord fails), but not in the case where the root node is adversary itself. To
enable successful lookup also in this case, i.e. where the root node is adversary, we refer
to Direct Replica Routing (DRR) in 4.3.2.
With unidirectional greedy routing independent paths converge towards the root [158].
Using Ts allows a path to continue if at some hop all entries in Tr smaller than the key k
are already in Tm. For independent restart, using Tm guarantees that all paths in a lookup
are independent. Further, independent restart allows for up to s (the number of entries
in every Ts) independent paths because this is the maximum number of independent
paths that can converge on the penultimate hop before reaching the root. Because with
backtracking a new path does not necessarily start at the query node, nq, this technique
only explores alternate (but not independent) paths.
In our model, adversary nodes suppress non-adversary nodes in the routing tables Tr
and Ts they return. This implies for that once a path has reached an adversary node, only
adversary nodes will be added to Tm on this path. However, node-ID suppression attacks
do not prevent a query node from subsequently exploring a path with only non-adversary
nodes on every hop.
4.3.2 Direct Replica Routing
To tackle the situation where rootk, shieldk, or both are malicious we allow to route
directly to the replica roots of k. Chord replicates content at r − 1 replica roots which
are the r − 1 nodes directly succeeding rootk in the ring. However, in regular Chord the
replica roots are only used for redundancy (i.e. node failure of rootk).
We extend Chord in a way that routing to the replica roots of a key k is possible
without passing shieldk or rootk. We refer to the overall set of r replica roots for key k
as REPk, which includes rootk and is defined as follows:
REPk =
{
root1k, . . . , root
r
k
}
(4.18)
where root1k is rootk and root
x
k refers to the (x− 1)-th replica root directly succeeding
rootk in the Chord ring. We allow direct routing to a node ni ∈ REPk if ni ∈ Ts (we
refer to this as Direct Replica Routing, DRR). Because at every hop Ts contains s direct
successors in the ring, the query node nq can check if some of these nodes are in REPk:
nq simply has to verify if ∃nj ∈ Ts|k ≤ nj ≤ rootrk (i.e. nq has to check if some nodes in
Ts have a node-ID greater than k which can be at maximum r nodes in Ts).
If all replica roots retrieved at some hop have been queried without success, a failover
(backtracking or independent restart) is pursued. Using direct replica routing results in
each key k having effectively s shield nodes (the s direct predecessors of rootk) which we
denote with shieldk, . . . , shield
s
k = SHIk. By setting s = 2r (globally) in the system,
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Figure 4.3: Reaching Replica Roots with Direct Replica Routing
any of the r + 1 closest shield nodes to a particular key k can route directly to any of
the r replica root nodes for k. In general, setting s ≥ r ensures that the last replica root
rootrk is accessible from s− r + 1 shield nodes.
Figure 4.3 exemplifies how replica roots can be reached through more than one node
with DRR (b), compared to regular Chord (a). For both cases, the figure shows all
routable links from shield nodes to replica roots in a network without attackers. In an
infiltrated network, any Ts the query node nq will receive from an adversary node will
only contain the next s adversary nodes in the ring. However, by setting s = 2r we
guarantee that reaching one non-adversary shield node of the r + 1 closest shield nodes
to k is enough to reach one non-adversary replica root in REPk (if existing). Note, for
instance, that in the example node shield4k can only reach rootk (and not root
2
k) because
it is more than r + 1 directly succeeding nodes away from rootk.
Figure 4.4 shows the flow chart of the algorithm for Direct Replica Routing, in con-
junction with Multipath Routing. As in figure 4.2, ≤ and ≥ have a semantic according to
the ring structure of Chord, i.e. using modular arithmetic that allows for routing across
the 0 point in the node-ID space. We refer to the combination of DRR and CMR as MRR
for Multipath Replica Routing. Essentially, MRR uses DRR to check at each routing hop
hc if there are links in Ts(hc) which are succeeding the key k. If this is not the case, the
current hop node hc is too far away from rootk and regular CMR routing continues. If
there are indeed nodes in Ts(hc) succeeding the ID of the key, these nodes must be replica
roots. DRR then checks each of these nodes consecutively to retrieve the key. As long
as any one of these nodes (i.e. nodes in Ts(hc) succeeding the key) is non-adversary, the
lookup is successful. Otherwise, the lookup can still continue using independent restart
or backtracking, respectively.
4.3.3 Detecting Node-ID Suppression Attacks
Recall that in our attacker model a network of good nodes is infiltrated and routing tables
in Chord are constrained (and therefore protected against routing table poisoning). Thus,
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Figure 4.4: Flow Chart for Direct Replica Routing in Conjunction with Multipath Rout-
ing
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good nodes have (with high probability) f×d adversary nodes and (1−f)×d good nodes
in their routing table Tr as well as f × s adversary nodes and (1− f)× s good nodes in
Ts. Adversary nodes suppress good nodes in the routing tables they return. This enables
them to attack lookup availability even if complete-knowledge iterative routing is used
by the query node.
We can detect these attacks by using density checks : the query node nq calculates the
average distance α(nq) between nodes in its direct successor list Ts as follows:
α(nq) =
lastentry(Ts(nq))− firstentry(Ts(nq)
s
(4.19)
where lastentry is the last entry in Ts(nq) and firstentry is the first entry in Ts(nq). From
any routing table Ts(ni) that nq receives from a node ni, nq can compute α(ni) (analog
to equation 4.19) and compare it with its own average distance α(nq) by computing
δ =
α(ni)
α(nq)
(4.20)
where δ is the density-ratio of the direct successor list between nq and ni. If δ ≥ td(nq)
(where td(nq) is the density threshold of the query node), nq considers ni to be an adver-
sary node.
An adversary node na can only decrease its α(na) by either creating artificial entries
in Ts(na) (which will be detected on the next hop if such an entry is chosen by nq) or limit
suppression of good nodes in Ts(na) (which would give nq access to good nodes). With
a low density threshold td there is a risk of falsely estimating good nodes as adversary
ones. However, this only affects froute() of nq locally.
4.4 Assessment of the Proposed Algorithms
4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis
Our proposed extensions to Chord provide several independent paths between nq and
rootk, and route directly to the replica roots of a key k so that not a single root node can
control all access to data items for a key k. Thus, there exist at most s shield nodes (one
on the penultimate hop of every independent path) denoted shieldk, . . . , shield
s
k and for
every key k there are r routable replica roots, denoted rootk, . . . , root
r
k.
We now extend the theoretical results for regular Chord to this case. Analytically, we
use a sample space Ω for a random lookup. Ω samples all shields and all replica roots for
an arbitrary key and determines for each shield and replica root node if it is an adversary
node. We are interested in the following events in our sample space:
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A = {“at least one shield node is non-adversary”} (4.21)
B = {“at least one replica root is non-adversary”} (4.22)
E = {“at least one replica root and one shield node are not adversary nodes”} (4.23)
Event E states an upper bound on the success rate for an arbitrary lookup because
this event is the minimum requirement for any lookup to succeed (a lookup can still fail
under this event if all paths explored contain at least one adversary node). We now
derive the probability for event E for the case that we have precisely s shield nodes and
r routable replica roots for any key k:
P (A) = 1− f s (4.24)
P (B) = 1− f r (4.25)
P (lookupsuccess) ≤ P (E) = P (A)× P (B)) (4.26)
Inserting equation 4.24 and 4.25 in Equation 4.26 we get
P (lookupsuccess) ≤ (1− f s)× (1− f r) (4.27)
Equation 4.27 thus provides an upper bound on lookup success for our proposed
extensions (i.e. Multipath Replica Routing). Note that it is possible to multiply P (A)
and P (B) because these events are statistically independent in our model. Adapting the
lower bound from equation 4.13 to s independent paths we get [261]
1−
(
1− (1− f)( 12) logN
)s
≤ P (lookupsuccess) (4.28)
With our extensions, there exist at most s independent paths and exactly r replica roots.
Since equation 4.27 provides an upper bound, it holds for our extensions even though
some lookups might explore less than s independent paths. However, the lower bound
in equation 4.28 does not apply to our extensions. Still, it indicates analytically that as
more independent paths are explored (which is the effect of our multipath-extensions to
Chord) the lower bound on the success rate increases. In any case, we are interested in the
maximum success rate (and thus the upper bound) that our extensions can theoretically
achieve. The upper bound enables us to assess our algorithms compared to theoretical
limits on lookup success.
Table 4.2 shows the upper bound of equation 4.27 for MRR with s = 16 and r = 8.
It can be observed that for attacker rates less than f = 0.7, the upper bound on lookup
success is very close to 1. Even for attacker rates of f = 0.7 (or f = 0.8), the upper bound
on lookup success is higher than 0.93 (or higher than 0.80 for f = 0.8, respectively).
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f (1− f s)× (1− f r)
0.1 0.99999999
0.2 0.99999744
0.3 0.99993439
0.4 0.99934421
0.5 0.99607855
0.6 0.98292647
0.7 0.93922028
0.8 0.80880271
Table 4.2: Upper Bound on Lookup Success with Multipath Replica Routing (s=16, r=8)
Figure 4.5: MRR-r with th = ∞ Compared to Theoretical Upper Bound (N =
1000, 2000, 4000, 8000)
4.4.2 Simulation Results
We implemented our algorithms and Chord routing extensions in the planetsim DHT
simulation framework [15]. This implementation allows us to conduct various simula-
tions to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms. In all our experiments
we simulated a total of 1000 lookups in 10 random Chord networks (i.e. 100 lookups in
each of the 10 randomly created networks) with |I| = 232 and adversary nodes behaving
according to our attacker model. We set r = 8 and s = 16 in all the experiments we
present here. These values seem acceptable for nodes to maintain links in Ts() and for
data replication. Further, Table 4.2 shows that in theory these values should suffice to
achieve a high lookup success rate. In our simulations, we only consider lookups where
Ts(nq)∩REPk = , i.e. lookups where no replica root is contained in the direct successor
list of the query node. For details about our simulator and experiments, as well as more
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Figure 4.6: MRR-b with th = ∞ compared to theoretical upper bound (N =
1000, 2000, 4000)
detailed results of the experiments we conducted we refer to Appendix B.1.
Comparing algorithms to analytical upper bound We first simulated Chord Mul-
tipath Routing (CMR) combined with Direct Replica Routing (DRR) (i.e. MRR, Mul-
tipath Replica Routing) to see how close our algorithms come to theoretical limits. We
simulated MRR with independent restart (MRR-r) and backtracking (MMR-b) for var-
ious network sizes, N , and attacker rates, f , and compared it to the upper bound on ρ
from equation 4.27. Figure 4.5 shows results for independent restart for different net-
work sizes. Figure 4.6 displays the results for backtracking. It can be observed that our
algorithms come very close to the upper bound (u bound) on lookup success in equation
4.27, almost reaching theoretical limits even for high attacker rates. We noticed, however,
that with th = ∞, the average hop count χ can get quite high with increasing levels of
network infiltration. For instance, for f = 0.6 and N = 2000, we obtained a success rate
of 98.90%. But at the same time we measured an average of 436.26 hops per lookup (the
average hop count values corresponding to the lookup success rates in Figures 4.5 and
4.6 can be found in Appendix B.1).
Results with hop count threshold In the type of DHT applications we consider in
this thesis (i.e. decentralised service location and in particular real-time communication
session establishment) the time it takes for a lookup to succeed is crucial. To reflect this
requirement and investigate the effectiveness of our algorithms with a timing constraint,
we conducted simulations with a hop threshold th. Figure 4.7 displays MRR with back-
tracking (-b) and independent restart (-r) compared to regular Chord with independent
restart (RC ) for th = 50 in a network of N = 4000 nodes. Additionally, the figure shows
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Figure 4.7: Success Rate for MRR with Hop Count Threshold Compared to Regular
Chord and Upper Bound (th = 50, N = 4000)
Figure 4.8: Success Rate for MRR-r and MRR-b with and without Hop Count Threshold
(th = 50, N = 8000)
81
Figure 4.9: Success Rate for MRR with Independent Restart (MRR-r) and Different
Density Thresholds td (th = 50, N = 4000)
the success rate for MRR-r with density checks (MRR-rd) for td = [1.5, 2.5].
It can be noticed that independent restart performs better than backtracking for
attacker rates up to f = 0.7. Further, the detection of node-ID suppression attacks with
density checks on every hop increases lookup availability perceptibly. The results show
that only with density checks it is possible to achieve a lookup success rate of more than
90% for attacker rates up to f = 0.3. One can see that a higher threshold td is better
suited for low attacker rates, whereas a lower threshold results in better performance for
high attacker rates. Precisely, in Figure 4.7, td = 1.5 performs better than td = 2.5 for
attacker rates higher than f = 0.3. In general, it is advisable to set td <
1
f
because the
range of an attacker’s successor list increases reciprocally to f with node-ID suppression
attacks.
Figure 4.8 displays the success rate for MRR-r and MRR-b without and with different
density thresholds (td = [2.0, 2.5]) for th = 50 in a network of N = 8000 nodes. Also
these results show that only with density checks it is possible to achieve a lookup success
rate of more than 90% for attacker rates up to f = 0.3. In particular, with a density
threshold of td = [2.0] or td = [2.5] the lookup success rate is 100% for attacker rates up
to f = 0.2, and with a density threshold of td = [2.0] the lookup success rate is 96% or
more for f = 0.3, independently of using iterative restart or backtracking.
Varying the density threshold Next, we investigated variations of the density thresh-
old, td, in more detail. Figure 4.9 exemplarily shows results for MRR-r with different
values of td in a network of 4000 nodes and a hop threshold set to 50. We obtained com-
parable results for backtracking and for other network sizes. These results and figures
similar to Figure 4.9 for different network sizes and backtracking as well as independent
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Figure 4.10: Effect of Increased Hop Threshold th for Different Algorithms (N = 2000)
th td ρ χ
MRR-r 50 ∞ 0.56 30.52
MRR-r 100 ∞ 0.63 49.90
MRR-rd 50 2.0 0.87 16.85
MRR-rd 100 2.0 0.92 21.40
MRR-b 50 ∞ 0.42 33.97
MRR-b 100 ∞ 0.52 58.69
Table 4.3: ρ and χ Compared for th = 50 and th = 100 for Different Algorithms (f = 0.4,
N = 2000)
restart can be found in Appendix B.1. The results in Figure 4.9 illustrate that a density
threshold of td = 2.0 can achieve nearly 100% lookup success for attacker rates of f ≤ 0.3
(we confirmed this result for backtracking and other network sizes as well, see Appendix
B.1). Moreover, observe that td = 2.0 and td = 2.5 provide better results for f ≤ 0.3,
whereas td = 1.5 yields better results for f ≥ 0.4. A very tight density threshold, i.e.
td = 1.25, performs even slightly better for high attacker rates (f ≥ 0.6), but very poorly
for low attacker rates.
In reality, the attacker rate f might not be known to nodes. For moderately infiltrated
networks, td = 2.0 performs best in all our experiments. For highly infiltrated networks,
achieving a high lookup success rate seems in any case unrealistic, and td = 2.0 performs
only slightly worse than td = 1.5 in this case. Thus, when the exact attacker rate is
unknown, 2.0 seems a reasonable recommended setting for td.
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f td ρ χ
MRR-r 0.5 ∞ 0.29 40.72
MRR-rd 0.5 1.5 0.7 26.03
MRR-rd 0.5 2.0 0.54 31.75
MRR-r 0.3 ∞ 0.69 25.33
MRR-rd 0.3 1.5 0.94 11.89
MRR-rd 0.3 2.0 0.98 9.39
Table 4.4: ρ and χ for MRR-r with and without Density Checks (f = 0.3 and f = 0.5,
th = 50, N = 4000)
Increasing the hop count threshold and keeping the average hop count low
Figure 4.10 visualises the effect of an increased hop count threshold, th, of 100 in com-
parison to th = 50. The figure shows results for MRR-r, MRR-b, and MRR-r with the
best density threshold for moderate attacker rates, td = 2.0, in a network of N = 2000
nodes. Not surprisingly, for each of these algorithms an increased hop count threshold
results in an increased success rate. However, the gain is rather small. Most importantly,
for attacker rates up to f = 0.3, the gain of an increased hop count threshold for MRR-
rd[2.0] (i.e. the best algorithm for th = 50) is negligible (mostly because the success rate
for th = 50 is already very close to 100% in these cases). Further, the gain in lookup
success rate has to be weighted to the potential increase in the hop count. Table 4.3
shows the average hop count corresponding to the results in Figure 4.10 for f = 0.4. For
regular MRR-r and MRR-b (i.e. without a density threshold), an increase of at most 0.1
in lookup success comes at the price of an increase of more than 60% in the average hop
count. We obtained very similar results for N = 1000 and N = 4000 (see Appendix B.1).
In addition to increasing the success rate, density checks also significantly decrease the
average hop count χ. Table 4.4 exemplarily illustrates this by showing ρ and χ for MRR-r
(with and without density checks) for f = 0.3 and f = 0.5, th = 50, and N = 4000. For
f = 0.5, td = 1.5 has clearly the best success rate. But in addition, the average hop count
is 36% (or 14 hops on average) lower than for MRR-r without using density checks. For
f = 0.3, td = 2.0 achieves a lookup success rate of 0.98 with less than 10 hops on average.
The lookup success is 29 percent-points higher than without using density checks at all;
at the same time the hop count is almost 16 hops less on average.
For N = 8000 and an attacker rate of f = 0.3, we obtained an average hop count of
less than 10 hops for MRR-bd and settings of th = 50 and td = 2.0, while also achieving
a lookup success rate of ρ = 0.97 (see Appendix B.1). This is a similar hop count and
almost the same success rate as for MRR-rd and N = 4000 (ρ = 0.98) with the same
settings (compare Table 4.4). Overall, our algorithms can thus achieve (in the network
sizes we simulated) a lookup success rate of ρ = 0.97 (or even ρ = 0.98 in networks with
up to 4000 nodes) for networks with up to 30% attackers when a hop count threshold of
th = 50 is applied as a limit for lookups to succeed. At the same time, the average hop
count is less than 10 hops for such medium infiltrated networks (i.e. f = 0.3).
Note that on the Internet, the average Round Trip Time (RTT) can very roughly be
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estimated as 200ms [7]). For iterative DHT routing (as in our algorithms), one DHT hop
results in one round trip from query node to hop node and back. For an Internet-scale
DHT, our hop count results can thus very roughly be mapped to the same amount of
Internet-scale RTTs. Our results thus imply an overall lookup time in the order of a few
seconds which is acceptable for service location (e.g. 2s in case of 10 hops). For instance,
the ITU-T regards less than 8s to be acceptable for phone call setup delay [30]. Also,
for smaller-scale DHTs (e.g. where all—or most—nodes are located within a nationwide
ISP), shorter RTTs are likely to be expected. We hence consider our results as satisfactory
with respect to fulfilling the real-time requirements of Decentralised Service Location in
the presence of adversary nodes.
4.5 Related Work
There exists quite some work on various DHT security challenges (see also 2.1.4). Here
we survey previous work with focus on DHT lookup availability (the scope of our work
in this chapter). In particular, we examine existing approaches for increasing lookup
availability in Chord, identify their weaknesses and methodological flaws, and highlight
the differences of these approaches in relation to the algorithms we presented.
In addition, we present a survey of approaches to increase lookup availability in DHTs
other than Chord. Due to DHT routing specifics, these approaches are not directly
applicable to Chord and therefore not easy to compare with our proposed solutions.
Nevertheless, we regard these works to be important related work in the field of DHT
security.
4.5.1 Approaches for Lookup Availability in Chord
4.5.1.1 Existing Proposals
Marti et al. : Marti et al. use an external, existing social network among users (e.g.
Facebook) to increase the probability that a lookup path contains only non-adversary
nodes in Chord [167]. The underlying assumption is that the probability of a DHT-node
ni being malicious is proportional to the number of hops between the query node’s user
and ni’s user in a social network. The authors present an extension to Chord called
SPROUT (Social Path ROUTing). With SPROUT, nodes in the DHT have additional
routing links between each other if their users are connected (and online) in a given
social network. Essentially, these additional social network based links are preferred in
DHT routing as much as possible to increase the probability that a path contains solely
non-malicious nodes. If no social link exists, the query proceeds with regular Chord
routing. In [167], SPROUT is evaluated through simulation with random lookups. The
metrics for assessing the benefit of the proposed algorithm are a) average path length,
and b) path reliability. Path reliability is computed using a linear trust function and
gives the probability that a random path contains only non-malicious nodes with respect
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to a specific trust metric which is assigned to social links. It is shown that SPROUT can
outperform regular Chord in both metrics. However, in their evaluation of SPROUT, the
authors do not consider key replication nor lookups which consists of multiple paths.
Danezis et al. : Danezis et al. use a weak form of a social network, the so-called
bootstrap graph, to improve lookup performance in a Chord network under attack [106].
In addition to regular Chord routing tables, each node in the DHT maintains a network
introduction graph, i.e. the bootstrap graph. Two nodes ni, nj are connected in this graph
if one node joined the DHT via the other node (i.e. ni joined the DHT by connecting
first to nj). The bootstrap graph is typically a tree for DHTs [106]. Each node builds
its own local bootstrap graph as a side effect of normal lookup operations and stores for
each node in its routing tables Tr, Ts also the path on the bootstrap graph to these nodes
[184]. Further, Chord is extended such that on each hop, the queried node returns its
direct successor, its direct predecessor, all entries in its routing table Tr, and all direct
connections it has in the bootstrap graph. In addition, on each hop the queried node
returns for all these links the paths to these nodes on the bootstrap graph. The query
node can thus select from alternatives when choosing the next routing hop.
Based on the bootstrap graph, several backtracking routing techniques are investi-
gated, each exploring alternate routing paths. The goal of all strategies is to balance how
many times a single node can be on different alternate routing paths for a single lookup
(referred to as diversity routing). In other words, diversity routing tries not to put too
much trust on a single node so that nodes are not disproportional often represented on
the paths of the queries [184]. During a lookup, the query node maintains a histogram
(called trust profile) of how many time each node was traversed on the bootstrap graph
during the lookup so far. Based on these histograms, on each hop precisely the next
hop node is selected which would increase only small trust profiles among all nodes in
the histogram. The rationale behind this strategy is that adversary nodes which have
bootstrapped many other adversary nodes will gain high values in the trust profile be-
cause they will be on many bootstrap graph paths. To ensure that queries make progress,
two ways of combining diversity routing with regular Chord routing are explored8. With
mixed routing, on each hop the next node is selected based on a weighted sum between
closeness to the key on the DHT ring and diversity as described above. With zigzag
routing, regular Chord routing and diversity routing are alternated on each routing. In
summary, zigzag seems to be the best strategy with respect to the number of routing
hops.
Artigas et al. : Artigas et al. present an approach for hierarchical DHTs called Cyclone
[48]. In Cyclone, a single ID-space is used to connect several individual DHTs to one
hierarchical meta DHT. The ID space consists of a prefix and a suffix, where the prefix
denotes the ID for each node within its particular DHT and the suffix denotes the ID
of the particular DHT the node belongs to (i.e. the cluster-ID). Suffix IDs are ordered
bitwise right to left to form a hierarchy among DHTs. In this way, Cyclone combines
8For an in-depth description and thorough analysis of this approach, the reader is referred to [184].
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a hierarchical approach with a flat DHT routing design: Several single DHTs can be
combined by assigning a suffix ID (cluster-ID) for each DHT (according to the desired
hierarchy) and maintaining the local DHT IDs as prefix IDs.
In [49], Artigas et al. apply Cyclone to increase lookup availability by enhancing Chord
with multipath routing. A regular Chord DHT gets split into multiple disjoint DHTs
using so-called equivalence classes. Two nodes ni, nj are in the same of e equivalence
classes (where e is a system parameter) if the remainder of their node-ID modulo e is the
same. A DHT gets hence split into e disjoint clusters, and the rightmost log2e bits of
each node ID form the Cyclone suffix ID. Except on the first and last routing hop, nodes
only route within their equivalence class. The query node can start independent routing
paths by selecting a node of each individual equivalence class ∈ 0, . . . , e− 1 from its list
of direct successors Ts. At the last routing hop, again the direct successor list Ts is used
to find a node ne where suffix(ne) = suffix(k), i.e. to find rootk. In [49], the authors show
by simulation that Cyclone on top of Chord can increase lookup success significantly
compared to regular Chord. However, in their simulations they do not consider the case
where rootk is malicious; any path which reaches rootk is considered successful. Note
also that e independent routing paths can only be guaranteed in the case where the node
identifier space is fully utilised; otherwise Cyclone can only achieve at most e (the number
of equivalence classes) independent routing paths (see 4.5.1.2 for details).
Kapadia and Triandopoulos: Halo [146] is a probabilistic approach which does not
change regular Chord-routing at all. Instead, multiple (not necessarily independent)
lookups are started at the query node for the so-called k-knuckles for a key k. These
knuckle nodes, if non-malicious, are nodes that should have a link to rootk in their routing
table Tr. All these knuckle nodes are then queried for the first node in their routing table
Tr that succeeds k to obtain several candidates for rootk. The lookup succeeds if at
least one of the knuckle nodes is not an adversary. By directly routing to candidate root
nodes, this approach from Kapadia and Triandopoulos avoids routing pass the shield
node. However, the case that a root node itself is malicious is not considered. Simulation
results under these assumptions (i.e. the root node not being malicious) show that Halo
can achieve a 90% success rate in networks with an attacker rate up to f = 0.3 [146].
Other approaches: Myrmic is a routing security extension to Chord [282]. It features
a root verification protocol such that any node can verify if a particular node is the
correct root node for a given key. However, Myrmic relies on a central authority called
Neighbourhood Authority (NA) to assert that nodes are responsible for certain parts of
the keyspace. Thus, Myrmic cannot be considered a fully decentralised approach.
Harvesf and Blough present a replica placement scheme for Chord which can provide
independent lookup paths to different replicas roots [128]. However, they show analyti-
cally that their approach can guarantee a certain number of disjoint paths only for the
case that a network has a fully utilised ID-space, which is a very unrealistic scenario (see
further 4.5.1.2). Further, simulation results are only provided for small networks (i.e.
1024 nodes) with a rather small cardinality of the ID-space (i.e. I = 220) which implies a
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rather small ID-space utilisation in the experiments.
Jaing et al. present Bi-Chord, a modification of Chord’s unidirectional routing scheme
to a multidirectional routing [142]. Essentially, Bi-Chord adds to regular Chord a second,
counter-clockwise routing path for each lookup. As such, Bi-Chord merely provides two
independent lookup paths for a given key from each node in the network. It can hence
not increase lookup availability significantly.
Needels and Kwon present extensions to Chord that are similar to ours [186]. Their
enhanced Chord routing uses backtracking and a routing table density check regarding
Tr on every hop. Only premature simulations on small networks (with a fixed size of
N = 1000 nodes in all experiments) have been conducted. Further, node lookup and not
key lookup has been simulated (even worse: lookups that reach a malicious root node are
considered successful). These facts make the results published in [186] not very useful;
it is questionable to what extent the presented routing extensions can provide lookup
availability in realistic scenarios.
4.5.1.2 Methodology Flaws in Existing Approaches
During our examination of existing research proposals for DHT lookup availability in
Chord, we discovered several methodological flaws. Here we detail these findings and
discoveries, highlighting why the specific simulation methodology used leads to misleading
or inaccurate results9.
Simulating only fully utilised ID-space To demonstrate the effectiveness of Cyclone
for increasing Chord lookup availability, in [49] simulation results are presented which are
based on a very strong (and completely unrealistic) assumption: a fully utilised node-ID
space I. Without a fully utilised node-ID space I, Cyclone cannot guarantee that the
query node nq has a link to a node of each individual equivalence class ∈ 0, . . . , e − 1
in its list of direct successors Ts(nq). Similarly, at the last routing hop, there may not
be a node ne in the direct successor list Ts where suffix(ne) = suffix(k). Thus, in the
case the node-ID space is not fully utilised, Cyclone cannot guarantee the existence of e
independent paths, but only potentially achieve at a maximum e independent paths for
each lookup.
Note that for DHTs usually m = 160 and |I| =2m. Hence, a DHT node-ID space
is normally envisioned to have a size of |I| = 2160 (if for instance SHA-1 is used as the
hash function). The number of nodes in the DHT is bound to the node-ID space but
most likely significantly smaller. Today, P2P networks in the range of 1,000,000 nodes
are considered very large. Considering 220 = 1, 048, 576, even such a large P2P network
9In addition to these methodological flaws, we found several implementation faults in the simulator
used to obtain the results published in [106]: First, there is no use of a pseudo-random-number generator
to initialize different simulation runs with a seed; second, key algorithms have been implemented with
some bugs, making the obtained simulation results questionable. For a detailed analysis regarding these
faults the reader is referred to [184].
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Figure 4.11: Key Lookup in Chord
would have a utilisation degree of 2
20
2160
= 1
2140
which is very low. We conclude that for
most DHT applications, N << |I|.
By simulating exactly the unlikely setting of a fully utilised ID-space, the results
obtained in [49] are not applicable to the general case of an arbitrarily utilised node-ID
space. More importantly, the simulated scenario is a very specific and peculiar case, in
which, however, Cyclone can achieve best results for DHT lookup availability. The results
published in [49] can therefore be regarded as very misleading. Similarly, an instance of
this methodological flaw has been applied in [128], where the proposed replica placement
scheme has only been proven to produce a given number of independent paths in case of
a fully utilised ID-space.
Node-ID lookup vs. key-ID lookup We note the difference between simulating node
lookup and key lookup. Simulating node lookup means that a query node always knows
precisely the destination node when starting a lookup. In other words, not a lookup for
a key is simulated, but simply the sending of a message from one node to another via
DHT routing. On the other hand, key lookup means that the query node only knows
the key when initiating a lookup. Clearly, simulating key lookup models the reality of
a DHT better than node lookup. In reality, a querying node only knows a key but not
the root node for a key. In addition, for key lookup the shield problem comes into play.
By contrast, a node lookup can succeed without passing the shield: a node on the path
which has the destination node in its routing table can route directly to the destination.
For key lookup, this is not possible because it is not known by a node on the path which
node is the root for a given key except for the shield. Thus, the success rate for key
lookup is the metric we suggest (and consequentially use) for comparing different lookup
algorithms.
Example 4.2: As an example comparing key lookup and node lookup, consider figures
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Figure 4.12: Node Lookup in Chord
4.11 and 4.12. Figure 4.11 shows a Chord network with regular key lookup. Figure 4.12
shows the same network with node lookup. In the example, n6 looks up key 60 (key lookup,
figure 4.11), or n62 (node lookup, figure 4.12), respectively. It is obvious that node lookup
does not have to pass shield60. This is because node lookup can route directly to the
destination node once a node has a link to the destination node in its routing table (node
39 in the example). In contrast, key lookup must pass shield60 (n49 in the example) on
the path to key 60.
In [106], node lookup has been simulated, essentially meaning that not regular DHT
lookups have been modelled. For key lookup, the most effective algorithm proposed in
[106], zigzag routing, will not always succeed. This is even true if there is always a good
path in the bootstrap graph between any two good nodes. The reason for this is the shield
problem: Even if there is a path consisting of only good nodes in the bootstrap graph,
key lookup has to pass the shield. Hence, a lookup may still fail if the shield node is
adversarial. We verified this fact through simulations, showing that zigzag routing indeed
cannot effectively circumvent the shield problem and thus not increase lookup availability
significantly compared to regular Chord routing (see 4.5.1.3 and [246]).
In summary, it is unrealistic to simulate node lookup because a query node does not
know rootk for a lookup of a given key k. Thus, node lookup gives simplified results
when showing the effectiveness of the zigzag routing algorithm. We emphasize that the
results published in [106] are correct under the assumptions made. Also, our simulations
[246] agree that this is an effective algorithm. However, this algorithm is only effective
in decreasing the hop count instead of increasing the success rate. Regarding lookup
availability, the simulations in [106] using only node lookup miss one important aspect
of the Chord protocol, namely the shield problem.
Varying network size in simulations In a Chord network the size of the node-
ID space I is 2m; every node maintains m routing table entries. Although every node
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maintains links to m nodes, out of these m nodes there are usually only d ≤ m distinct
nodes in each routing table (compare with Figure 2.7). It can be shown that in a network
of N nodes each node only has about d = logN distinct routing table entries [164]. Thus,
in a network of N nodes, each node knows only about logN other nodes. As the network
size increases, the ratio between distinct nodes in routing tables and network size ( d
N
) gets
smaller. Hence, with increasing network size, the knowledge of a single node in relation
to network size decreases. This is the reason why the average path length ϑ grows as N
increases. The probability of all nodes on a path being good is (1− f)ϑ [84]. Thus, with
increasing N the probability of a path consisting of only good nodes decreases. Therefore,
it should be harder to find such a path and consequently the success rate must decrease
when the network size increases.
Consequently, any proposed solution for increasing DHT lookup availability should
be analysed and simulated with varying network sizes. In the publications of Danezis et
al. [106] and Artigas et al. [49] only results for one particular combination of network size
and attacker rate f are presented. Additionally, some of the networks simulated in [106]
are very small (100–500 nodes).
Contrary to network size, the size of the ID-space does not affect simulation results.
Even if the ID-space is not fully utilised (N < |I|), d only depends on N . Thus, the ratio
between distinct links and network size stays the same for constant N , independent of
variations in |I|.
4.5.1.3 Progress with Respect to State of the Art
The approach closest to ours is Cyclone [48] [49], because it is an extension to Chord
which tries to enhance Chord with independent multipath routing. Indeed, Cyclone can
guarantee multiple independent paths in Chord, but only in the very special case where
the ID-space is fully utilised. Also, the model used to generate the success rate results
published in [49] does not consider the possibility of root nodes being adversary: each
time a lookup has reached a root node, the lookup is considered successful. Compared to
Cyclone, our solutions are beneficial in any network, independent of ID-space utilisation.
In addition, our work differs from the one in [48] [49] as we use iterative routing (which
allows the detection of node-ID suppression attacks), and our solution allows to directly
route to replicated content in case the root node is adversary.
Contrary to our work, none of the attacker models in [146], [106], [167], or [49] con-
sider the case where the node responsible for storing content, i.e. the root node, itself is
adversary. Further, the attacker models in [106] and [167] also do not consider the case
where the root node’s predecessor, i.e. the shield node, is an adversary node. Halo [146]
elegantly routes passed the shield node, but it cannot route to replica roots and hence
fails if the root node for a given key is malicious. Consequently, state-of-the-art solutions
cannot significantly increase lookup availability in Chord under realistic assumptions. We
explicitly consider the cases where the root node, the shield node, or both are adversary
nodes in our model. Moreover, we provide techniques to mitigate lookup failures in these
situations based on realistic assumptions.
91
Unlike our approach, the approaches in [106] and [167] demand the existence of some
sort of a social network to increase lookup availability. Essentially, this implies that query
nodes rely on additional information about routing hop nodes—which is provided by other
nodes—to make routing decisions. Instead, we consider a distributed system where nodes
only rely on themselves for DHT routing decisions. With our approach, query nodes only
use regular DHT routing information to select other nodes as routing hops. Nonetheless,
approaches based on social networks can be considered complementary to our approach
and such techniques can potentially be used as add-ons to our algorithms (given the
existence of a social network).
Finally, in contrast to other Chord extensions, our approach enables the detection
of node-ID suppression attacks on every routing hop in Chord. The advantage of this
technique is to identify attacker nodes early on a path, which prevents the query node
from spending resources on exploring such paths.
A quantitative comparison of results between our work and other proposals is difficult
for several reasons. First, a different attacker model than ours has been used in most
other publications. Second, often different scenarios or lookup algorithms (e.g. node
lookup) have been simulated. Moreover, the various parameters and designs of individual
algorithms make it hard to agree on comparable settings. Finally, some of the existing
work uses other metrics than lookup success rate to evaluate the presented approach. We
argue that a quantitative comparison with our work is not needed, as we have shown
qualitatively that the main competing approaches are flawed and cannot solve the shield
problem in realistic scenarios. However, in the cases of Cyclone [49] and zigzag [106]—
which are both close to our work in certain aspects—comparing the effectiveness with
our approach quantitatively is possible to some degree.
The quantitative results for Cyclone’s lookup success rate published in [49] refer to the
ideal, best imaginable case for Cyclone (a fully utilised ID-space). For our algorithms, we
simulated a different scenario with a sparsely utilised ID-space. Further, the results pub-
lished in [49] are not directly comparable to our results because a different attacker model
underlies these experiments: In [49], root nodes are always considered as non-adversarial.
Nonetheless, a somewhat imprecise comparison with our algorithms regarding the achiev-
able lookup success rates can be done by multiplying the lookup success rates published
in [49] with 1−f , to analytically account for the fact that the root node can be adversary
with probability f in our model. Table 4.5 compares10 the best results from [49] (for the
largest network size, N = 2048) with our simulation results for MRR-rd[2.0] (in a net-
work of N = 2000 nodes). The results show that with less overall hops, our solution can
achieve a much higher lookup success rate for a comparable network size. We emphasise
that this comparison is not exact nor precise due to the differences in the underlying
assumptions, attacker models, and experiment scenarios used in our simulations and the
ones conducted by Artigas et al. in [49]. However, the results for Cyclone in Table 4.5
10The results published in [49] have been obtained by executing eight lookup paths, each with a hop
count limit of five. The overall hop count th for lookups has thus been 40 in the experiments in [49].
The graphs in [49] do not enable to read off the exact values obtained with the experiments. The values
for ρ for Cyclone with potentially adversary root nodes in Table 4.5 have been calculated by reading off
approximate results from the graphs in [49] and multiplying this value with 1− f .
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N f th ρ
Cyclone 2048 0.2 40 ≈0.77
MRR-rd 2000 0.2 25 0.99
Cyclone 2048 0.3 40 ≈0.56
MRR-rd 2000 0.3 25 0.96
Cyclone 2048 0.4 40 ≈0.32
MRR-rd 2000 0.4 25 0.79
Table 4.5: Lookup Success Rate for Cyclone Compared to MRR-rd[2.0] for Selected
Attacker Rates
refer to the optimal scenario for Cyclone (a fully utilised ID-space); in realistic scenarios,
the obtained success rate is likely to be even lower.
We have re-implemented the algorithms from Danezis et al. (published in [106]) in
our simulator. This enables to evaluate the effectiveness of the best algorithm according
to the results from [106], zigzag routing, under key lookup. Further, it enables a fair
comparison with our algorithms under the same scenario and attacker model. Simulating
zigzag routing for key lookup, we verified that—due to the shield problem—zigzag routing
only achieves a marginally higher lookup success than regular Chord. Thus, zigzag is not
much help against the shield problem in Chord. Figure 4.13 exemplarily shows ρ for
various attacker rates, comparing zigzag with MRR-r for different network sizes. These
results demonstrate that zigzag cannot achieve a reasonable lookup success rate. More
results for zigzag with key lookup that we have obtained have been published in [246]
and [184].
Figure 4.13: Comparing the Success Rate of Zigzag Routing with MRR-r for Various
Attacker Rates and Different Network Sizes
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4.5.2 Approaches for Lookup Availability in Other DHTs
Each DHT has its unique routing structure and algorithms. It is thus difficult to compare
secure routing extensions that have each been proposed for a particular DHT among each
other. This is especially the case since each DHT has its own security weakness and the
extensions usually target the mitigation of these particular weaknesses [278]. Below
we provide a summary of the main works regarding lookup availability that have been
proposed for DHTs other than Chord. If possible, we highlight the main differences of
these approaches (other than not being applicable directly to Chord) compared to our
work.
Several works propose extensions to Pastry (and the related DHT Tapestry), trying
to mitigate attacks on DHT routing, thus trying to increase lookup availability. Castro et
al. propose secure routing techniques for Pastry [84]. They suggest constrained routing
tables against routing table poisoning. In addition, they design a recursive multipath
routing technique which explores alternate (but not necessarily independent) routing
paths. Finally, they propose a density check technique specifically designed for recursive
routing in Pastry where a candidate root node’s neighbour list density is compared to
the query node’s neighbour list density. Since Pastry is a multidimensional DHT and
in several other aspects different from Chord [158], these techniques are not directly
applicable to Chord. Our work is fundamentally different in that we propose iterative
routing and techniques that ensure independent paths. Further, we specifically target the
shield problem which is unique to Chord. Finally, our density check technique for Chord
is different because it is used at every iterative routing hop and compares the average
distance among nodes in Ts between the current hop node and the query node
11.
Hildrum and Kubiatowicz propose iterative routing techniques for Tapestry and Pas-
try [130]. Their solution relies on a service that measures network proximity on the
underlying network. At each routing hop, several nodes which are closest from this net-
work proximity perspective are chosen. The underlying assumption is that adversary
nodes cannot easily forge network distance on the underlying network, and thus cannot
force routing to adversary nodes. The algorithms introduced in [130] essentially make
Pastry’s routing tables more constrained (based on network proximity). Chord features
constrained routing tables per default. The proposed solution is thus somewhat specific
to DHTs with unconstrained routing tables like Tapestry and Pastry.
Ganesh and Zhao investigate what they refer to as identity theft attacks for Pastry
and Tapestry [118]. With such an attack an adversary node tries to spoof the identity
of the root node for a given key. Such attacks are possible in Pastry and Tapestry
because key responsibility is merely based on closeness in the ID-space and not on other
constraints. As a countermeasure to such attacks, Ganesh and Zhao propose a technique
called Existence Proofs, where special proof manager nodes sign certificates which certify
the existence of nodes in some range of the node-ID space. Root identity spoofing attacks
11Castro et al. briefly mention a similar density check technique for iterative routing in [84]. However,
they suggest comparing the average distance between nodes in the query node’s neighbour set with the
average distance between routing table entries at an intermediate hop to a constrained point p in the
node-ID space.
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are harder in Chord, as the root node has to have an identifier not only close to the key,
but also succeeding the key in the Chord ring. In our work, we assume that the DHT
application can detect such attacks through self-certifying data items. In addition, our
Direct Replica Routing algorithms provide Chord with the ability to route to replica roots
in the face of such attacks.
Baumgart and Mies propose extensions to Kademlia that extend Kademlia’s routing
algorithm such that multiple paths are independent [65]. Note that although Kademlia
has a unidimensional routing structure [158], it uses multiple parallel routing paths per
default. The extensions introduced in [65] hence merely extend Kademlia such that d
disjoint (i.e. independent) routing paths are used. Although the goals are similar to our
work, the proposed solution is very specific to Kademlia and not applicable to Chord.
Also, the obtained lookup success rates are hard to compare with ours since the results
are measured based on the number of disjoint paths and not on the total number of
routing hops. More importantly, Kademlia’s routing is fundamentally very different from
Chord (e.g. routing table membership is symmetric in Kademlia and each routing table
entry contains multiple links [65]) so that a comparison of the results seems unjust.
4.6 Summary and Contribution
The work presented in this chapter concerns lookup availability in Chord networks where
adversary nodes are present. Our main contributions are the following: We presented
a detailed analysis of previously existing approaches for increasing lookup availability
in Chord, detailing the individual insufficiencies of these solutions. As a consequence,
we proposed novel algorithms to address the problem of lookup availability in Chord.
Further, we evaluated the effectiveness of these new solutions analytically and through
simulations, showing that they can significantly increase lookup availability in Chord
under realistic assumptions.
We have examined existing approaches for lookup availability in Chord, which are
mainly the works of Danezis et al. [106], Artigas et al. [48] [49], and Marti et al. [167]. We
discovered several flaws in evaluation methodology of these approaches: In the approach
of Danezis at el. [106], node lookup has been simulated which does not consider the shield
problem in Chord. Moreover, the results presented in [106] do not vary the network size.
The approach proposed by Artigas et al. [49] has only been evaluated with a fully utilised
node-ID space which is an unrealistic scenario for most DHT applications.
Further, the attacker models of these existing works do not consider the case where the
root node itself is adversary. In addition, only the work of Artigas et al. [48] [49] provides
a solution for the shield problem; however, the proposed solution can only address this
problem in extremely unrealistic scenarios. Consequently, existing approaches cannot
satisfactorily increase lookup availability in Chord when considering an attacker model
where root node or shield node can be adversary nodes.
In summary, our analysis of prior work revealed that several of these approaches
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contain methodological flaws. Further, none of the existing approaches can sufficiently—
i.e. under realistic conditions and assumptions—address the shield problem in Chord or
the case where the root node is adversary. These solutions can thus not achieve high
lookup availability. This was our motivation to design novel algorithms for addressing
the problem of lookup availability in Chord without the aforementioned deficiencies.
Based on analytical observations, we presented algorithms which enhance Chord to
increase lookup availability. Our proposed algorithms extent Chord routing with mul-
tipath routing (exploring either independent or alternate routing paths), direct routing
to replica roots, and mechanisms for detecting node-ID suppression attacks. Together,
these algorithms can provide reasonable resilience of the DHT’s lookup service against
attacks on the DHT-routing layer.
We evaluated our proposed algorithms analytically by deriving upper bounds, to
demonstrate that they can in principle achieve very high lookup availability in the pres-
ence of attackers. In addition, we showed through simulations that our algorithms can
come very close to these theoretical limits. For instance, we can actually achieve a lookup
success rate of 98 % in a network with 60 % adversary nodes. Further, we studied the
effectiveness of our algorithms for different network sizes, with different hop thresholds,
and with variations of the density threshold.
In summary, our results show that Multipath Replica Routing (MRR) can achieve a
higher lookup success rate with independent restart than with backtracking in most cases.
Further, using density checks on every hop can significantly increase lookup success as
well as reduce the average hop count. For moderately infiltrated networks (i.e. f ≤ 0.3),
a density threshold of td = 2.0 yields the best results. In the network sizes we simulated,
MRR using such a density threshold of td = 2.0 can virtually achieve 100 % lookup
success for f ≤ 0.3 (i.e. at least 97 % on average for f = 0.3) when a hop count threshold
of th = 50 is applied as a limit for lookups to succeed. At the same time, the average
hop count is less than 10 hops in the network sizes we simulated (i.e. in networks with
up to 8000 nodes). We consider these hop counts acceptable for Decentralised Service
Location (e.g. real-time communication session establishment) even for an Internet-scale
DHT. Overall, we regard these results as satisfactory for providing lookup availability
under timing constraints for low to medium attacker rates.
A quantitative comparison of our results with results from other publications is diffi-
cult due to different attacker models, diverse scenarios or lookup algorithms, and some-
times dissimilar evaluation metrics. Also, comparable settings are hard to agree on for
the various algorithms. We provided two exemplary comparisons of lookup success rates
where it was possible to some degree, showing that our approach can achieve higher
lookup success rates than the works from Artigas et al. [49] and Danezis et al. [106]
under our attacker model and a realistic scenario.
We have discovered several methodological flaws in previous work on lookup availabil-
ity in Chord through a detailed analysis of existing approaches. Our theoretical analysis
of Chord and the many simulations we conducted have further contributed in revealing
potential pitfalls when simulating Chord with adversary nodes. We summarize our find-
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ings in several propositions on characteristics of a proper Chord simulation methodology:
 Do not simulate a fully utilised node-ID space: In most DHT applications, it can
be assumed that the number of participating nodes is several orders of magnitude
lower than the size of the node-ID space, i.e. N << |I|. For generally applicable
results, one must not simulate a fully utilised node-ID space.
 Simulate key lookup to estimate the success rate: The main primitive of a DHT is
to lookup a key. Due to its unidirectional routing structure, the predecessor of the
root node for a specific key can deny access to the key’s data item in Chord. To
show the effectiveness of a DHT routing algorithm in the presence of adversaries
one must simulate key lookup instead of node lookup.
 Use variations of the network size in simulations : The probability that a path
consists of only non-adversary nodes decreases with increasing network size. The
network size must be varied in simulations to analyse the effectiveness of a DHT
routing algorithm in the presence of adversaries.
We have conducted all simulations and obtained results according to these proposi-
tions. The reader is referred to Appendix B.1 for a description of the simulation method-
ology used for obtaining the results presented in this chapter and in Appendix B.1 itself.
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Due to the lack of a central authority, the verification of the integrity of content
stored in a P2P network is a non-trivial task. However, without the possibility to verify
the integrity of content stored in the network the service offered by such a network is of
little use: Nodes cannot verify that messages they receive from the overlay have not been
altered on some (overlay-) hop by an adversary node.
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In this chapter, we present a decentralised approach to verify the integrity of data
stored in a DHT1. We consider a P2PSIP network (see Chapter 3) as a prototypical
example of DHT-based service location. We focus on attacks on the content stored in
the DHT. More specifically, we look at the location bindings stored in P2PSIP networks
and how to protect the integrity of these bindings. Our solution uses self-certifying data
as content. This solution makes man-in-the-middle attacks on content stored in the
network infeasible. Further, the authenticity of location-bindings can be verified by any
entity in the network without relying on any kind of a public key infrastructure. To
accomplish this, we introduce self-certifying SIP-URIs. We show how message-integrity
can be achieved for P2PSIP with our solution. Finally, we discuss benefits and deficiencies
of this approach.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 presents the rationale for
the approach and solution presented in this chapter. The proposed scheme is presented
in detail in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the deficiencies and benefits of the chosen
approach. Section 5.4 presents related work. The chapter concludes in Section 5.5 with
a summary and a reflection on the contributions.
5.1 Rationale
5.1.1 Motivation and Goals
In Chapter 4 we presented techniques to provide availability of content stored in the
network. However, even if the availability of content can be achieved (by added security
measures) other attacks on Structured Overlay Networks are possible. For instance, a
message that gets delivered successfully to its recipient could have been altered by the
root node or by any other intermediate entity.
As an example, Figure 5.1 [239] shows a man-in-the-middle attack on content that
is stored in a P2PSIP network (the binding of SIP-URI to a location). In the example
recursive routing is used. Without authentication of messages, the requesting node (node
27) cannot verify the authenticity of messages it receives from the overlay. Any interme-
diate node on the overlay path can change the content of the message, thereby directing
a phone call that follows the location lookup to a false location. In the example, node 156
acts as an adversary and exchanges the IP-address before handing over the message to
the requesting node 27. When iterative routing is used, similar attacks can be conducted
by an adversary root node: In that case, the root node can alter the data item it returns
for a given key.
The attack model for a DHT depends on the application the overlay is used for. We
focus on service location and P2PSIP as a prototypical example. In the case of P2PSIP,
the integrity of messages has to be protected (in addition to availability): Otherwise,
1Parts of this chapter (including figures) have originally been published in [239]. See also Appendix
A.
100
Figure 5.1: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Content Stored in a P2P-SIP Network
attacks on the content stored in the network are possible, as shown in the previous
example. The content stored in the network is the binding of SIP-URI (the identity of
users in the system) and a location. Thus, it is of high importance to protect the integrity
of the content in order to prevent impersonation of SIP-URIs by an attacker.
Our main goal in this chapter is to design a decentralised solution such that query
nodes can verify the integrity of content they receive from the DHT. An additional ob-
jective is to have a means for query nodes to authenticate the originator of a data item
stored in the DHT. We desire a decentralised solution which is secure but computationally
feasible, i.e. based on cryptographic techniques which imply low computational overhead.
Specifically, we intend to design a solution which fulfils the following requirements:
 Fully decentralised and autonomous : The verification of content’s integrity shall
not depend on a central authority. Further, integrity verification should not rely
on the authority or opinion of other nodes, i.e. on other nodes’ recommendations
or assessments.
 Secure: Integrity verification shall be based on cryptographic techniques which can
be considered secure according to state-of-the-art research.
 Acceptable overhead : In order to be usable for real-time communications such as
P2P-VoIP, the verification process must be computationally feasible, i.e. incur low
overhead for the query node.
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5.1.2 Attacker Model and Integrity of Data Items
We consider the same attacker model as in the previous chapter (see 4.1.4): We assume
secure node-ID assignment and a network that has been infiltrated over a certain period
of time by adversary nodes. We look at the network at a certain state σi where f × N
attacker nodes are distributed uniformly over the node-ID space I. Further, adversary
nodes may collude and they may return false data items as a response to lookup requests.
We assume store-once read-only data items in the DHT. This assumption is reasonable
as modification of data items in a DHT essentially boils down to storing new, updated
data items (e.g. with newer timestamps, see 4.1.1). We thus do not consider mutable
data. Further, we assume that storage of data items has happened before the network
has been infiltrated by attackers; secure storage (and replication to replica root nodes) in
face of adversary nodes is out of scope of our work. Note, however, that in principle also
secure storage and modification of data items is possible in infiltrated networks [278].
In computer security, integrity can broadly be defined as “prevention of unauthorized
modification of information” [121] or similarly “... that assets can be modified only by
authorized parties or only in authorized ways” [202]. We consider only read-only data in
our model (see above); authorized modifications are thus of no concern. We define the
integrity of a data item stored in the DHT hence as follows:
Definition 11 (Data Integrity): Data Integrity is the property that a data
item has not been modified since it has been stored in the DHT or during the
storing process itself.
In addition to data integrity, data origin authentication is a desirable property, i.e.
being able “to verify the source and integrity of a message” [121]. Accordingly, we define
data origin authentication as follows:
Definition 12 (Data Origin Authentication): Data Origin Authentica-
tion is a mechanism to verify the source and data integrity of a data item
retrieved from a DHT.
Note that integrity is an explicit integral part of data origin authentication. The
approach we present in this chapter provides data origin authentication. It thus enables
query nodes to detect if a data item retrieved from a DHT has been altered, and in
addition to authenticate the source of the data item. We mostly refer to integrity in this
chapter; if not explicitly highlighted, data origin authentication is an implicitly implied
property.
5.1.3 Potential Solutions and their Drawbacks
To protect the integrity of content stored in a peer-to-peer network, one obvious solution
is to add a central authority which certifies nodes (more precisely: node-IDs) in the
network. Nodes could then sign content before storing it in the network. Verification of
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these signatures would be possible for any node requesting content stored in the network
through the added public key infrastructure.
A different approach—which has been suggested to secure P2P networks—is to use a
reputation system [105] [168]. In a reputation system, so-called trust values are assigned
to nodes based on prior behaviour observed by other nodes in the network. A node can
decide whether to rely on information it receives from other nodes based on these values.
In principle, a reputation system could be used by the query node in a DHT to determine
if a root node for a given key can be considered as trustworthy (e.g. in the case that
iterative routing is used and the data item for the key is retrieved directly form the root
node).
We propose a different approach to authenticate content in Structured Overlay Net-
works: self-certifying data. The idea of self-certifying data is not new and has been
introduced in several applications (e.g. [50], [103], [183] [1]). We suggest this approach
for decentralised service location and specifically for P2PSIP because of the deficiencies
we see in alternative options:
 Trusted Authority for Certification: A central authority which certifies iden-
tities limits scalability of the network. Also, a central authority would lower the
ease of deployment of the network and add a single point of failure to the network.
Thus, it diminishes much of the advocated benefits of P2P networks. Furthermore,
known problems with certification infrastructures such as revocation of certificates,
validation of identities to certify, and trust in the central authority would be inher-
ited.
 Reputation System: Most reputation systems that have been introduced for P2P
networks focus on traditional file-sharing applications, addressing the problem of
selfish nodes2 and not the prevention of malicious behaviour [168]. In addition,
many existing reputation systems are not fully distributed: They rely on a central
authority to store trust values. In general, reputation systems are not autonomous
by their very nature. Further, they can only provide probabilistic security in the
sense that it cannot be guaranteed that reputation scores are precise and correct.
5.1.4 Self-certifying Identities
The idea behind a self-certifying identity is that the ownership of the identity can be
verified without relying on a trusted third party (e.g. a certificate authority in a public
key infrastructure) [50]:
Definition 13 (Self-certifying Identity): A Self-certifying Identity is an
identity where ownership of the identity can be verified without relying on a
trusted third party.
2e.g. free-riding nodes which are using the services of a P2P network without delivering services to
the network
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This property can be achieved by representing the identity as the secure hash (using
a secure hash function such as SHA-1 [28]) of a public key. Only the owner of the
identity possesses the corresponding private key and can prove its ownership by signing
the identity. More precisely, a self-certifying identity can be generated as follows:
1. Start with a cryptographic private/public key pair
2. Represent the identity as the hash of the public key
3. Sign the identity with the corresponding private key and append public key
Anybody can verify the signature for such an identity by
1. Checking that the hash of the public key is the identity
2. Verifying the signature with the public key
In the case of P2P-SIP, the identity stored as content in the network is the SIP-URI.
Hence, for a self-certifying SIP-URI the URI must be generated as the hash of a public
key. Our scheme is described in detail in the following section.
5.2 Self-certifying SIP-URIs
5.2.1 A Scheme for Protecting the Integrity of Content in P2PSIP
In order to protect the integrity of location binding updates, users can use self-certifying
SIP-URIs. First, the user needs to create a public-private key pair3. Then she/he hashes
the public-key and converts the hash into a valid SIP-URI. She/he can then sign any
binding update to be stored in the network with the corresponding private key.
To check that a user location (IP-address and port) stored in the overlay indeed
belongs to the specified SIP-URI, any node requesting a key lookup can verify the au-
thenticity of the location-binding it receives from the network by doing two things: a)
hashing the public key (which is sent along) to check that the public key indeed belongs
to the SIP-URI and b) verifying the digital signature with the public key.
Notation: We use the following notation of public key cryptography to describe our
proposed scheme: To express a digital signature on data item a with the private key of user
b, kpriv(b), we denote “a is digitally signed with private key kpriv(b)” as “signkpriv(b) {a}”.
Similarly, to express the verification of a digital signature on data item a with the public
key of user b, kpub(b), we denote “the digital signature on a is verified with public key
3Below we use RSA [217], but in principle any asymmetric encryption system can be used.
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kpub(b)” as “verifykpub(b) {a}”. Further, we denote storing a data item a in the DHT
under key k with Chord.Store(k; a), and the lookup of key k returning a as value with
a=Chord.Lookup(k).
We can use this notation to describe how our scheme works in detail as follows:
1. Cryptographically Generating a SIP-URI
(a) Assume a user intends to generate a self-certifying SIP-URI ui. The user
generates an arbitrary RSA [217] public-private key-pair, computing kpub(ui)
and kpriv(ui) as basis for the SIP-URI ui she/he intends to create
4:
kpub(ui), kpriv(ui) = RSA.generate(seed) (5.1)
(b) The user hashes the public key kpub(ui) with a predefined hash function hsci
which is collision resistant (which implies that it is also second pre-image
resistant [174]) to obtain an intermediate self-certifying identity for ui, sci(ui):
sci(ui) = hsci (kpub(ui)) (5.2)
(c) The user converts sci(ui) to an alphanumeric string using a predefined mapping
function mapuri to obtain the (self-certifying) user component of her/his SIP-
URI ui, usersci(ui):
usersci(ui) = mapuri (sci(ui)) (5.3)
(d) The user prepends the generated string usersci(ui) followed by @ to her/his
domain to generate her/his SIP-URI ui:
ui = usersci(ui)@domain (5.4)
2. Registering a Location for a SIP-URI
(a) The user signs her/his current location (e.g. her/his IP-address and port) for
ui, l(ui), with the private key for ui to obtain a signature for this location,
sig(l(ui)):
sig(l(ui)) = signkpriv(ui) {l(ui)} (5.5)
(b) Using the hash function of the DHT5, hDHT , the user computes the corre-
sponding key-ID for ui in the DHT, k(ui):
k(ui) = hDHT (ui) (5.6)
(c) The user stores the URI (ui), the location l(ui), the signature sig(l(ui)) and the
public key for the URI kpub(ui) in the DHT under the corresponding key-ID,
k(ui):
Chord.Store(k(ui); {ui, l(ui), sig(l(ui)), kpub(ui)}) (5.7)
4Note that a user can have several URIs (e.g. for different roles in his personal life). This is expressed
by the index i ∈ Z.
5In principle, hDHT and hsci can be the same hash function, e.g. SHA-1 [28]. To avoid confusion, we
differentiate the two hash functions with two different notations.
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3. Verifying the Integrity of Location Data
(a) A query node nq requests a location for SIP-URI uj from the overlay network.
It computes the key-ID for uj, k(uj), by applying hDHT (uj) and uses this
key in the DHT lookup. It receives the location binding, signature, and the
corresponding public key from the DHT:
{uj, l(uj), sig(l(uj)), kpub(uj)} = Chord.Lookup(hDHT (uj)) (5.8)
(b) The query node verifies that the public key, kpub(uj), indeed belongs to uj:
mapuri (hsci (kpub(uj))) @domain == uj? (5.9)
(c) If the previous step results in a positive outcome (i.e. the truncated hash of
uj’s public key is the user part of the SIP-URI uj), nq verifies the location
signature with the public key:
verifykpub(uj) {sig(l(uj))} == l(uj)? (5.10)
(d) If the verification is successful, l(uj) can be regarded as the correct, authenti-
cated location for SIP-URI uj by the query node nq. If the verification is not
successful, nq cannot regard l(uj) as authenticated.
Note that the scheme above fulfils our goals from 5.1.1. First, the scheme is fully
decentralised and autonomous as the query node can perform the verification of location-
bindings it looks up in the DHT solely on its own, based on information stored in the
DHT along with the actual data item for a key. Second, the scheme relies on asymmetric
cryptography and a secure hash function. The security thus depends on the proper
choice for these algorithms and the corresponding cryptographic strength these choices
offer. One potential weakness with respect to the security that the scheme can offer is
the conversion of the self-certifying identity to an alphanumeric string (i.e. the function
mapuri() in equation 5.3). We will discuss this issue below in 5.2.2.
Finally, our scheme has low overhead: For each lookup the query node has to perform
one hash operation, one string-mapping, and one digital signature verification in addition
to regular Chord operations. Similarly, a node storing a location binding needs to perform
one hash operation, one string-mapping, and the computation of one digital signature.
All these operations can be computed within milliseconds on today’s hardware (even on
devices such as VoIP hardphones or mobile phones) and thus make our scheme applicable
to real-time communications such as P2P-VoIP.
5.2.2 Generating a Self-certifying SIP-URI
In our scheme, a private key is used to sign the binding of an IP-address to a SIP-URI
(equation 5.5). To prove that this private key indeed belongs to the (owner of the) SIP-
URI in the binding, the hash of the corresponding public key (equation 5.2) is encoded
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bit-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
bit-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
bit-3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
bit-4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
bit-5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ASCII a b b d e f g h i j k l m n o p
bit-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
bit-2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
bit-3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
bit-4 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
bit-5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ASCII q r s t u v w x y z 1 2 3 4 5 6
Table 5.1: Mapping of Hash-bits to ASCII Characters
within the SIP-URI. This conversion needs some discussion: First, the SIP-URI must
be formed as specified in [222] in order to enable backwards compatibility with existing
SIP-implementations. Second, the resulting SIP-URI shall not be too long, so that it can
be typed into the interface of a user agent properly (even with limited user interfaces
as in VoIP hardphones). Thus, a specified function is needed to convert the hash-value
sci(ui) (equation 5.2) into a string (equation 5.3). This string then forms part of the
SIP-URI (equation 5.4).
A SIP-URI is generally of the type user@domain [222]. The user part can consist of
one or more ASCII-characters. In summary, these characters are limited to alphanumeric
values (i.e. a − z, A − Z, 0 − 9) and some special reserved characters. Altogether, 79
different ASCII characters may be used for the user part of a SIP-URI (see [222], pp. 147
and [100] for details). Thus, it is possible to encode at most 6 bits in any ASCII-character
of the user part of a SIP-URI (26 = 64 ≤ 79).
We suggest the following algorithm to convert the hash of the public key into a string,
assuming a 160-bit hash value is used (as with SHA-1, for example). This algorithm
forms the mapping function mapuri() in equation 5.3:
1. Use only the leftmost b bits of the hash value
2. From left to right, encode every 5 bits into one ASCII character according to a
defined mapping table tmap−uri
We suggest using only lower-case letters and digits for the generated URIs. Although
more characters are allowed in SIP, this prevents attacks—similar to common phishing
websites—where users are tricked into a wrong URI because of case-sensitivity: An at-
tacker could automatically generate public keys until she/he gets a value that hashes to
a URI similar to the URI she/he wants to impersonate except for case-sensitivity. Thus,
we only use 32 ASCII-characters (26 lower-case letters plus 6 digits). This results in
encoding 5 bits into one character (25 = 32).
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Figure 5.2: Procedure of Generating a Self-Certifying SIP-URI
Table 5.1 shows an example for a predefined table tmap−uri which maps a hash onto
ASCII characters. Figure 5.2 shows the general procedure of mapping a public key onto
a self-certifying SIP-URI. First, the public key (of length strengthenc) is reduced to a
strengthhash-bit hash value by a predefined hash function (hsci in our scheme). Then,
the function mapuri() is applied to the leftmost b bit of the hash-value, mapping every
5 bits from left to right onto a character/digit. The resulting lengthuri characters/digits
are prepended to the domain of the user, separated by the @ sign.
In practise, one can assume a 2048-bit RSA public key (strengthenc=2048) and a
hash value of 160-bit when using SHA-1 (strengthhash=160). When using, for instance,
b = 65, the user part of the resulting SIP-URI is 13 characters/digits long instead of
11 characters/digits when compared to using all possible characters and encoding 6 bits
into one character (65÷ 5 = 13; 65÷ 6 ≤ 11). We feel that this is a reasonable trade off:
the added security is worth the longer SIP-URI (e.g. two characters more in the case of
b = 65).
In general, strengthenc, strengthhash, b, and the table tmap−uri are design choices.
Given a fixed table tmap−uri, lengthuri depends solely on b. The proper value for b involves
a trade off: The smaller the value is, the more readable and memorable is the resulting
SIP-URI for human users. For instance, with b=65, a self-certifying SIP-URI will look like
sip:k4h1gfhdh5wdd@sip-provider.de. If, on the other extreme, b = 160 is chosen, the
resulting SIP-URI has a user component of lengthuri = 32 (since 160÷5 = 32), and would
thus look something like sip:kdjs5ksgat2hdkfksh34nccsjaq2n1ee@sip-provider.de.
At the same time, the smaller b is chosen, the weaker is the security provided by the
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hash function against attacks. A successful second pre-image attack would enable an
attacker to generate a public/private key pair where the hash of the public key would
match the SIP-URI to be attacked. The larger b, the harder such attacks on (the effec-
tively used part of) the hash function become. We discuss potential attacks on the hash
function in Section 5.3.
5.3 Discussion
In this section, we evaluate our proposed scheme and the general approach. We exam-
ine imaginable attacks on the presented scheme and discuss potential countermeasures.
Further, we contrast the benefits and drawbacks of our solution.
5.3.1 Potential Attacks and Countermeasures
Self-certifying SIP-URIs are susceptible to certain attacks. Below we discuss these attacks
and outline potential countermeasures to prevent them.
Attacks on the hash function The security of our solution relies on some charac-
teristics of the hash function that is used: The hash function must be collision-resistant
and second pre-image resistant. Pre-image resistance is not important for our scheme
because the public key gets sent along with its hash in each message. If at some time
the second pre-image resistance of the hash function is broken (for example due to some
new sort of attack), an attacker could generate a public/private key-pair with the same
hash as the target URI of his attack. This would enable him to sign falsified messages.
Since we only use the leftmost b bit of the hash, our SIP-URIs are possibly susceptible
to second pre-image attacks. To circumvent this shortcoming, hash extension techniques
can be used [52] [51] [50]: A second hash-value is used, where the m leftmost bits must
be 0. Using this technique, the effective hash length can be incremented by m bits (see
further Section 5.4).
Denial-of-Service attacks In our scheme, any node verifying the authenticity of a
message must perform cryptographic primitives which consume resources at the node.
Thus, in principle the network will be more susceptible to Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tacks: An attacker can exploit this fact by inserting bogus messages into the network to
attack nodes’ availability. However, computing a hash function and verifying a digital
signature is not a significant cryptographic computation. We thus regard the enhanced
susceptibility to DoS attacks as minor. Moreover, our technique also prevents some DoS-
attacks because each node in the network can detect messages with forged content and
drop such messages immediately instead of forwarding them further (see 5.3.2).
A potential countermeasure against DoS attacks with bogus messages would be to use
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a so-called cookie mechanism similar as in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
([148], pp. 17-19). When receiving a Chord.Store(k(ui); {ui, l(ui), sig(l(ui)), kpub(ui)})
request (equation 5.7), the root node, rootk(ui), would first send a cookie (i.e. a small,
randomly generated token) to the IP-address and port, l(ui), before verifying sig(l(ui)).
Only after receiving an answer to the cookie message, rootk(ui) would begin to verify
sig(l(ui). This would prevent DoS attacks where an attacker would use other IP-addresses
than under her/his control in location-binding store requests. Still, an attacker could
send a large amount of bogus Store requests from IP-addresses under her/his control,
answering every cookie request from the root node correctly. To counter such attacks,
a root node could employ a certain threshold of location-bindings it accepts from a
unique location l(ui) or IP-address per time unit. Further, instead of sending a simple
cookie, rootk(ui) could challenge the origin of a location-binding store request with a
computational puzzle, demanding resource consumption per storage request at the sender
(e.g. similar to the mechanism suggested in [138]).
Replay attacks Our scheme as presented in Section 5.2 is prone to replay attacks.
An attacker can re-use an old location-binding,
{
ui, l
old(ui), sig(l
old(ui)), kpub(ui)
}
, which
she/he captured to direct calls to a location lold(ui) which in fact is not valid anymore
for the URI ui. Since the signature verification for such bindings will be correct, any
root node will accept such replayed Store requests. Similarly, query nodes will assume
such bindings received from the DHT as correct since the signature verification will not
fail. In case the attacker is currently in control of l(ui), he can direct calls to himself,
resulting in an impersonation attack on ui (the URI contained in the location-binding).
Alternatively, calls are directed to a wrong location l(ui), resulting in a DoS attack on
the URI ui with respect to receiving calls.
Normally, if a user changes the location for URI ui, l(ui), his node will update its
location-binding in the DHT by sending out a fresh DHT Store message for the new
location, lnew(ui):
Chord.Store(k(ui); {ui, lnew(ui), sig(lnew(ui)), kpub(ui)}) (5.11)
In addition, the node will delete the old location binding by sending out a DHT
Remove message:
Chord.Remove(k(ui);
{
ui, l
old(ui), sig(l
old(ui)), kpub(ui)
}
) (5.12)
Note that—prior to its removal—an attacker could have easily retrieved the correctly
signed location-binding
{
ui, l
old(ui), sig(l
old(ui)), kpub(ui)
}
for the old location, lold(ui),
from the DHT. In fact, an attacker can harvest location-bindings for any key k(ui) using
regular DHT lookup primitives. To execute a replay attack on a URI ui, the attacker
will send a DHT Remove message as in (5.12) but with the correctly signed location-
binding for the current location of ui, l
new(ui) (which the attacker can easily fetch from
the DHT). Then, the attacker will send out a DHT Store message as in (5.11) but with
a correctly signed old location-binding for ui, l
old(ui), assuming the attacker previously
retrieved such a location-binding from the DHT.
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Similar replay attacks on location-bindings are known for the DNS Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) [45] [47] [46] where attackers can re-use signatures which have not expired
[289]. The solution used by DNSSEC against these kinds of replay attacks is to use limited
signature lifetimes [289] [47]. DNSSEC uses an absolute time to express the signature
expiration (see [47] pp.8 for details). This limits the replaying of signatures by attackers
to within the signature lifetime.
As countermeasures against replay attacks on self-certifying signatures, we suggest
limited signature lifetimes as in DNSSEC. Note that such a mechanism implies the ne-
cessity of time synchronisation among entities in the system. We assume that nodes can
synchronize their clocks6, e.g. by using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [177]. When
signing a location-binding (compare equation 5.5), additionally an absolute time-stamp
for the expiration of the signature, exp(l(ui)), is signed:
sig(l(ui)) = signkpriv(ui) {l(ui)|exp(l(ui))} (5.13)
where | denotes bitwise concatenation. When storing the location-binding in the DHT
(compare with equation 5.7), additionally the expiration time for the signature, exp(l(ui)),
is stored:
Chord.Store(k(ui); {ui, l(ui), exp(l(ui)), sig(l(ui)), kpub(ui)}) (5.14)
Any node can verify the integrity of the expiration time using the signature sig(l(ui))
and the public key kpub(ui). Nodes should disregard expired location-bindings. This
bounds replay-attacks to a limited period up to the expiration time.
Note, however, that in a fully decentralised system as P2PSIP without trust relation-
ships among nodes, any node could remove a valid, existing location-binding for a URI ui
by issuing a DHT Remove message, as in (5.12). The Remove request would contain the
current, correct location-binding for ui which the attacker node can lookup in the DHT.
A simple solution to prevent such attacks with forged Remove requests is to include the
type of the DHT request (i.e. Remove or Store), req-type, in the signature of the location:
sig(l(ui)) = signkpriv(ui) {l(ui)|exp(l(ui))|req-type} (5.15)
Generating a signature as in equation 5.15 limits replay attacks to the same DHT
request type: An attacker could not remove a location-binding (prior to its expiration
time), if she/he previously captured a signed Chord.Store message for ui.
Another mechanism we suggest against replay attacks—in addition to limited signa-
ture lifetimes—is the use of nonces to authenticate the originator of Store and Remove
messages, or in general to verify ownership of a SIP-URI. Consider a root node for key
k(ui), rootk(ui). The root node can challenge any DHT Store or Remove request it re-
ceives by sending a randomly generated nonce, nonce(l(ui)), directly (i.e. without DHT
routing) to the location contained in the specific request, l(ui). Only if a message with
a combined signature on l(ui), exp(l(ui)), req-type, and nonce(l(ui)), signonce(l(ui)), is
returned and the signature is verified, rootk(ui) will regard the request as authenticated
6Attacks on time synchronisation are outside the scope of our work.
111
and accept it. The combined signature on location, expiration time, request-type, and
nonce can be generated as follows:
signonce(l(ui)) = signkpriv(ui) {l(ui)|exp(l(ui))|req-type|nonce(l(ui))} (5.16)
Signing the concatenation (and not just the nonce) ensures that an attacker could only re-
use such a signature for the same combination of location, expiration date, DHT request
type, and randomly generated nonce.
In case of recursive routing, in principle not only the root node but any intermediate
node on the routing path could challenge Store and Remove requests before forwarding
them. We regard such per-hop challenging as not efficient and too much overhead. It
suffices if such replay attacks within the signature lifetime can be detected by the root
node. Note, however, that even without challenging the sender, self-certifying identities
still enable intermediate nodes to detect forged location-bindings and replay attacks with
expired location-bindings.
If a root node is an adversary, it may accept any replayed Remove or Store request
without challenge. In the case of Remove and subsequent Store, limited signature life-
times (as introduced in equation 5.13 and 5.14) limit such attacks to the signature ex-
piration date. Moreover, it requires an attacker which is in possession of a previous,
correctly signed location-binding for the URI to be attacked. In the case of only Remove,
this behaviour by the root node is not different from it not returning a data item for a
key in lookup requests. It can thus be detected by a query node (see also Chapter 4).
Apart from integrity checks on DHT requests, any query node nq can challenge the
callee at a location nq received from the DHT, l(ui). nq sends a nonce, nonce(l(ui)), to
l(ui) before initiating the actual communication (e.g. sending a SIP Invite message).
Only after nq receives a message with signonce(l(ui)) (as in equation 5.16) which it can
correctly verify, nq starts the session establishment with l(ui). This way, a query node nq
can itself challenge the location for a URI, l(ui), with a nonce to counter replay attacks
and to handle the case of an adversary root node (see above).
5.3.2 Notable Properties
Generally speaking, our scheme is independent of any network property and can thus be
used as a security add-on in almost any scenario. Specifically, our proposed solution has
the following benefits:
No central authority Most notably, our solution enables authentication of messages
without the use of a central authority. Thus, it retains the spirit of peer-to-peer computing
(no server), and scalability is not a problem.
Verification of message-integrity possible at all routing hops The verification-
procedure can be done at any routing hop. Thus, not only the requesting node can verify
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message-integrity: Any node in the network can verify the integrity of messages it receives
and detect (and possibly drop) falsified messages. For instance, with recursive routing
any node routing a storage or a lookup request could immediately drop a message which
contains a forged location binding. Also—independent of recursive or iterative routing
being used—a root node could decide not to replicate content at replica roots in case it
receives a forged location binding for a key. Dropping messages with forged content can
prevent Denial-of-Service attacks where attackers try to flood the network with bogus
messages (see 5.3.1).
Independence of overlay and routing strategy The scheme works independent
of the concrete DHT algorithm used. Chord has been chosen as the DHT algorithm
for P2P-SIP [140], but there may be alternative implementations based on other DHTs.
Therefore, it is important that any mechanism for protecting content integrity can also be
used with a different DHT/overlay protocol. Also, our scheme can be used with iterative,
recursive, or more sophisticated routing strategies [106].
Backwards compatibility Because the added cryptography is encoded within the
SIP-URI, our scheme works with any existing SIP implementation and most likely with
any future specification for P2P-SIP. No new headers or components are added. Hence,
the scheme can also be used on top of any existing (Client-Server) SIP deployment.
5.3.3 Drawbacks
The proposed scheme prevents man-in-the-middle attacks on content in P2P-SIP net-
works: Using this scheme, any node in the network can verify the authenticity of a
SIP-URI/location binding message it receives. However, the presented solution intro-
duces some new—mostly practical—hurdles. In this subsection we list and discuss these
issues.
Readability of SIP-URIs One of the most obvious disadvantages of the presented
solution is the (un)readability of self-certifying SIP-URIs. As they are computed by
converting the hash of a public key into a string, URIs will look cryptic to the user (e.g.
sip:k4h1gfhdh5wdd@sip-provider.de for a design choice of b = 65).
Key revocation With self-certifying identities, a public/private key pair and an iden-
tity are securely bound to each other. If the private key for a self-certifying identity is
compromised, key revocation essentially means URI revocation. Generating a new self-
certifying SIP-URI is not problematic. However, circulating a new URI to contacts and
informing them personally that the old URI is not valid anymore may be cumbersome to
users.
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Performance Because cryptographic functions are added to the nodes participating in
the network, such a network may loose some of its performance. As highlighted previ-
ously, the cryptographic primitives necessary to verify the authenticity of content in our
scheme demand very little computational resources from nodes. We therefore consider the
performance degradation due to the introduced cryptographic operations as negligible.
Associating a SIP-URI with a user Because URIs are cryptic, there must be a
way to reliably associate a user with a self-certifying SIP-URI. We suggest using existing
authentication infrastructure available to users for this purpose: A certified web service
using TLS [107] can publish an “online phone book”, mapping users to SIP-URIs. The
certificate of the service can be verified by users in their web-browser. In addition, users
may use business cards or existing communication channels (such as encrypted email) to
obtain a trustworthy association of an actual person with a SIP-URI. Note that without
self-certifying SIP-URIs in regular Client-Server SIP the same problem exists: How can
a user be sure that a SIP-URI indeed belongs to the person he intends to speak to,
especially if the person is previously unknown to the user?
5.4 Related Work
Self-certifying IPv6 addresses (CGAs) One of the main applications of self-certifying
identities has been network layer address generation for IPv6 [131]. Aura proposed to
generate self-certifying IPv6 addresses in [50]. With this proposal, the interface identifier
of an IPv6 address, i.e. the 64 least significant bits of an IPv6 address, are generated
based on a cryptographic hash of a public key. This approach is generally referred to as
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA). So-called hash extension techniques—as
originally proposed by Aura and Roe [52]—enable to increase the difficulty of a brute
force pre-image or second pre-image attack on the hash function while keeping the length
of the hash output constant: An additional hash function, h2() is repeatedly computed
on the public key, kpub, with a changing, concatenated modifier, r, until the first m bits
of this hash function’s output are equal to zero. Then, the actual hash of the public key
is computed, h1(kpub), but concatenating rsuccess, i.e. the value for r which resulted in an
m-bit zero output of h2() (see [52] pp.7 for details). For successful verification, the first m
bits of h2(kpub|rsuccess) must be zero and h1(kpub|rsuccess) must result in the self-certifying
identity. Essentially, this technique increases the strength of the hash function by m bits.
Earlier proposals for self-certifying IPv6 addresses [192] [181] lack this feature of being
able to increase the cryptographic strength of the hash function at a constant bit-length
and can thus only provide security equivalent to a 64-bit hash output (the length of the
interface identifier of an IPv6 address).
A concrete mechanism for generating CGAs including hash extension techniques has
been standardised [51] and is used by several Internet protocols such as SEcure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) [136], Shim6 [190], or Mobility Support in IPv6 [144]. A security
analysis of the significance of collision attacks on SHA-1 (e.g. by Wang et al. [284] [230]
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[229]) for CGAs is provided by Bagnulo and Arkko in [56]. They conclude that not
collision attacks, but rather second pre-image attacks on the hash function are the main
security concern for CGAs. Bos et al. provide a detailed security analysis of CGAs and
propose several improvements they refer to as CGA++ [73].
Self-certifying YURLs and httpsy scheme Close proposes self-certifying web-
URLs called YURLs [95] [137]. A YURL is a URL as specified in [67] which contains
the hash of a public key. Close also defines the httpsy scheme [96] for YURLs. Essentially,
httpsy uses a self-certifying YURL as basis for authenticating a website (instead of a DNS
hostname as in https): only a server which can authenticate itself with a private key
that corresponds to the public key which is intrinsically encoded in the YURL, is accepted
by the httpsy client.
In addition, Close proposes the use of so-called petnames [176] [97] to map crypto-
graphic hashes as in a YURL to a human readable format. The user’s browsers maintains a
mapping of user-chosen petnames to YURLs. The browser uses the YURL/httpsy concept
to authenticate web servers internally, but it displays these websites with petnames to
the user.
TOR Hidden Services TOR is an anonymity network using Onion Routing [108].
TOR provides so-called Hidden Services which enable to offer any kind of service running
over TCP (e.g. a web-server) without revealing the location (i.e. the IP-address) of the
service [21]. TOR Hidden Services can only be accessed via the TOR network, and only by
TOR clients. A pseudo top-level domain .onion is used to access TOR Hidden Services.
Self-certifying hostnames are generated by hashing and truncating a public key onto 16
alphanumeric characters and appending the .onion domain [22] [21]. Any hidden service
generates such a hostname, signs it with the corresponding private key, and publishes it
at centralised TOR directory servers7 [193].
To locate a hidden service in TOR, a TOR client needs to retrieve the self-certifying
hostname of that service out-of-band (e.g. by using a special website). Then, it looks
up this hostname (e.g. fjsusjfl4lq9hdfj.onion) at the TOR directory service. As a
result of the lookup, the client retrieves not the location of the desired service, but the
address of an introduction point. The client can verify the authenticity of this address
due to the self-certifying property of the service’s hostname. The introduction point is a
TOR relay server chosen by the hidden service. The TOR client requests a connection
with the hidden service at the introduction point, notifying it about its rendezvous point,
a TOR relay server chosen by the client. Communication with the actual hidden service
is established via the rendezvous point: Both the client and the hidden service establish
a TOR circuit (i.e. a set of encrypted connections through relays on the network) with
the rendezvous point individually.
7In principle, any key-value lookup service (e.g. also a decentralised one such a DHT) could be used
[108]. However, such an external lookup service would allow clients to access services anonymously only
if the lookup service itself is protected by TOR (which would not be the case for a DHT) [108].
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Other applications of self-certifying identities The Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
[183] uses the hash of a public key as the so called Host Identity Tag (HIT). This HIT is
a self-certifying identity in HIP. Since the HIT is the identifier used for host identification
on HIP, the self-certifying property enables hosts to authenticate each other based on
their identifier in HIP.
So-called strong names provide a form of self-certifying identities to software assem-
blies (i.e. compiled code libraries) in Microsoft’s .NET platform [1]. In the .NET frame-
work, an assembly’s name consists of several parts, such as a filename and a version
number. If the assembly name also contains a public key token, it is called a strong name
[1]. Such a public key token is obtained by hashing an associated public key. By contain-
ing this token as part of itself, the assembly name becomes self-certifying: it contains the
hash of an associated public key. The owner of the code can sign the assembly with the
corresponding private key to protect the integrity of the software assembly which has a
strong name.
Mazieres et al. present SFS, a file system which introduces self-certifying pathnames
[172]. In SFS, file systems are addresses by a path Location:HostID, where HostID is
the cryptographic hash of a public key. These self-certifying pathnames enable clients to
verify the authenticity of servers’ public keys solely based on the path of a file-system.
Dabek et al. propose a Cooperative File System (CFS) in [103]. CFS is a distributed
read-only file system based on the Chord DHT [267]. Files are stored in distributed
blocks in the DHT. The root block of a file is signed with the owner’s public key. The
root block’s Chord key is the hash of the owner’s public key, making the DHT key for
root blocks a self-certifying identity.
Baumgart proposes P2PNS, a decentralised naming service for P2PSIP [63]. This
approach mainly addresses the problem of secure node-ID generation and node-ID as-
signment in a DHT. In P2PNS, a DHT nodeID is generated as the hash of a public key.
A hash extension as proposed in [52] is applied to increase the hash strength while keep-
ing the effective bit-length of the resulting nodeID reasonably small. Users can choose an
arbitrary SIP-URI; a static binding between URI and nodeID is stored in the DHT. This
URI/nodeID binding is signed with the private key that corresponds to the public key
which hashes to the nodeID. In addition, the current location for a nodeID is stored in the
DHT and also signed with the private key corresponding to the nodeID. In summary, this
two-stage name resolution has a self-certifying nodeID, but no self-certifying SIP-URI.
Alternative approaches for integrity protection of content stored in a P2P
network Tamassia and Triandopoulos present an approach for authenticating data re-
trieved from a P2P network [272] in which they introduce a distributed version of a
Merkle tree [175]. A data source can cryptographically protect the integrity of multiple
data items stored in a P2P network: A root data item is signed by the source, and the
integrity of other data items from the same source is protected with an authentication
tree. This approach assumes that any node in the system can authenticate the public key
of a source via some external mechanism. The scheme targets applications where a single
source store multiple data items in the DHT; the main benefit of the authentication tree
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is that this source does not have to sign each data item.
Pathak and Iftode [197] and Palomar et al. [194] propose decentralised mechanisms for
authenticating public keys and content in a P2P network based on Byzantine agreement.
Assuming that each peer has a trusted group of other peers it regards as trustworthy,
and assuming that the majority of peers in this trusted group is actually behaving in a
non-adversary way, peers can authenticate public keys using the protocols from [197].
The actual mechanism requires that each peer in a peer B’s trusted group challenges
the originator of a new, unknown public key received by B. If there is no consensus
among the peers in B’s trusted group, Byzantine agreement is used to enable B to decide
on authenticating the newly received public key or not. The work in [194] extends this
concept to enable authentication of content received from a P2P network.
Differences to self-certifying SIP-URIs We have presented a solution to protect the
integrity of location bindings stored as content in a P2P-SIP network. In our approach,
SIP-URIs are self-certifying, i.e. generated based on a cryptographic public key. Prior to
our work8, no self-certifying approach for SIP-URIs has been presented. In addition, our
work constitutes a detailed design to protect the integrity of data items stored in a DHT
for the purpose of communication session establishment. As another difference to other
work, our approach makes the user identity in a distributed system self-certifying.
Compared to CGAs [50] and HIP [183], our approach puts self-certifying identities
at the application layer, making it suitable to protect P2P networks which route at the
application layer. The identity to be authenticated is not a routing layer address or
network layer identifier (as in the case of HIP), but a user’s identifier at the application
layer. Hash extension techniques [52] [50] [51] can easily be applied to our approach,
and in fact we suggest the use of such techniques to strengthen the security of the hash
function against attacks while keeping a SIP-URI at reasonable length (see 5.3.1).
SFS [172] and CFS [103] concern file system integrity and prevent file modification
attacks. Self-certifying SIP-URIs are designed to protect the integrity of location-bindings
in real-time communications. They prevent impersonation attacks on a user’s identifier.
The work of Tamassia and Triandopoulos [272] seems to target the same goal as our
work: authenticating data retrieved from a P2P network. However, there are important
differences. In P2P-SIP (i.e. in decentralised service location), only a single location-
binding is stored for each URI. Thus, there is no need for an authentication tree and the
added complexity. Further, self-certifying SIP-URIs provide the property that the public
key belonging to a source (i.e. to a SIP-URI) can be authenticated without external
mechanisms. Finally, Tamassia and Triandopoulos list protection against replay attacks
as a main benefit of their solution compared to other approached. We have presented
techniques to prevent replay attacks for self-certifying SIP-URIs, making our solution
comparable in this respect.
Authentication approaches based on Byzantine agreement [197] [194] differ from our
8originally published in [239]
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approach as they assume for each peer in the network a set of peers it initially regards as
trustworthy. Additionally, these approaches result in significant communication overhead
among peers and demand additional computational resources at each peer. Further,
approaches using Byzantine agreement can only guarantee correct authentication up to
a certain threshold of attackers. In contrary, self-certifying SIP-URIs do not rely on pre-
established trust relationships among peers, work correctly independently of the number
of attackers in the network, and require an acceptable cryptographic overhead.
P2PNS [63] and YURLs [95] [137] are approaches close to ours. P2PNS has in com-
mon with our approach that it aims at securing P2P-SIP networks with self-certifying
identities. However, the goal of P2PNS is to provide secure node-ID generation. Self-
certifying SIP-URIs protect the user-ID. With a self-certifying node-ID as in P2PNS, the
integrity of a location-binding cannot be verified based on a URI. However, in reality,
the caller’s node is in possession of the URI of the callee, and not its node-ID. A query
node cannot rely on a signed URI/node-ID binding in P2PNS unless it knows the node-
ID of the callee. Another drawback of P2PNS is that nodes have static node-IDs and
a static node-ID/URI mapping. This does not ensure uniform distribution of node-IDs,
and hence enables DHT routing attacks, where an attacker repeatedly generates node-IDs
until she/he is able to join the DHT in such a way that she/he can cut off a particu-
lar node-ID from the DHT. In addition, a static node-ID/URI mapping makes it not
straightforward for a user to receive calls for a URI on a secondary or temporary device.
YURLs are similar to our approach as the self-certifying identity is a URI at the
application layer, and the application type to be secured is service location. However,
YURLs use no hash extension techniques to keep the hash output at reasonable length.
Instead, petnames are the suggested solution to make self-certifying identities human-
readable. petnames rely on a trustworthy software (e.g. a browser) with an adequate user
interface to map a self-certifying identity onto a petname. They are thus, in contrary to
self-certifying SPI-URIs, not backwards compatible with existing VoIP hardphones which
only accept a SIP-URI as an identity. One other difference is that YURLs encode self-
certifying identities within an http-address, while our approach takes SIP-specifics into
account. In addition, one of our core contributions is the application of self-certifying
identities in P2P networks, and the design of a self-certifying scheme for DHT-based ser-
vice location (including protection against replay attacks). The existing work on YURLs
targets http client-server communications. In principle, however, YURLs could also be
applied to authenticate data items stored in a DHT (e.g. for a decentralised, DHT-based
DNS approach).
Another approach very close to our one is the use of self-certifying URLs by TOR
Hidden Services [21]. Similarly to our approach, self-certifying URLs are used to locate
a service. However, with TOR hidden services, the self-certifying hostname does not
actually locate the desired service. Instead, a TOR relay server (as introduction point for
the hidden service) is returned. The actual location (i.e. IP-address) of the hidden service
is never revealed to the TOR client. This is due to the objective of hiding services (also
called responder anonymity). Our work does not target anonymity of services; hence the
actual location of services is not protected by self-certifying identities in our approach.
Further, self-certifying .onion hostnames are stored at centralised TOR directory servers.
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Our work includes the design of distributed storage of self-certifying identities in a DHT. It
is noteworthy to point out that in [108], the use of a DHT as a decentralised alternative
to TOR directory servers for storing the addresses of introduction points for .onion
hostnames is briefly mentioned. However, such a design is currently not used by TOR
[22]. More importantly, such a design would not enable clients to connect to hidden
services anonymously [108].
5.5 Summary and Contribution
In any SIP communication, a user is represented by a SIP-URI. We protect the integrity
of messages regarding this identity by introducing self-certifying SIP-URIs. For these
URIs, only the owner of the identity can sign messages. Thus, users can prove their
ownership of a SIP-URI.
However, we do not solve the problem of how to bootstrap authentication: How can
a caller be sure about the callee’s real (physical) identity? Bootstrapping authentication
without a central authority or a pre-call trust relationship seems very hard to achieve.
We feel it is best to rely on existing authentication infrastructure to achieve this, e.g. by
using an https website with a URI directory like a phone book. Even though existing
authentication infrastructure (like https web-pages) uses a central authority (and has
some problems), this central authority is neither part of the P2P network nor used to
authenticate the SIP identity.
With self-certifying SIP-URIs, users cannot choose the characters in their SIP-URI.
Essentially, this is the price being paid for the ability to prove ownership of a SIP-URI.
We feel that the ability to prove ownership of a URI to any entity in the system is worth
this drawback.
We have presented a solution to protect the integrity of location bindings stored as
content in a P2P-SIP network. Our proposal is the first self-certifying approach for SIP-
URIs. Moreover, our approach is unique as it proposes a self-certifying user identifier
in DHT-based communication session establishment. We provide a scheme for using
self-certifying SIP-URIs as data items for user registration and location lookup in a
P2P network. The proposed scheme requires no central authority, enables verification of
message-integrity on all routing hops, and is independent of the DHT or routing strategy
being used. Further, it can be used on top of any existing SIP-deployment because all
added cryptography is encoded within the SIP-URI.
The proposed scheme has been described in detail. We have shown how our solution
prevents man-in-the-middle attacks on content stored in the network. In addition, we have
discussed problems that arise when using self-certifying content in a P2P-SIP network
and evaluated our approach. Finally, we have examined potential attacks on the scheme
and presented countermeasures, most notably against replay attacks.
Our approach as described in this chapter is specific to SIP-based communications,
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as the self-certifying property is intrinsically encoded in the SPI-URI. It can be applied
to secure DHT-based as well as to client-server based SIP deployments. However, we see
self-certifying identities—and in particular self-certifying URIs—as a general mechanism
to protect the integrity of location-bindings in any kind of decentralised service location
application. For instance, our scheme could be modified to self-certifying URIs for a
decentralised Domain Name System (DNS).
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In this chapter, we present a decentralised solution for protection against unsolicited
incoming messages (Spam) in real-time communications1. For VoIP, the term Spam-over-
IP-Telephony (SPIT) is often used to describe such unwanted communications from the
callee’s perspective. Our solution applies to any kind of multimedia communication Spam;
however, for simplicity we will use VoIP as the example application in this chapter and
hence the term SPIT to refer to unsolicited real-time communications. One core challenge
in preventing SPIT attacks is to assess the trustworthiness of the caller’s identity. Further,
spoofing attacks must be prevented by verifying that the call has been initiated by the user
belonging to the caller’s identity. We propose to adapt a Web-of-Trust model to real-time
communication in order to assess the trustworthiness of incoming signalling messages—
e.g. VoIP calls—based on the social relationships among users. We present the design of a
system which is capable of cryptographically verifying identity assertion chains associated
with users in real-time [44], i.e. efficiently in that it induces minimal overhead during the
regular processing of signalling messages. We show how our scheme can be applied to
client-server SIP as well as to decentralised scenarios such as P2PSIP. Further, we present
an evaluation of the proposed approach applied to P2PSIP, based on a prototypical
implementation. Our results show that indeed real-time cryptographic verification of
certificate chains among users is feasible for P2P-based VoIP communications and can be
performed in a decentralised manner. Finally, we highlight the benefits of our system as
well as its limitations, discuss open issues, and relate our proposed scheme to other work.
We discuss our motivation and goals as well as existing solutions and their drawbacks
in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we present our approach and describe the proposed system
in detail. Subsequently, we present the results of our prototypical implementation and
discuss potential limitations of our proposal (Section 6.3). Finally, we relate our work
to other approaches (Section 6.4) and conclude with a summary of our contributions
(Section 6.5).
1Parts of this chapter (including figures) have originally been published in [244]. See also Appendix
A.
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6.1 Rationale
6.1.1 Motivation and Goals
As highlighted in Chapter 3, one research challenge for P2P-based VoIP systems is the
prevention of Spam-over-IP Telephony (SPIT). In order to prevent SPIT it is necessary
to estimate if an incoming signalling message (e.g. SIP-Invite) is unsolicited from the
receiving SIP user agent’s perspective or not. One core challenge is to assess the trustwor-
thiness of the caller’s identity with respect to sending unsolicited messages. Moreover,
it is important to verify that the call has been initiated by the user belonging to the
caller’s identity in a SIP-message (the SIP-URI in the From header). This problem is not
easy to solve as VoIP-identities (e.g. the SIP-URI) can be spoofed easily. This makes
the detection of social attacks like SPIT and unsolicited communications in general (i.e.
any kind of unwanted incoming messages from the callee’s perspective) a sophisticated
problem.
Existing solutions to protect users against SPIT rely on central entities such as SIP
proxies [220] [204] (see further Section 6.4). In a fully decentralised scenario, anti-SPIT
protection can only reside in terminals. There is no central entity such as a proxy protect-
ing the terminal. Some existing anti-SPIT techniques such as whitelisting, blacklisting,
or simple IQ tests (i.e. challenging the caller) can be integrated in terminals [245]. How-
ever, existing solutions for identity assertion in SIP rely on pre-call trust relationships
between SIP entities of the caller’s and callee’s domain. The process of issuing certificates
is centralised and certificate verification is based on a public key infrastructure (PKI).
In P2PSIP, no centralised SIP entities nor a centralised PKI exists. Therefore, such
mechanisms cannot be applied to a completely decentralised setting.
In this chapter we present a solution for decentralised identity assertion: We propose to
adapt a Web-of-Trust (WoT) model to real-time communications. Our approach uses the
social relationships between users in order to detect if an incoming signalling message was
really sent by the user belonging to the caller-identity inherent in the message or not, and
further to estimate if this user/identity is trustworthy, i.e. not sending unsolicited (or even
malicious) messages. In the absence of any reliable information about a caller’s identity
(e.g. in case a callee has not received a call before from a given caller), a fully autonomous
decentralised solution is not feasible. Instead, the only decentralised approach is to rely
on other nodes to judge the trustworthiness of the identity of an incoming call. This is
our rationale for choosing a Web-of-Trust model.
To be applicable to real-time communications such as VoIP, the social relationships
between users in a Web-of-Trust have to be known to the callee either prior to the call or
must be derived at the time of the call in real-time, i.e. efficiently enough to still allow
for a session establishment duration that is acceptable for real-time communications.
Otherwise, the downloading of certificates and cryptographic verification of certificate
chains is likely to delay communications (e.g. a VoIP call) too much to be acceptable
to users. There exist algorithms for real-time derivation of WoT certificate chains [198].
However, existing application usage models of a Web-of-Trust are different from our
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approach and do not enable real-time verification of certificate chains. Consider the
common usage of the PGP [298] Web-of-Trust in non real-time communications such as
email: PGP key-servers (e.g. [10]) merely offer storage of users’ certificates. A user who
receives a signed email usually has a direct relationship with the sender of the email.
Otherwise, the user has to retrieve the certificate of the sender and must then verify the
certificate chain between itself and the sender of the email (which most probably results
in fetching more certificates). While there exist services for computing the certificate
chain between sender and receiver [198], such tools are not integrated in email clients and
the cryptographic verification of the certificate chain can only be done after receiving
an email. More importantly, the necessary certificates need to be fetched subsequently
by the user. This renders current usage of Web-of-Trust models infeasible for real-time
communications.
One main challenge for our work is hence the adaptation of a Web-of-Trust model to
real-time communications such as VoIP. Further, we aim to design a scheme for decen-
tralised identity assertion, i.e. the overall system should rely on as few central entities as
possible. The main goal of our work is thus to develop and evaluate mechanisms that
allow decentralised identity assertion for real-time communications. In other words, we
desire a system distributed among entities which enables the timely—i.e. fast enough to
be useful for real-time communications—derivation of a certificate chain between a caller
and callee as well as the corresponding cryptographic verification of the certificate chain.
6.1.2 Existing Solutions for Identity Assertion in Real-Time
Communications
The research and standardisation communities have realised the problem of SPIT and
in particular SIP identity spoofing. Below we summarize existing approaches for SIP
identity assertion and point out why they are not applicable to P2P-based VoIP systems.
Many proposed mechanisms for estimating if an incoming message was sent by the user
belonging to the caller-identity rely on so-called strong identities [276]: If an identity is
signed by a centralised authority which is trusted by the receiving end, messages received
from this identity are believed to be non-malicious. For SIP, the identity of the caller is
the SIP-URI in the From header of a SIP-Invite message. RFC 4474 [201] specifies a
mechanism for having this identity, i.e. the SIP-URI of the caller, signed by the domain
of the caller. When the caller places a call, its SIP domain challenges the caller with
an authentication request. Only after proper authentication the domain will sign the
outgoing message. When receiving a call, the proxy of the callee verifies the signature
with the public key of the caller’s domain [201]. Figure 6.1 shows this approach in the
context of the classic SIP trapezoid.
For verifying the binding of a retrieved public key to the domain of the sender a PKI is
used. A hierarchy of Certificate Authorities (CAs) is used to establish a cryptographically
verifiable certificate chain between any two SIP domains. This implies that a central
authority on top of this CA-hierarchy, the Root-CA, is regarded as trustworthy by all
124
Figure 6.1: SIP Strong Identity Approach (RFC 4474)
entities in the system. The Root-CA is the basic building block for all assurance related
to assertions of identities in such a system. Thus, the process of issuing certificates is
centralised.
In addition, with current approaches there is no trustworthiness associated with the
process of identity assertion. The cryptographic assertion of an identity is merely techni-
cal: the proxy’s assertion does not regard the trustworthiness of the signed identity but
instead in most cases only assesses the possession of the private part of an asymmetric
cryptographic key pair. It is important to realise that an identity asserted by its domain
can still misbehave, e.g. send unsolicited messages (which are correctly signed by its out-
going SIP-proxy). The reason is that it is not specified what the basis for asserting a
SIP-identity is. In particular, identity assertion is not tied to the perceived trustworthi-
ness of the asserted identity regarding certain actions (e.g. with respect to sending out
unsolicited messages).
In summary, existing approaches for SIP identity assertion rely on centralised SIP
servers and in addition on a centralised PKI for certificates. Further, identity assertion
is merely technical and does not consider the trustworthiness of an identity regarding an
expected behaviour. In contrast, our goal is to design a decentralised solution for SIP
identity assertion. By using a Web-of-Trust, our approach also enables to bind identity
assertion to social relationships among users.
6.2 Adapting a Web-of-Trust Model to Decentralised
Real-Time Communications Identity Assertion
The main idea behind our approach is to use a Web-of-Trust to verify the binding of an
unknown identity to a public key and additionally to verify the trustworthiness of this
identity. The rationale behind this approach is that the social relationships among users
(e.g. in a VoIP network) are very beneficial for assessing the trustworthiness of identities.
Users can assess the trustworthiness of identities based on the perceived interaction in
the past, e.g. through received phone calls in the case of VoIP. Using a Web-of-Trust
adds the necessary cryptographic primitives so that users can express their assessment
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of SIP-identities by signing other users’ identities. We assume the reader to be familiar
with the general scheme of a Web-of-Trust, as used for instance in PGP [298].
Compared to using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for retrieving and verifying
public keys of the certificate chain between caller and callee, our approach has the ad-
vantage of decentralised identity assertion: In a Web-of-Trust, the process of issuing and
signing public keys is not centralized but distributed among nodes. Thus, there is no
single root authority which has to be trusted by all participants in the system (as is the
case in a PKI). Rather, the authority to assert identities is distributed among all nodes
in the system.
6.2.1 Assumptions and Definitions
We assume that a Web-of-Trust (WoT) infrastructure exists (e.g. the publicly available
protocols used by PGP [81]) where redundant servers (similar to PGP key-servers [10])
store certificates of users. The WoT key-servers update each other’s key-database with
a special protocol amongst themselves. Users can upload certificates which have been
signed by other users to these servers. Each public/private key pair has a unique key-ID
in the system. The binding between a user-identity (user-ID) and such a key-ID is signed
by users in certificates.
A key assumption for our system is that users sign other identities in the system only
if they have had positive (e.g. non-malicious or solicited) interactions with this identity
in the past. This means that users can express how trustworthy they regard other users
to be (with respect to sending malicious/unsolicited messages) by signing the certificates
of these other users in the WoT. Note that in a PGP-like WoT, key-servers are not
trusted entities; they simply store certificates. Any user can store any certificate on these
servers. Specifically, the signatures of the certificates are not necessarily verified by the
key-servers. This task is left to the users. Thus, to achieve real-time computation and
verification of a certificate chain between two users this approach is not feasible per se
and needs to be modified. We define a certificate chain between two user identities as
follows:
Definition 14 (Certificate Chain): A Certificate Chain (or transitive
identity assertion path) between two user identities ux, ul in a Web-of-Trust
is a chain of signed certificates between users in the Web-of-Trust such that
ux asserts u1 asserts u2 ... ul−2 asserts ul−1 asserts ul, where assertion refers
to signing the binding of the identity with the corresponding public key.
We use the terms certificate chain and identity assertion path synonymously. The
length l of an identity assertion path is the number of intermediate entities in the certifi-
cate chain between the two users including ul. Note that there can be various different
identity assertion paths between two users. We thus define the minimal certificate chain
length as described below:
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Definition 15 (Shortest Certificate Chain Length): The Shortest Cer-
tificate Chain Length lmin between two user identities is the minimal certifi-
cate chain length among all certificate chains between these two users.
The underlying assumption is that in the average case the shorter the certificate
chain, the less is the probability that the transitive assertion path between two users has
been infiltrated by an attacker (e.g. by deluding a legitimate user to assert an attacker’s
identity). Adopting the definition of an assertion path to real-time communications such
as VoIP and expressing it cryptographically, we say that there is a certificate chain of
length l between callee and caller, if in the WoT there is an assertion path such that
[keyID(callee)] signed [keyID1, userID1] signed [keyID2, userID2]
. . . [keyIDl−1, userIDl−1] signed [keyID(caller), userIDcaller].
Since the receiving party (i.e. the callee) wants to know how trustworthy the calling
identity is, we are only interesting in identity assertion paths going from callee to caller
(and not vice-versa).
All (or a given subset of all) certificate chains for a given WoT can be visualised in a
certificate graph, which we define as follows:
Definition 16 (Certificate Graph): The Certificate Graph of a Web-of-
Trust is a directed graph G = (V,E) where vertices (V ) represent identities
and edges (E) represent certificates issued among identities. A directed edge
v1, v2 ∈ E denotes that v1 asserted the identity v2 with a certificate.
Example 6.1: Figure 6.2 shows the certificate graph between two user identities in the
PGP Web-of-Trust (obtained with [88]). In the example, the minimum length of a certifi-
cate chain between jan.seedorf@nw.neclab.eu and dwing@cisco.com is 6. Note that
in the figure also the respective PGP key-IDs of the corresponding public key for each
identity-key binding is displayed, e.g. C9E46707 for jan.seedorf@nw.neclab.eu.
The overall rationale is that the longer the identity assertion path, the less reliable
is the (indirect) signature chain of the caller’s identity to the callee. Our approach
potentially enables identifying trustworthy identities (whitelisting) but not the detection
of badly behaving identities. In other words, if no or only a long certificate chain can be
found, our approach cannot assess the trustworthiness of the caller. We therefore assume
that our WoT scheme is used in conjunction with other security and SPIT prevention
mechanisms which either reside on central entities or on the receiving terminal.
We propose detailed schemes on how to apply our idea to a client/server-based VoIP
system as well as to a P2P-based VoIP system. Our main interest is the application
to a fully decentralised system such as P2PSIP. However, it is worth noting that our
decentralised identity assertion scheme can be applied to a centralised client/server SIP
system just as good. Furthermore, it is easier to grasp the overall scheme and message
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Figure 6.2: Example of a Certificate Graph
flow if explained how it can be applied to a client/server setting first. For each use case
we have specific assumptions:
1. Client/server-based SIP scenario: Here, we assume that the callee is protected by
its upstream SIP proxy which analyses incoming messages on behalf of the callee.
To assess the trustworthiness of incoming calls, the callee’s proxy can either invoke
an assertion path calculation from a third entity or such a computation can be
performed by the SIP proxy itself. Depending on the length of the shortest identity
assertion path found, the proxy conducts further processing of SIP messages2. The
result of the WoT mechanism is combined with a holistic VoIP protection solution,
e.g. as presented in [204]. If a short certificate chain is found, we assume this to
be an indication of the incoming call not being unsolicited. Depending on system
settings, e.g. the set certificate chain path length threshold, the call might directly
be forwarded to the callee, or this fact might influence an overall security score
computed by the callee’s SIP proxy.
2. P2PSIP scenario: Here, we assume that the callee’s terminal itself analyses incom-
ing messages. The reason for this assumption is that in a P2PSIP scenario the callee
cannot rely on any upstream entity for protection. Thus, to assess the trustwor-
thiness of incoming calls, the callee’s terminal must in some way do the assertion
2e.g. forwarding to the callee for very short path lengths, conducting further security tests for medium
length paths, and potentially directly forwarding the call to the mailbox of the callee for long paths
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path calculation itself. Since there are existing anti-SPIT mechanisms which can
be deployed at the receiving terminal [245], we account for other security checks
of incoming messages conducted by the receiving terminal which can be combined
with identity assertion into an overall rating. The assessment of the incoming SIP
message based on identity assertion (potentially combined with other mechanisms)
results in a SIP-response sent to the caller. Depending on the overall rating, such
a response can either reject the phone call, impose some additional challenges to
be solved by the caller, redirect the call to some outsourced protection entity, or
accept the call.
6.2.2 Real-time Derivation and Verification of Certificate Chains
Our approach relies on the computation of transitive identity assertion paths between
callee and caller. In principle, an attacker can fake such paths by uploading a certifi-
cate to a key-server which binds its user-ID to its key-ID, but with an invalid signature
apparently from a legitimate user. This results in falsely marking the attacker as trust-
worthy. To prevent such assertion path forging, any certificate chain in a WoT must be
cryptographically verified.
6.2.2.1 Verifying Key Server
Our approach enables to find the identity assertion path between two identities as well
as cryptographically verifying the complete certificate chain in real-time. To achieve
derivation and cryptographic verification of an identity assertion path in real-time, we
introduce a specialized WoT key-server as part of the key-server federation which operates
normally in the key-server network but additionally does the following:
1. For each certificate it receives either from a user or from another server it verifies
the signatures in the certificate. The server can do this because as a key-server it is
in possession of the corresponding public keys to the private keys which signed the
certificate. In case the key-server is missing a public key necessary to verify a newly
received certificate, it tries to retrieve this key from other servers in the key-server
network. If it cannot obtain the necessary certificate, the corresponding signature
is considered as unverified by the key-server.
2. It periodically publishes a file which contains in a compressed, machine-readable
format the certificate graph (i.e. the identity assertion relationships) between all the
certificates it stores of which it has verified the signatures. These identity assertion
relationships are verified by the server in the sense that all cryptographic signatures
responding to the certificate graph inherent in the file have been verified. The file
published by the server is structured in such a way that certificate paths between
any two identities can be computed efficiently using this file. We refer to such a file
as a Verified Compressed Certificate Graph (VCCG).
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Figure 6.3: System Architecture of Proposed Approach
Note that there already exists a file format for publishing a certificate graph in a
compressed way, the so-called .wot-file format [87]. Such files are created by certain
PGP key servers. We demand that all signatures have been verified before creating such
certificate graph files. In case the corresponding signatures for a certificate graph have
not been verified, we refer to such a compressed data structure (with unverified certificate
chains) as an Unverified Compressed Certificate Graph (UCCG).
The special Verifying Key-Server (VKS) is a lightweight central entity in the system.
Its function is to to correctly perform certificate verification and to correctly compute the
certificate graph as outlined above. It is trusted to perform these operations correctly by
the receiving party, i.e. either the callee’s SIP-proxy (in the case of client/server SIP),
or the callee’s terminal (in the case of P2PSIP). It is important to understand that the
VKS is not a trusted authority with respect to issuing and signing certificates. This
functionality is decentralised in our scheme based on the Web-of-Trust model. The au-
thorities which sign certificates (i.e. the users) are distributed over the system. The VKS
fetches publicly available certificates from other key-servers and verifies the signatures.
The callee (or its proxy) merely relies on the fact that the VKS performs this signature
verification correctly. Most notably, the VKS is not necessarily needed for the establish-
ment of phone calls: the receiving party can use the VCCG published by the VKS to do
the certificate chain calculation itself. Indeed we study such an approach when applying
the scheme to P2PSIP networks.
6.2.2.2 Efficient Certificate Chain Computation
The VCCG published or used by the VKS itself contains the identity assertion relation-
ships among all nodes in the WoT in a compressed form. Identity assertion paths derived
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from the VCCG can be considered verified because all certificates corresponding to the
certificate graph have been verified a priori by the VKS. We now consider the problem
of deriving the certificate chain from the VCCG efficiently.
For each identity in the WoT, it can be obtained from the VCCG which other identities
it asserted. Also, all the identities which asserted a specific identity (and its certificate)
can be found directly using the VCCG. A simple approach for finding an identity assertion
path is to start at the callee’s identity and conduct a Breadth-First Search (BFS) on the
VCCG until the caller is found. However, BFS has a time-complexity of O(bd+1) where
b is the branching factor and d is the depth of the graph [225].
Given that from the VCCG it can be inferred directly for each identity i not only
the other identities which i asserted, but also the identities which signed i’s certificate,
it is more efficient to start a search from both directions, i.e. in parallel going from the
caller to the callee and vice versa. The time-complexity of this search is O(2b
d
2 ), because
essentially two BFS algorithms are executed with half the depth d [225]. Note that the
time-complexity of such a double-sided Breadth-First Search is less than the O(bd+1) for
standard BFS (assuming b ≥ 2). A sketch of an algorithm for computing a certificate
chain in a WoT efficiently based on the above rationale has been presented in [198].
We refer to such an algorithm as dBFS for double-sided Breadth First Search. In the
following, we assume that a dBFS (or similar) algorithm is used for fast certificate chain
derivation.
6.2.3 A Scheme for Decentralised Identity Assertion in Real-
Time Communications
Before we detail how the VKS and a WoT can be used for identity assertion in a P2P-
based VoIP system, we present a scheme for using our decentralised identity assertion
approach in a client/server SIP setting.
6.2.3.1 System Architecture
The general procedure of our approach is as follows: A user signs a signalling message
(e.g. SIP-Invite) with its private key and appends (e.g. via S/MIME [208]) a self-signed
certificate containing the corresponding public key3. The proxy of the callee receives the
message with the attached self-signed certificate of the caller. To check that the message
was really sent by a user who is in possession of the corresponding private key, the callee’s
proxy verifies the message-signature using the public key from the attached certificate.
To further check that the message was sent by the user belonging to the identity inherent
in the message and to check that the identity of the caller is trustworthy, the proxy checks
that the SIP-URI in the From-header of the message corresponds to the SIP-URI in the
attached certificate and invokes an algorithm which delivers a certificate chain between
3The concrete way of signing a message is orthogonal to our method as long as the signature is unique
for every message to prevent replay attacks (RFC 4474 [201] specifies such signatures for SIP messages).
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the caller and the callee. The input to this algorithm is the certificate attached to the
received SIP-message as well as the receiver’s certificate. Since the certificate attached
to the message binds the caller’s user-ID (e.g. his/her SIP-URI) to its key-ID, attackers
cannot spoof SIP identities as long as they are not in possession of the corresponding
private key. Depending on the length of the identity assertion path between caller and
callee, the proxy may invoke further steps to check the trustworthiness of the message,
e.g. by applying other tests on the message [204]. The computation of identity assertion
paths is either done by the callee’s proxy or by a third party.
Figure 6.3 shows the general architecture of the proposed solution. As described pre-
viously, the VKS in the figure is a specialized key-server which not only stores keys/cer-
tificates but additionally verifies the signatures. Also, it periodically computes a VCCG
file which contains the identity assertion relationships between all verified certificates by
the server. Using this file, it can offer the service of computing a certificate chain between
two identities. As an alternative, it may also publish this VCCG file to be used by others.
In the example, however, a proxy which receives a message from a A to B uses the ser-
vices offered by the VKS to find out the minimum certificate chain length lmin between
B (callee) and A (caller). The server detects that B has asserted an identity C which in
turn has asserted an identity A. Since all signatures in the corresponding certificates of
A, B, and C have been verified by the VKS a priori during their upload, the certificate
chain is not only computed but verified as well.
6.2.3.2 Detailed Scheme and Message Flow
We now describe the cryptographic procedures and message flows of our proposed scheme
in detail. We describe our scheme for the case that the VKS is used by the callee’s
SIP proxy on every call to compute a verified shortest certificate chain length lmin. In
principle, the callee could also perform the certificate verification process itself for each
call. However, this would result in longer call setup time because the callee would need
to fetch the corresponding certificates from a key server. We postpone the investigation
of this trade-off, i.e. between depending on the VKS for certificate verification and call
setup duration, to Subsection 6.2.4 where we discuss applying our scheme to P2PSIP
networks.
In the following, we use the notation for digitally signing and verifying messages
introduced in Section 5.2. Hence, we denote a self-signed certificate for identity s as
signkpriv(s) {kpub(s), s}, meaning that the signature cryptographically protects the binding
of identity and corresponding public key (e.g. by signing a hash of the concatenation of
both elements). Assume a caller (with SIP-URI s) is trying to establish a SIP-based
VoIP call with a callee (with SIP-URI r). Assume further that the callee is protected by
its proxy Pr, and the proxy is in possession of the key-ID for the certificate of r, kID(r).
The proxy uses a special, trusted WoT key-server VKS which offers real-time derivation
of pre-verified certificate chains. Then the following steps are executed:
1. Pr receives a SIP-Invite message m which is signed by s with its private key
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kpriv(s), attached is a self-signed certificate from s:
s→ Pr : signkpriv(s) {m} , signkpriv(s) {kpub(s), s} (6.1)
2. To protect r, Pr needs to find out if the certificate attached to m really belongs
to the SIP-URI in the From-header of m (i.e. s). Therefore Pr first verifies the
signature using the public key from the certificate:
Pr : verifykpub(s) {m} (6.2)
If the signature is valid, Pr knows that whoever sent m was in possession of the
private key kpriv(s). Otherwise (i.e. if the signature is not valid), Pr rejects m.
3. Additionally, Pr wants to verify that the attached public key really belongs to
identity s and to know how trustworthy the identity s is. Thus, Pr computes the
key-ID for s, kID(s), by hashing the certificate of s with a specified cryptographic
hash function hKID, and then sends this key-ID as well as the key-ID of the callee,
kID(r), to the VKS:
Pr : kID(s) = hKID
(
signkpriv(s) {kpub(s), s}
)
(6.3)
Pr → VKS : kID(s), kID(r) (6.4)
4. The VKS computes the length of the minimal certificate chain length in the WoT
between r and s, lmin. To find the shortest certificate path efficiently, it can use a
double-sided breadth first search (dBFS) algorithm to find the minimum certificate
chain from r to s. If there is no certificate chain, lmin is 0. VKS returns lmin to Pr:
VKS : lmin = dBFS {kID(r), kID(s)} (6.5)
VKS→ Pr : lmin (6.6)
5. Depending on lmin, Pr conducts further processing of m.
Figure 6.4 shows an example for a possible message flow using the proposed scheme
for establishing a VoIP call. Here, a message M is sent from caller s to callee r. The
callee’s SIP proxy server Pr uses an external service provided by a special WoT VKS.
It is also possible that the proxy does the identity assertion path computation itself. In
this case Pr and VKS could either be located in the same device/entity, or Pr would
frequently fetch a VCCG file published by the VKS. Depending on lmin (and potentially
other mechanisms) the proxy may take different actions on M , e.g. forward M to the
callee if an overall score is below a certain threshold.
As an alternative (shown in Figure 6.5), the caller may only append its key-ID (instead
of its self-signed certificate) to the message. In this case, the proxy of the callee passes the
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Figure 6.4: Scheme for Decentralised Identity Assertion (Caller Attaching Self-signed
Certificate)
key-ID on to the key-server which returns not only the length of the certificate chain but
also the certificate of the caller4. This variation has the advantage that the SIP-Invite
message does not increase much compared to a regular SIP message (except for the
key-ID in a new SIP-header). Appending the certificate with each SIP-Invite message
would increase each such message by the size of a certificate (e.g. up to 4kb with 4096-bit
RSA keys). On the other hand, as a disadvantage in this case (i.e. only appending the
key-ID), it is not possible for the proxy to verify the signature of the message instantly
(i.e. before passing on information to the key-server). Instead, the proxy can only verify
the signature after having received lmin and the certificate of s from the key-server. This
makes the scheme more susceptible to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: An attacker could
send bogus messages with invalid signatures in order to stress the computational power
of the proxy or the VKS. Note that replay attacks are not possible in any case since the
signature is unique for every SIP message.
Note that our definition of the WoT key-ID (equation 6.3) deviates from the specifi-
cation of a key-ID in PGP. In PGP, the key-ID is defined as the leftmost 64-bit of the
hash of the corresponding public key [81]. In particular, PGP key-IDs are not pre-image
nor second pre-image resistant. In other words, it can be possible for an attacker to
generate a public key which matches an existing key-ID of some other user. In contrary,
our definition of a key-ID assumes that a secure hash function is applied to the certificate
which binds the user’s identity to its public key. Specifically, we assume the hash func-
tion to be second pre-image resistant. Hence, if the caller sends its key-ID along with
the SIP-Invite message, no identity spoofing attacks are possible: In case an attacker is
creating a fake key and correctly signs the SIP-Invite message with this key and appends
the corresponding key-ID, there will be no identity assertion path to the key-ID in the
4Delivering the corresponding certificate for a certain key-ID is the basic primitive provided by any
regular WoT key server.
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Figure 6.5: Scheme for Decentralised Identity Assertion (Caller Attaching Key-ID)
WoT. On the other hand, an attacker can append a correct key-ID of a legitimate user
but is unable to sign the SIP-Invite because he is not in possession of the corresponding
private key.
6.2.4 Applying the Scheme to P2PSIP Networks
We now describe how the scheme presented in the previous subsection can be adopted to
a decentralised scenario such as P2PSIP.
6.2.4.1 System Architecture
Since our goal is to design decentralised security solutions, we do not consider the case
where the callee’s terminal contacts the VKS on every call. Such an approach would put
too much dependency on a centralised entity. Therefore, we envision the callee’s terminal
to periodically fetch the VCCG file published by the VKS, in an out-of-band fashion with
respect to receiving phone calls. The VKS pre-verifies certificates it uses in the published
certificate graph VCCG. Thus, the callee’s terminal simply has to compute the minimal
certificate chain itself. It can assume that the certificate chain is valid. Figure 6.6 shows
the corresponding system architecture: The callee directly fetches the VCCG file from
the VKS.
If a self-signed certificate is attached to the SIP-Invite by the caller, the callee’s
terminal can use it directly to verify the integrity of the message. In case that only the
key-ID is attached to the message, the callee’s terminal needs to retrieve the corresponding
public key for verifying the signature of the SIP-Invite message. It can fetch the caller’s
certificate from any regular key server (i.e. not necessarily from the VKS): Since the
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Figure 6.6: System Architecture in a Decentralised Scenario
key-ID is computed via a secure hash function of the certificate in our approach (which
comprises the identity and the public key), a secure link to the certificate chain can be
verified by the callee by hashing the retrieved certificate and comparing the result with
the key-ID sent by the caller.
6.2.4.2 Detailed Scheme and Message Flow
For simplicity, we only present the message flow for the case that the caller appends
its self-signed certificate to the SIP-Invite message. In case the caller only appends
its key-ID to the SIP-Invite message, the corresponding certificate needs to be fetched
from any key-server by the callee. Prior to receiving calls, r has downloaded a verified
certificate graph (VCCG) from a trustworthy VKS:
VKS→ r : VCCGV KS (6.7)
In a P2PSIP scenario, there is no proxy protecting the callee. The callee, r, thus di-
rectly receives a SIP-Invite message m which is signed by the caller, s, with its private
key kpriv(s). To confirm that the certificate attached to an incoming message, m, really
belongs to the SIP-URI in the From-header of m, r first verifies the signature using the
public key from the certificate. The first two steps are thus similar to the client/server
case (6.1, 6.2), except that r, the callee, is the entity performing the signature verification
of the incoming message:
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Figure 6.7: Scheme Applied to P2PSIP
1. r receives a message m from s, attached is a self-signed certificate from s:
s→ r : signkpriv(s) {m} , signkpriv(s) {kpub(s), s} (6.8)
2. r verifies the signature of m. If the signature is valid, r knows that whoever sent
m was in possession of the private key kpriv(s). Otherwise (i.e. if the signature is
not valid), r rejects m :
r : verifykpub(s) {m} (6.9)
3. To see if the public key really belongs to the identity s and to determine how
trustworthy the identity s is, r computes the minimum certificate path length as
follows. First, r computes the key-ID for s, kID(s), by hashing the certificate of
s with a specified hash function hKID. Assume that r has precomputed its own
key-ID kID(r). Then, r executes a double-sided Breadth First Search (dBFS) al-
gorithm on VCCG to find the minimum certificate chain from r to s:
r : kID(s) = hKID
(
signkpri(s) {kpub(s), s}
)
(6.10)
r : lmin = dBFS {kID(r), kID(s))} (6.11)
4. Depending on lmin, r creates a SIP response message R(m). For instance, r may
return a SIP 180-ringing message if it accepts the call from s, or r may return a SIP
407-authentication required message to signal to s that it cannot (sufficiently)
authenticate the binding of s and kpub(s).
The message flow is depicted in Figure 6.7 for a message M sent by a caller. The
response generated by r may not only depend on lmin. Rather, r can use lmin as one
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Figure 6.8: Using an Unverified Certificate Graph by the Callee
component (out of many) for judging the trustworthiness of s and for assessing M . Fur-
ther, r can use a more or less restrictive policy in accepting calls. It may immediately
reject calls which do not pass certain checks or it can further challenge the caller in such
cases to account for false positives (as outlined e.g. in [204]). For instance, in case r
does not immediately accept an incoming message, it may challenge the caller with a
computational puzzle [138].
6.2.5 Trade-offs for Higher Degrees of Decentralisation
A potential drawback—from a decentralisation perspective—of the scheme outlined in
6.2.4 is the fact that the callee relies—though not on every call—on a trustworthy VKS.
In principle, any untrusted key-server KS could be used which publishes an unverified
certificate graph UCCG periodically. However, the retrieval of the certificates corre-
sponding to an identity assertion path must then be done by the either the caller or the
callee’s receiving terminal. In addition, the callee must verify all certificates in the chain
efficiently itself, prior to accepting a call. In this subsection we analyse such adaptations
of the scheme which allow a higher degree of decentralisation. However, such decen-
tralisation comes at the price of higher workload for the callee or the caller and results
in longer call establishment times. We postpone a quantitative analysis of the different
options to 6.3 where we evaluate them based on our prototypical implementation.
6.2.5.1 Using Unverified Certificate Graphs
Using Unverified Certificate Graphs allows for higher decentralisation because the callee
does not depend on a trustworthy VKS. However, the callee cannot trust the certificate
relationships in an unverified certificate graph, UCCG, because an attacker could have
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Figure 6.9: Oﬄoading Certificate Chain Computation and Certificate Retrieval to Caller
uploaded an incorrect certificate to a key server. Thus, the UCCG can merely be used for
computing a potentially cryptographically verifiable identity assertion path; additionally,
the callee’s terminal must have the corresponding certificates at its disposal and verify
each certificate in the chain. In principle, path computation and certificate retrieval for a
potential certificate chain can be done by the caller or the callee. We discuss both options
below. Certificate verification must be done by the callee.
Verification of certificate chain by receiving terminal A trivial usage of an UCCG
is as follows: When receiving a call, the callee can use an unverified certificate graph
(which is periodically published by any regular key server) to compute the shortest cer-
tificate chain length lmin itself. It then fetches the necessary certificates from any regular
key server and verifies the certificate chain.
Figure 6.8 displays the corresponding message flow. It can be observed that this option
puts high load on the callee’s terminal. It needs to verify the signature on the SIP-Invite
message, compute a certificate chain from r to s, CCr,s, fetch all the corresponding
certificates, C(1), . . . , Clmin (CCr,s), and finally verify each certificate in the chain. Thus,
the scheme would make the callee highly susceptible to Denial-of-Service attacks since
any incoming bogus message results in several operations at the callee.
Oﬄoading path computation and key retrieval to caller The computation of
identity assertion paths and key retrieval can be oﬄoaded to the caller. This avoids the
aforementioned drawbacks that the callee needs to perform many operations on every
incoming call. Figure 6.9 shows the message flow for this option. The caller, s, period-
ically downloads an UCCG from any WoT key-server. s searches this file for the WoT
key-ID corresponding to the callee’s identity r, KID(r). It uses the UCCG to compute
the shortest identity assertion path, CCr,s between the callee and itself. It then retrieves
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Figure 6.10: Storing Certificates in DHT
the certificates for the path, Clist(r, s), from any WoT key-server, and sends them along
with the signed SIP-Invite message. The callee, r, just needs to verify the signature of
the Invite-message and the certificates. Based on the verification and lmin it sends back
a response, R, to the caller. Optionally, to exclude the possibility of retrieving wrong
certificates from key servers, the caller may also verify the signatures of the certificate
chain prior to signing and sending out the message.
Note, however, that the mapping from r to kID(r) is not secure. An attacker could
have uploaded a forged certificate which binds the identity r to an incorrect key-ID kID(r̂).
Such forged certificates would result in a Denial-of-Service on s because r might reject (or
treat differently) the call if it cannot verify the certificate chain. Using self-certifying SIP-
URIs (as proposed in Chapter 5) would prevent such attacks, as the binding between r’s
public key and r could be verified by s in this case (see further 6.2.6). If no self-certifying
SIP-URIs are used and there are multiple certificates for an identity r, s cannot determine
which is the correct key-ID kID(r) to use. We therefore assume the use of self-certifying
identities with this scheme and postpone an associated discussion to 6.2.6.
It can be observed in Figure 6.9 that this options puts much load on the caller. The
callee only needs to perform several signature verification operations. In particular, the
callee does not need to download any certificates. Hence, this option is preferable from
the perspective of Denial-of-Service attacks on the callee.
6.2.5.2 Decentralised Certificate Storage
The message flows depicted in figures 6.8 and 6.9 still rely on the availability of a WoT key
server for certificate retrieval on every call. To further decentralise the scheme, certificates
can be distributedly stored in and retrieved from a DHT, i.e. the P2PSIP DHT in which
140
nodes participate in for SIP service location. Figure 6.10 shows a corresponding scheme
with certificate retrieval from a DHT. The message flow is the same as in figure 6.9,
except that the caller fetches the certificates which are needed to verify the certificate
chain CCr,s from the DHT.
As proposed in [253], certificates can be stored in the DHT by using h(certificate :
[SIP − URI]) as the DHT key-ID for retrieving the certificate corresponding to a par-
ticular SIP-URI. As an alternative, depicted in figure 6.10, the WoT key-ID (equation
6.3) can be used directly as the DHT key-ID. In both cases, the integrity of certificates
retrieved from the DHT cannot be verified by the caller unless self-certifying SIP-URIs
are used. Similarly, the mapping from r to kID(r) is not secure if self-certifying SIP-URIs
are not used (compare 6.2.5.1). We thus assume that self-certifying SIP-URIs are used
when certificates are stored in the DHT and refer to a discussion thereof to 6.2.6.
It is worth noting that in the scheme as described above, merely certificate retrieval
is decentralised in a DHT. The computation of a UCCG-file is performed by WoT key
servers, i.e. distributed but not completely decentralised entities. We thus assume that
each time nodes store a certificate in the DHT, in parallel they store the certificate also in
the WoT key server network. It is an open research problem how to compute a certificate
graph in a decentralised way, e.g. when keys are stored in a P2P network5. Hence, the
approach we present above constitutes the highest degree of decentralisation possible with
state-of-the-art research.
6.2.6 Simplifications when Using Self-Certifying SIP-URIs
In principle, the use of self-certifying SIP-URIs (as presented in Chapter 5) is independent
from the identity assessment schemes we present in this chapter. Self-certifying SIP-URIs
enable the caller to verify the location of a desired callee. Identity assertion, on the other
hand, enables a callee to assess the identity of a caller. Hence, the former scheme mostly
secures the initiation of real-time communication, while the later scheme protects the
receiver of such a communication attempt.
Nevertheless, there are several instances where a combination of the two techniques
provides some benefit. For instance, if self-certifying SIP-URIs are used, Pr would know
more about the caller s in the client-server scheme with attached self-signed certificate
by the sender (see Figure 6.4). Instead of only knowing that the sender was in possession
of the private key which corresponds to the self-signed certificate, Pr could verify that
the signature indeed was done by the owner of identity s. Further, if the identity of s is
self-certifying, s would not need to attach a self-signed certificate, SSCs. It would suffice
to attach the public key kpub(s) and the key-ID KID(s). The self-certifying property
would enable an intermediate entity (or the callee) to verify that kpub(s) is the correct
5In [182], an approach for computing a certificate graph in a decentralised way has been presented.
However, the work in [182] uses a probabilistic algorithm for finding certificates and certificate chains
in a decentralised fashion. Thus, in contrary to a DHT, it cannot guarantee that a certificate is found.
Further, the approach introduces a high number of messages to be sent (i.e. in the range of 100 messages
each with several hops) for finding a certificate chain.
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public key for identity s.
For a decentralised P2PSIP scenario, self certifying SIP-URIs are useful in case a
UCCG is used and certificate retrieval is oﬄoaded to the caller (see figures 6.9 and 6.10).
In such scenarios, the caller s needs to determine the key-ID of the callee r, KID(r). This
opens the door for attacks with forged certificate bindings between an identity r and
an incorrect key-ID kID(r̂) (see 6.2.5.1). If the identity r is self-certifying, such attacks
are not possible because the caller can exploit the self-certifying property to verify that
the certificate retrieved, C(r), is correct for r. The caller can thus verify the binding of
identity and public key contained in each certificate it (eventually) retrieves for a key-ID
if self-certifying SIP-URIs are used.
6.3 Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we evaluate and analyse our proposed scheme. We present a prototypical
implementation and performance results of decentralised identity assertion we obtained
with this prototype. Based on these measurements, we compare the different approaches
for integrating our approach into P2PSIP presented in the previous section quantitatively.
Finally, we discuss general advantages and drawbacks of our approach. More details on
our experiments and our prototype can be found in Appendix B.2.
6.3.1 Prototype Implementation
6.3.1.1 Prototypical Implementation of Decentralised Identity Assertion
We implemented our approach in a prototype [244] which uses the existing PGP [298]
WoT and the corresponding infrastructure (i.e. key-servers [10], protocols [81], etc.). Us-
ing the PGP WoT allows us to use the largest publicly available and cryptographically
secured WoT for our experiments. Currently the PGP WoT is used to bind email ad-
dresses as identities to public keys. In principle, however, this infrastructure would also
allow to bind SIP-URIs (which are very similar to email addresses) to public keys. To
evaluate our approach with a real WoT, we treat the identities in the existing PGP WoT
as SIP-URIs instead of email addresses and we regard the corresponding signatures in
the WoT as according to our scheme (i.e. not only binding an identity to a public key
but also expressing trustworthiness with respect to that identity not sending unsolicited
or malicious messages).
Our prototype sends signed SIP-Invite messages to a modified SIP proxy which
then verifies the signatures and calculates the identity assertion path length. For signing
the messages we follow the procedure depicted in Figure 6.5 (see 6.2.3.2), i.e. the caller
attaches its key-ID to the SIP-Invite message. We compute the signature for each
message as specified in RFC 4474 [201] and also use the SIP Identity header for the
signature and the SIP Identity-info header for the key-ID as defined in [201]. Note,
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Name # identities # signatures Date of Snapshot
WOT25k 25,487 230,445 25-Feb-2005
WOT33k 33,050 328,912 01-Jun-2006
WOT40k 40,480 405,289 15-Nov-2008
Table 6.1: WoT Snapshots Used for Analysis
however, that we only use the syntax from [201] and that our approach is different:
Instead of transmitting the identity of a PKI certificate authority we convey a Web-of-
Trust key-ID (as defined in equation 6.3) in the Identity-info header. In order to
verify a signature, the proxy has to be in possession of the sender’s public key. In our
implementation, if this key does not exist in the proxy’s local cache, the key is downloaded
from a PGP key server.
To evaluate the path search performance, we implemented a double-sided Breadth First
Search (dBFS) algorithm in our SIP proxy. As input graph for the search algorithm we
use snapshots of the PGP WoT in the .wot file format [87]. These files6 contain all key-
IDs and the identity assertion relationships (who signed whom) between the PGP users of
the largest cluster – the so called strong set. The restriction to the strong set implies that
between any two identities a certificate chain always exists. To analyse the influence of
different WoT sizes on the path search performance we used different snapshots: the oldest
.wot file we found contains approximately 25,000 identities (≈ 230 thousand signatures);
the newest one (at the time of the evaluation) contains approximately 40,000 identities (≈
400 thousand signatures). Finally we chose a third .wot file containing 33,000 identities
(≈ 328 thousand signatures). The different WoT snapshots are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.3.1.2 Applying the Prototype to Evaluate Various Use Cases
Our prototype (as described above in 6.3.1.1) is generic in the sense that it enables
an evaluation of our WoT approach for client-server SIP as well as for P2PSIP. Our
implementation comprises a SIP proxy which is able to
1. verify certificates,
2. fetch certificates from a key server if not locally available,
3. and compute a double-sided Breadth First Search (dBFS) to find the shortest cer-
tificate chain between to identities.
Executing a large number of experiments, our implementation is able to measure the
average time needed for all the three steps above. Figure 6.11 shows a screenshot of
the graphical user interface of our prototype implementation, visualising how an identity
assertion path between callee and caller is found.
6We assume that for each identity assertion path in the .wot file the signatures have been pre-verified.
Specifically, we treat .wot files downloaded from real PGP key-servers as a VCCG file (as described in
Section 6.2), i.e. as if they were published from a trustworthy VKS.
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Evaluating client-server SIP with the prototype For a client-server SIP evaluation
of our decentralised identity assertion approach, our implementation in principle mimics
a SIP proxy (which protects the callee) with a co-located (or integrated) VKS. However,
the integrated VKS does not contain all certificates. If a certificate is not cached locally
(because it has been retrieved for previous communications), the proxy fetches it from
a key server. Comparing with figure 6.5, it can be observed that our implementation
emulates the steps V KS : lmin = dBFS {kID(r), kID(s)} (compare also with eq. 6.5) and
Proxy : verifySSCs {M} (compare also with eq. 6.2). Note that our prototype can also
be used to evaluate the option where the caller attaches a self-signed certificate (instead
of the key-ID) since all key functionality is emulated (compare with Figure 6.4).
Evaluating P2PSIP with the prototype For an evaluation of our decentralised
identity assertion approach in a P2PSIP network, our implementation mimics precisely
a P2PSIP callee which has been enhanced with the necessary functionality we introduce
for our approach. In particular, our prototype implementation has fetched a VCCG file
(i.e. a .wot file), and can emulate the following steps (compare with Figure 6.7): Callee :
verifySSCs {M} (compare also eq. 6.9) and Callee : lmin = dBFSV CCG {kID(r), kID(s)}
(compare also eq. 6.11). For higher degrees of decentralisation (see Subsection 6.2.5),
our prototype also emulates the main functions computed by the callee (compare Figures
6.8, 6.9, and 6.10), including the fetching of necessary certificates in case an unverified
certificate graph (UCCG) is used by the callee (compare Figure 6.8). Note, though,
that our prototype only verifies the certificate of the caller, since it assumes the use
of a VCCG. In cases an unverified certificate graph (UCCG) is used (see Figures 6.8,
6.9, and 6.10), the callee also has to verify the complete certificate chain. This is not
emulated in our prototype. However, we measure the time needed for the verification of
one signature (the caller’s signature). It is reasonable to assume that the time necessary
for the verification of more signatures, i.e. lmin signatures when verifying the complete
certificate chain, scales linearly with the number of signatures. Our implementation can
thus also be used to evaluate use cases where a UCCG is used by the callee.
6.3.1.3 Performance Results
For each WoT snapshot (see Table 6.1) we randomly selected 1.200.000 source-destination
key pairs and executed the path search algorithm for each of those pairs. Figure 6.12
shows the distribution of the path lengths found: The distribution is very similar for the
different WoT sizes. The average identity assertion path length is nearly identical for
the three WoT snapshots (5.99, 6.01, and 5.97 for WOT25k, WOT33k and WOT40k,
respectively). Furthermore, independent of the WoT size, 90% of all paths found in our
experiments have a length of eight hops or less; 99% of the paths consist of at most twelve
hops. Figure 6.13 visualises this by showing the cumulative distribution function for the
identity assertion path length in different WoT snapshots.
Figure 6.14 shows the time our implementation needs to find a path of a certain
length as well as the 95% confidence intervall. As one expects for a Breadth First Search
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Figure 6.11: Screenshot of WoT Prototype Implementation in SIP Proxy
Figure 6.12: Distribution of Identity Assertion Path Lengths for Different WoT Sizes
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Figure 6.13: Cumulative Distribution Function of Identity Assertion Path Lengths for
Different WoT Sizes
algorithm, the time increases exponentially with the path length. At the same time, the
results suggest that (at least for the WoT sizes we evaluated) the search time increases
linearly with the number of signatures in the WoT. Recall from 6.2.2.2 that the time-
complexity of a double-sided BFS algorithm is O(2b
d
2 ), where b is the branching factor
and d is the depth of the search. In our case, d is the path length and b is the maximum
number of identities a member of the WoT has signed. Our results suggest that b is
linearly dependent on the overall WoT size.
Cache Check Certificate Retrieval Signature Verification
µ[ms] 0.62ms 98.39ms 3.19ms
σ 0.08ms 47.09ms 0.40ms
Table 6.2: Prototype Measurements (15,000 Repetitions) on Average Time Needed for
Cache Checking, Certificate Retrieval, and Signature Verification (Average Time µ, Stan-
dard Deviation σ)
Our experiments revealed that our system needs in average 0.6ms to check if a key
is already present in the local key cache. If the key does not exist in the cache, it is
downloaded within 100ms on average. After the download, the signature verification is
performed in 3.2ms on average. The exact measurement results are shown in Table 6.2.
6.3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Decentralisation Trade-offs
In a real world application, the weight a callee puts on a certificate chain—when judging
incoming messages—decreases with the length of the certificate chain. In other words,
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Figure 6.14: Duration for Path Finding Depending on Path Lengths
from the user’s point of view, a long identity assertion path does not imply much trust-
worthiness for messages from the corresponding identity. Thus, it is reasonable to have
the path search algorithm only examine identity assertion paths up to a certain length7.
Our results show that for short path lengths, identity assertion paths can be found in
a reasonably short amount of time (compare with Figure 6.14), e.g. around 10ms on
average for path lengths up to 5.
When comparing the times needed for certificate download, tcr (∼ 100ms), signature
verification, tsv (∼ 3ms), and path search, tdbfs(lmin) (5-10ms for short path lengths), the
time for certificate download, tcr, is the largest one by at least one order of magnitude.
Analysing our results for P2PSIP, we conclude that the time needed for identity path
calculation, tdbfs(lmin), is acceptable for real-time communications. Path search needs to
be performed only once by the callee for each incoming call, and can be performed on
average in about 10ms for short identity assertion path lengths. Further, the number of
signature verifications computed by the callee can be neglected since it takes less than
5ms per signature, so that even for medium path lengths (e.g. 10) the time needed for
signature verification of the whole identity assertion path by the callee is acceptable.
The most time-sensitive operation occurs when a certificate has to be downloaded
by the callee (∼ 100ms on average). Thus, attention has to be paid to the number of
key retrievals needed at the callee. We can differentiate two different cases, depending if
the callee uses a VCCG or a UCCG file. The former case requires less time-consuming
certificate retrievals, while the later case allows for higher decentralisation (at the price
of multiple certificate retrievals):
 In case a VCCG file is used by the callee (compare Figure 6.7), at most one certifi-
7Determining the concrete threshold up to which identity assertion paths should be computed is
outside the scope of our work.
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cate retrieval operation is needed at the callee: In case the caller attaches his/her
certificate to the SIP Invite message, no certificate retrieval is needed at all; in case
the caller attaches his/her WoT key-ID, the callee only needs to retrieve the certifi-
cate corresponding to the caller’s key-ID. All other (intermediate) certificates are
not needed because a VCCG file implies that all intermediate identity assertions
have been pre-verified by the issuing VKS.
 In case a a UCCG file is used by the callee (compare Figures 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10)
all certificates of the identity assertion path are needed by the callee. The time for
multiple certificate retrievals can be oﬄoaded to the caller (as in the schemes shown
in Figures 6.9 and 6.10). In that way, the callee has to perform no time-consuming
certificate retrieval at all. As a drawback, attaching several certificates to the SIP
signalling message by the caller implies a larger messages size, demanding more
bandwidth. If the callee retrieves each certificate itself (as in the scheme displayed
in Figure 6.8), the download of multiple certificates from a KS can potentially be
performed in parallel to speed up the process.
The overall time needed to perform all necessary operations, tdia, for the different
decentralisation options we propose can be estimated as follows:
tdia = α× tcr + β × tsv + tdbfs(lmin) + tsg (6.12)
where α is the number of times a certificate has to be retrieved, β is the number of
times a signature has to be verified, and tsg is the time needed to generate a signature
(by the caller on the SIP Invite message)8. Table 6.3 compares the overall time penalty
our different approaches introduce at the caller and the callee. Note that in the schemes
where the certificate chain computation and certificate retrieval is oﬄoaded to the caller,
we assume that the caller is attaching its self-signed certificate to the SIP-Invite message.
Attaching the key-ID would require an additional, unnecessary key retrieval at the callee
in these schemes.
In summary, our results show that when the callee is using a certificate graph with pre-
verified certificates (i.e. a VCCG file) and regards identity assertion path lengths up to 5 as
useful, the additional operations we introduce will delay an incoming phone call on average
by less than 150ms (tdia(Callee) = tcr+tsv+tdbfs(lmin)) ≈ 100ms+3ms+10ms ≈ 113ms).
We regard this an acceptable overhead for processing incoming messages by the callee.
Moreover, if the caller is attaching its certificate and a VCCG file is used by the callee,
the additional operations we introduce at the callee can be performed on average in less
than 15ms (tdia(Callee) = tsv + tdbfs(lmin)) ≈ 3ms+ 10ms ≈ 13ms).
To decentralise our scheme further—by not relying on a trustworthy key-server—
we proposed several schemes where the callee is using an unverified certificate graph (a
UCCG file). Table 6.3 reveals that with this option, it is meaningful to oﬄoad certificate
8We neglect the time needed for hashing the self-signed certificate of the caller onto a key-ID, i.e. the
computation of kID(s) = hKID
(
signkpriv(s) {kpub(s), s}
)
by the caller or the callee (depending on the
scheme). We regard the time needed for computation of a hash function negligible on today’s hardware.
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chain computation and certificate retrieval to the caller. In these cases, the callee only
has to verify the lmin signatures of the identity assertion path (tdia(Callee) = lmin× tsv ≈
5 × 3ms ≈ 15ms for an identity assertion path length of 5). The caller on the other
hand needs to retrieve all certificates of the complete identity assertion path in addition
to computing the certificate chain (tdia(Caller) = tsg + (lmin − 1) × tcr + tdbfs(lmin) ≈
3ms+ 4× 100ms+ 10ms ≈ 413ms on average for a certificate chain length of lmin = 5)9.
It is debatable if such an additional call setup delay is acceptable on top of the DHT
operations P2PSIP requires for finding the location of the callee.
Decentralised Type of Certificate α, tdia Fig.
Identity Certificate Graphs and β (Caller s,
Assertion Graph Certificates Callee r)
Scheme used retrieved
from
Caller attaching VCCG VKS 1, s: tsg —
key-ID 1 r: tcr + tsv + tdbfs(lmin)
Caller attaching VCCG VKS 0, s: tsg 6.7
self-signed certificate 1 r: tsv + tdbfs(lmin)
Caller attaching UCCG KS lmin, s: tsg —
key-ID lmin r: lmin × tcr + lmin × tsv + tdbfs(lmin)
Caller attaching UCCG KS lmin − 1, s: tsg 6.8
self-signed certificate lmin r: (lmin − 1)× tcr + lmin × tsv + tdbfs(lmin)
Oﬄoading certificate UCCG KS lmin − 1, s: tsg + (lmin − 1)× tcr + tdbfs(lmin) 6.9
chain computation lmin r: lmin × tsv
and certificate
retrieval to caller
Oﬄoading certificate UCCG KS + DHT lmin − 1, s: tsg + (lmin − 1)× tcr + tdbfs(lmin) 6.10
chain computation lmin r: lmin × tsv
and certificate
retrieval to caller,
storing certificates
in DHT
Table 6.3: Estimated Time tdia for Caller and Callee for Different Decentralised Identity
Assertion Schemes Applied to P2PSIP
Moreover, in case a DHT is used for certificate retrieval, tcr is additionally increased
by the time it takes to look up a root node for a certificate in the DHT10. However,
note that the certificate retrieval as well as the necessary DHT lookups prior to retrieval
from DHT root nodes may be performed in parallel, resulting in less time needed for the
9Even though we did not measure the time needed for signature generation at the callee, tsg, it is
reasonable to assume this value to be similar to the time needed for signature verification, tsv.
10How many hops are needed for a DHT lookup depends on the size of the DHT and if or to what extent
it is infiltrated by attackers (see further Chapter 4). The time it takes for each DHT hop depends on
the distribution of DHT nodes over the underlying network and the specifics of this underlying network.
It is therefore hard to estimate the time a DHT lookup takes on average for the general case.
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overall retrieval of all certificates. In fact, in case certificates are retrieved from the DHT,
a query node could not only start parallel lookups for the necessary certificates, but start
these certificate lookups already in parallel to the regular DHT lookup for the location
of the callee. Since certificates are stored in the same DHT as location-bindings, these
parallel lookups should consume—on average—comparable time, so that the root nodes
for certificates should roughly be found in the same time as the lookup for the location
of a SIP-URI takes.
Call setup times in the order of seconds are accepted by users for phone calls, e.g.
ITU-T regards a call setup delay of 8s as acceptable for international ISDN calls (so-called
Post-selection delay [30]). Therefore, even extending call setup up to 500ms (or possibly
even more in case of time-demanding DHT lookups) may very well be acceptable.
6.3.3 Limitations of the Proposed Approach
We propose to adopt a Web-of-Trust model to real-time communication where users
can assert identities cryptographically. Exploiting the social relationships among users,
we enable decentralised identity assertion without relying on a trusted third party for
certifying identity assertions. Our scheme can be used to assess the trustworthiness of
a sender of a message, e.g. a VoIP caller, with respect to sending non-malicious or non-
solicited messages. Using asymmetric cryptography, our proposed approach ensures that
identity assertions can be securely verified by the callee. If the signature on the SIP-
Invite is unique for every SIP message (e.g. by including the SIP Call-ID and the SIP
Date header field in the signature as specified in RFC 4474 [201]), our scheme is protected
against replay attacks.
Our results show that a simple double-sided Breadth First (dBFS ) path search al-
gorithm is fast enough to calculate the identity assertion path length in a reasonable
amount of time for short certificate chains. We could not perform experiments on larger
real world WoTs since, to our knowledge, the PGP WoT we used is the largest one avail-
able. On the other hand, we regard the limitation to short identity assertion paths to
be acceptable since the benefit to the callee decreases with the path length, rendering
long identity assertion paths less useful. In summary, our measurement results show that
our overall scheme implies an acceptable overhead—with respect to the time needed to
compute the additional operations we introduce—to be used in decentralised real-time
applications (such as P2PSIP).
To work in practice, our approach relies on users behaving correctly. If users are not
careful in signing other identities, the overall system becomes less useful because it can
be infiltrated by attackers who trick careless users into signing their identities. In general,
we envision two options for users to express that an identity from which they received
a call is trustworthy: Either explicitly, e.g. by pressing a special button on the callee’s
phone, or implicitly, e.g. automatically based on statistics like the combination of call
duration and call frequency.
Our system uses pre-verification of certificate chains. The disadvantage of such pre-
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computation is, however, that the key database will always be slightly out of date. This
implies that recently uploaded certificates will not necessarily be considered for assessing
incoming calls. We regard this not to be a significant problem because it can potentially
only result in further message processing by the callee (or its proxy) but not in any kind
of attack.
Related to this timeliness of .wot-files is signature revocation. Revocation of certifi-
cates and signatures is a challenge in any large system which relies on asymmetric cryp-
tography. For our WoT approach, we assume that users are able to revoke signatures.
Further, we assume that such revocations of signatures can be uploaded to key-servers
and are taken into account by a VKS when computing a VCCG file (i.e. if a signature has
been revoked the VKS does not consider it anymore in the certificate graph). Thus, if a
formerly trustworthy identity suddenly starts to send malicious messages (e.g. because a
VoIP terminal has been infiltrated by malicious software), users which have signed this
identity are assumed to revoke their signatures for this identity as soon as they realize
that the identity is not trustworthy anymore. But as long as not all signatures for such
an infiltrated identity have been removed, this identity is still connected to the WoT and
may have a short assertion path to certain callees.
However, experience with email-worms shows that such malicious software usually
tries to spread using the address book of infected identities [285]. Here our approach has
advantages: Presumably exactly the identities in the address book of a user are the ones
which have social relationships and can thus revoke certificates. In addition, short-lived
signatures could limit the effect of infected hosts.
In general, we believe that other protection mechanisms (such a blacklisting or a
holistic approach as suggested in [204]) should be used in conjunction with our proposed
WoT approach in order to protect against infiltrated certificate chains, as may be the case
with sophisticated threats such as botnets. Research has shown that in order to prevent
against unsolicited communications, a combination of several mechanism is useful to
compensate for false positives and false negatives of single mechanisms [204] [245].
We showed that a double-sided Breadth First path search algorithm performs well
for efficient identity assertion path computation. We expect this to be true due to the
small world properties of the PGP WoT networks we used. However, we only considered
relatively small networks (with respect to real-world VoIP networks) with medium path
lengths in our experiments as these are the largest WoT networks publicly available today.
The scalability of the approach to very large WoTs still has to be investigated. A lot of
research has been done in the area of (heuristic) path computations in social networks
[74]. Although we did not discuss any advanced path search algorithm or heuristic, such
research is likely to help in increasing the maximum number of identities and signatures
which can be handled by a single server. Additionally, we believe that analysing load
balancing and data distribution of certificates is interesting future research regarding the
overall scalability of our approach.
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6.4 Related Work
Many works consider the prevention of unsolicited communications in VoIP systems, so-
called SPIT (Spam-over-IP-Telephony) prevention. In addition, researchers have anal-
ysed the existing PGP Web-of-Trust in the context of email communications. Below we
provide an overview of existing work in both areas: SPIT prevention and Web-of-Trust
research. Following this overview of related work in both areas, we then identity the
differences and advances of our approach compared to state-of-the-art.
6.4.1 SPIT Prevention Mechanisms
Due to the different nature of the medium, many means very effective in blocking email
spam cannot be directly applied to mitigate the SPIT threat [220]. Thus, researchers are
investigating new protection techniques specifically targeted at SPIT [58]. An overview
of state-of-the-art in SPIT prevention is provided in [220] and [204]. The potential legal
issues involved when filtering traffic for SPIT have been outlined and discussed in [259].
In principle, one can distinguish three kinds of methods:
 Non-intrusive methods are solely based on the exchange and analysis of signalling
messages. These methods do not create inconvenience for the caller and do not
disturb the callee (if they successfully block SPIT calls). This category includes
blacklisting, whitelisting, detections of call rates, call patterns, reverse lookup of
caller DNS entries, context awareness (e.g. time of the day, bundling with calendar
entries), and similar solutions [245] [220] [204].
 Caller-side interaction methods require the caller to pass a checking procedure for
the call which is typically based on question and answer [205] [275] or more gen-
eral on action and reaction [138] [245]. However, these methods create additional
inconvenience for the caller-side (e.g. delays in establishing communication).
 Callee interaction methods exchange information with the callee on a per-call basis.
An example is asking the callee before accepting a certain call (e.g. consent-based
communications [219], feedback from callee [188]). These methods are problematic
with respect to immediate prevention, as they miss the general goal of protecting
the callee from disruptions. However, they can be useful for subsequent protection
of the callee. An example for a useful callee interaction method is receiving feedback
from the callee on false negatives. With this feedback, an adaptive SPIT prevention
system can avoid letting a SPIT message pass the system twice.
Existing proposals for preventing SPIT are addressing the threat from different view-
points. On a high level, one can classify these approaches as architectural proposals [187]
[276] [228], protocol extension proposals [287] [188], and detailed mechanism/algorithm
proposals (e.g. [205] [156] [275] [212] [138] [219] [260]).
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Using PGP for SPIT prevention PGP certificates had been envisioned for sign-
ing messages in the original SIP specification [126] (now deprecated in RFC 3261 [222]).
However, PGP was only envisioned as the certificate format for SIP and not for using
a distributed WoT model. Zimmermann proposed ZRTP [297] as a decentralized solu-
tion for user authentication and key exchange over RTP streams. In contrary to our
work, ZRTP does not consider identity assertion paths for signalling messages but only
direct authentication of audio streams between caller and callee after the call has been
established.
SPIT prevention in P2PSIP systems There exists very few work on SPIT pre-
vention for P2PSIP. One exception is the approach proposed by Heikkila and Gurtov
[129] which has some similarities with our proposal11. As in our approach, using a Web-
of-Trust is proposed to protect P2PSIP users against SPIT. However, the approach in
[129] simply introduces a trusted third party for certificate chain computation which is
involved during every call. Moreover, this entity (called pathfinder) is accepted by caller
and callee as trustworthy. The caller uses the external pathfinder service for identity
assertion path computation. The pathfinder service returns a signed token with the path
length which the caller can present to the callee. As such, the approach in [129] is merely
a re-implementation of existing, stand-alone WoT identity assertion path computation
(pathfinder) services (e.g. [88]) which gets contacted by the caller for each call, and returns
a token signed by the pathfinder service.
Our presented approach differs in several important aspects: Most importantly, the
external pathfinder service in [129] needs to be involved in every call setup. With our
approach, the identity path computation is integrated into the callee (or caller), allowing
the callee to assess incoming calls itself. Thus, our approach decentralises identity as-
sertion as much as possible. We showed through prototypical implementation that this
approach is technically feasible with low overhead. In addition, in our scheme only the
callee needs to rely on a trustworthy key-server which is merely used oﬄine. Furthermore,
we investigate decentralised schemes with unverified certificate graphs (including certifi-
cate storage within the P2PSIP DHT) and the corresponding trade-offs with respect to
performance.
6.4.2 Web-of-Trust Research
Most Web-of-Trust research focuses on the existing PGP Web-of-Trust and on the analysis
of the structure of the PGP certificate graph. Capkun et al. [279] as well as Penning [199]
provide a graph analysis of the PGP network. Bidder et al. propose a new method for
synchronization among key-servers in a WoT [68].
Morselli et al. propose KeyChains, a decentralised system for computing certificate
chains [182]. The approach uses a probabilistic algorithm for finding certificates and
11Note that the initial disclosure of our ideas and scheme [189] (later on published in [244]) has been
prior to the publication of [129].
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certificate chains in a decentralised fashion. However, it cannot be guaranteed that an
existing certificate is found. Moreover, the approach introduces a high number of messages
to be sent (i.e. in the range of 100 messages each with several hops) for finding a single
certificate chain.
Capkun et al. present a decentralised public key authentication scheme for mobile ad-
hoc networks [83]. In their scheme, key authentication is performed via chains of public-
key certificates. Certificates are stored and exchanged among nodes in a decentralised
way, i.e. no trusted, central authority is involved. Their solution focuses on mobile ad-hoc
networks and on the distributed generation of certificate graphs in scenarios where nodes
have limited capabilities and limited reachability among each other.
6.4.3 Progress with Respect to State of the Art
We adapt existing algorithms to derive a certificate chain between a VoIP caller and callee
(or more general between real-time communication users) in real-time12 and additionally
propose novel techniques to achieve decentralised cryptographic verification of the certifi-
cate chain. Our approach thus integrates a Web-of-Trust into real-time communications
such as VoIP. In addition, our scheme provides a SPIT prevention mechanism specifically
suitable for P2PSIP. In particular, a core contribution of our work is the investigation
and implementation of adapting a Web-of-Trust model for securing decentralised VoIP
systems in a decentralised fashion, i.e. with as little involvement of centralised entities as
possible during call setup. As such, our work is related to other work in the area of SPIT
prevention but novel as it exploits the social relationships among users in a decentralised
cryptographic scheme for assessing trustworthiness of signalling messages.
6.5 Summary and Contribution
We applied a Web-of-Trust model to real-time communications in order to secure ap-
plications such as VoIP. We showed how our approach can be applied to decentralised
real-time communication systems such as P2PSIP. Our approach exploits the social re-
lationships between end-users for detecting solicited real-time communications. Further,
it can prevent identity spoofing attacks in a decentralised way. In summary, our system
enables decentralised cryptographic identity assertion based on a Web-of-Trust model for
the assessment of the trustworthiness of user identities in real-time communications.
A core contribution of our approach is the integration of a Web-of-Trust into real-
time communications such as VoIP. In addition, we contribute the investigation and
implementation of adapting a Web-of-Trust model for securing decentralised VoIP sys-
tems in a decentralised fashion, i.e. with as little involvement of centralised entities as
possible during call setup.
12more precisely in soft real-time, as defined in [44]
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We evaluated our proposal with a prototype implementation using real world WoT
graphs. Our results demonstrate that, for short path lengths, a double-sided Breadth
First path search algorithm integrated into a SIP proxy performs well enough for deriving
identity assertion paths in a real-time communication scenario. To enable fast assessment
of incoming calls by the callee, we introduce a specialised Verifying Key Server (VKS)
which pre-verifies WoT certificate chains. To prevent time-consuming downloading of
certificates for key-IDs, the caller can append his/her public key in a self-signed certificate
to signalling messages.
We investigated the different trade-offs between decentralisation, i.e. reliance on a
trustworthy key server for pre-verification of certificate chains and certificate retrieval,
and additional call setup delay at the callee and caller in a P2PSIP scenario. In summary,
our results show that if the callee is using a certificate graph with pre-verified certificates
and regards identity assertion path lengths up to five as useful, the additional operations
we introduce will delay an incoming phone call on average by less than 150ms. If the
callee is using an unverified certificate graph and certificate chain computation as well as
certificate retrieval is oﬄoaded to the caller, the callee only has to verify the signatures of
the identity assertion path which can be done in less than 20ms for short paths. However,
such schemes increase message size and may introduce a call setup delay of up to 500ms
(potentially even more in cases where certificates are retrieved from the DHT) at the
caller.
Throughout this chapter and in our prototypical implementation we exemplified our
proposed scheme for applying a WoT model to real-time communications with SIP [222]
and PGP [298]. Our approach is, however, general in nature and in principle applicable
to any kind of signalling protocol for setting up and managing real-time communication
sessions and any WoT infrastructure. Our approach only requires a (cryptographic) WoT
among users which is instantiated through protocols and key-servers.
Finally, it is worth noting that our scheme for decentralised identity assertion cannot
only be used for SPIT prevention or the identification of non-malicious incoming messages.
Our scheme enables the detection of spoofed identities. This is a key technique to fight
Spam (i.e. SPIT in the case of VoIP) because identity spoofing is used by spammers to
circumvent identity blacklisting/whitelisting and other anti-Spam techniques. However,
the detection of identity assertion can also help in preventing other types of attacks which
utilise identity spoofing. For instance, our scheme can also be used to protect against
Denial-of-Service attacks. If an attacker sends bogus SIP-Invite messages with spoofed
SIP-URIs in the SIP From header, no certificate chain to that identity will be found, or
the attacker will not be able to correctly sign messages for the spoofed identity. The
callee can exploit this fact by not accepting calls from such identities without further
challenging the caller. In summary, our scheme can be used against SPIT, but moreover
it is generally applicable to detect identity spoofing attacks.
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Lawful Interception in P2PSIP
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Lawful Interception (LI) is the process of legally authorised wiretapping of commu-
nications carried out by law enforcement organisations. It is conducted without the
intercepted parties being aware of it [209]. LI has been carried out in the PSTN and
GSM networks successfully for quite some time. However, the characteristics of highly
decentralised P2P-systems impose unique challenges for LI to be conducted in such sys-
tems.
On a high level, a Lawful Interception activity in communication networks is initiated
by an authorised legal entity which has identified a certain target identity (e.g. a mobile
157
phone number) of a suspect user. This target identity gets securely transmitted to the
responsible service provider with an authoritative interception request for the identity.
The service provider than has the technical challenge of identifying the current location of
the target identity, and further—depending on the location of that identity—to determine
a suitable location and entity in the network for interception. For instance, in the PSTN,
the location for a given phone number (target identity) is fixed, and a central point for
interception can thus easily be determined for a given phone number. In mobile networks
(e.g. GSM ), the location for a given mobile phone number may change dynamically.
Still, these networks are designed in such a way that for each phone number a central
interception entity can be identified by the service provider. Having identified a suitable
point for interception in the network, the actual interception then consists of passively
logging any kind of communication for the target identity at the interception point, and
transmitting this information securely to the legal authority that triggered the Lawful
Interception activity.
With P2P-based real-time communication, the identification of an interception point
in the network for a given target identity becomes more complex. Not only may the
target identity change its location dynamically. More importantly, the mapping of iden-
tities to dynamically changing locations is not stored at central entities but in the itself
dynamically changing P2P overlay. It is thus not possible to identify a static point in the
network that is suitable for intercepting all signalling messages for a given target identity.
This chapter provides a case study of carrying out Lawful Interception in P2P-based
real-time communication systems1. We use VoIP, and accordingly the terms caller and
callee, as an example application for P2PSIP to investigate Lawful Interception. However,
our study analyses the session establishment process in P2PSIP with respect to Lawful
Interception. It is thus general in nature and applies to any multimedia communication
session being set up with P2PSIP, and not only VoIP. As a prerequisite, Section 7.1 gives
a general introduction to the field of Lawful Interception. In addition, the challenges
of applying LI in IP networks and for (client/server-based) VoIP communications in
particular are examined.
There is a lot of controversy surrounding the topic of Lawful Interception in VoIP
networks regarding social, political, and economic issues (see e.g. [66] [38]). However, in
this chapter (and in this thesis) we analyse the problem of applying Lawful Interception
to P2P-based real-time communication systems (exemplified with Voice-over-IP) solely
technically. The characteristic properties of P2P-based approaches to multimedia session
establishment and the corresponding implications that complicate Lawful Interception
will be examined in detail in Section 7.2. Further, we inspect potential solutions for
implementing Lawful Interception in a P2PSIP system in general and discuss advantages
and drawbacks of such solutions (Section 7.3). Section 7.4 summarises this case study
and highlights contributions.
Throughout this chapter we will exemplify technical details with Chord-figures. How-
ever, the characteristic properties and corresponding challenges for LI we highlight in
1A significant part of this chapter (including figures) has originally been published in [240]. See also
Appendix A.
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this chapter are mostly independent of Chord or the DHT’s routing structure. Thus, the
analysis we present is of general nature and applies to all DHT-based VoIP systems.
7.1 Introduction to Lawful Interception
Lawful Interception can provide crucial information for criminal and security investi-
gations. LI may be used to collect information that can be used as evidence in court
afterwards as well as to gather information regarding criminal or terrorist activities in
order to even prevent crimes or attacks. Many countries have legislation in place which
allows a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) to request a communication provider (such as
an Internet Service Provider or a VoIP Service Provider) to carry out a LI-operation.
Lawful Interception of Voice-over-IP (VoIP) communications is technically more chal-
lenging than in the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). One reason for this is
the mobility of users, as enabled by SIP. In practise, user mobility implies that the current
location of an identity cannot always be determined prior to a call. Currently, Lawful
Interception is being standardised for VoIP and IP networks in general in ETSI [35] and
other standards organisations [32] [34] [57]2.
In general, the more central components are on the signalling path, the more manage-
able LI becomes. In current approaches, service architectures are considered where central
entities are on the signalling path (as this is the way VoIP and real-time communications
are being deployed today). However, future types of VoIP service architectures may be
characterised by a higher degree of decentralisation. For instance, if a P2P-network is
used for VoIP signalling (i.e. as with P2PSIP) there is no central entity in the network
through which signalling will pass. In principle, this means that not only the users, but
also signalling and location servers are mobile and highly dynamic, rendering LI even
more challenging.
This section introduces common Lawful Interception terminology. In addition, an
overview on how Lawful Interception is generally implemented in IP networks is given.
Further, some examples of applying LI to Voice-over-IP communications will be presented.
7.1.1 Terminology and Reference Model for IP Networks
A Lawful Interception activity gets triggered by a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) which
authorises a Network Operator, Access Provider, or Service Provider to intercept traffic
for a target identity. Generally, two different types of interception data can be distin-
guished:
 Intercept Related Information (IRI) denotes the signalling data identifying the com-
2The IETF, however, has published a statement arguing that wiretapping solutions will not be stan-
dardised within its body [134].
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munication. This data may comprise the source identity, the destination identity,
call duration, and other signalling information.
 The Content of Communication (CC) denotes the actual payload being transmitted.
For VoIP, this refers to the audio content of the call, i.e. the RTP-packets transferred
from/to the subject which is the target of the LI operation.
Figure 7.1: Generic Model for Lawful Interception in IP Networks
In general, when analysing various standards for Lawful Interception in IP networks
(e.g. [32] [34] [35] [57]), one can extract the generic model depicted in Figure 7.1 [209].
This model shows the core functions necessary for Lawful Interception. An administration
function serves for the operator to securely receive Lawful Interception requests authen-
ticated by the LEA. This information is used by the operator to trigger the interception
function for the IRI and the CC, respectively. The data collected by these interception
functions is mediated and then collected by the LEA for analysis.
Figure 7.2: ETSI Reference Model for Lawful Interception in IP Networks
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Figure 7.2 shows the reference model for Lawful Interception in IP networks as stan-
dardised by ETSI [35]. Three handover interfaces are defined (and standardised by ETSI)
between the operator that carries out the LI and the LEA that authorises the LI for a
specific target: an interface for the administration function (HI1), an interface for the
IRI mediation function (HI2), and an interface for the CC mediation function (HI3).
7.1.2 Lawful Interception of Multimedia Communications in
Server-based Systems
Figure 7.3: Lawful Interception of VoIP Communications
If multimedia communications such as voice are transmitted over IP networks, some
fundamental differences in signalling and media transport make LI challenging in such
systems. For Lawful Interception in SIP networks, the SIP-URI is the target identity of a
LI operation. Some of the characteristics of SIP-signalling complicate LI. First, signalling
and media traffic take different routes in the network (see Subsection 2.2.1). Second, the
network provider can be different from the multimedia communication service provider
(e.g. the SIP provider). Third, because SIP offers mobility to users, the network provider
used by a specific target identity can change frequently. Thus, the following fundamental
problem arises for LI: How to enable interception of the CC in real-time3 if the network
providers of the call participants are not known prior to the call?
Figure 7.3 shows how Lawful Interception can technically be implemented in a set-
ting were the network provider is also the SIP service provider [209]. In this case, the
IP-address of the target identity can be extracted from the SIP signalling messages in-
tercepted at a SIP server of the target identity. This data is then used to trigger the
interception of the CC (the media) at the corresponding aggregation router.
3as defined in[44]
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Figure 7.4 displays a different setting where the target identity is located in a different
access network than the SIP service provider [209]. However, in this setting a so-called
Session Border Controller (SBC) is used to force signalling and media (i.e. the IRI and
CC data) to traverse a single central entity. As depicted in the figure, in such a setting
the SBC becomes the central element to carry out LI requests received by the SIP Service
Provider. Essentially, Lawful Interception of VoIP communications is not much different
from the PSTN-case in this scenario.
In a setting where no SBC is deployed and the network provider of the target identity
is different from the network provider of the SIP service provider, it is necessary to extract
the IP-address of either the caller or the callee from the IRI (i.e. SIP signalling messages)
and then send an LI request to the corresponding network provider (as determined from
the IP-address) to trigger interception of the corresponding CC (i.e. RTP packets). All
of this has to be done in hard real-time in order to start intercepting the CC immediately
and not miss parts of the conversation, which is technically very challenging. Further, it
assumes a way for the SIP service provider to send an authenticated IP-traffic interception
request to the network provider in hard real-time (which then still has to determine the
corresponding aggregation router for the interception), most probably indirectly via the
LEA.
Figure 7.4: Lawful Interception of VoIP Communications with a Session Border Controller
In summary, Lawful Interception in client-server SIP systems is technically challeng-
ing. The concrete technical challenges depend to large extent on the type of service
architecture being considered.
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7.2 Challenges for Lawful Interception in P2PSIP
Systems
Using a P2P-network implies a significant paradigm shift for real-time communications
signalling, in particular with respect to Lawful Interception. First, there are no cen-
tralised components on the signalling path. Second, the network is dynamic and there are
no static routing paths between entities. From a Lawful Interception perspective, these
characteristics have serious implications, rendering current Lawful Interception practices
used in client-server SIP systems infeasible. In this section we analyse the specific prop-
erties of P2PSIP that make Lawful Interception a challenge in such systems and highlight
what the implications of these characteristics are for LI.
P2PSIP inherits (from client-server SIP with respect to LI) the problem that signalling
and media not only take different routes in the network but also that the media path
cannot be determined prior to a call. We therefore focus on the signalling differences in
P2PSIP (compared to client-server SIP) and the consequences for Lawful Interception
in our analysis. In addition to these signalling differences, any P2PSIP LI solution still
has to solve the problems of deriving the corresponding point for interception of media
in the network (e.g. the aggregation router of a network provider) and intercepting the
corresponding CC in real-time, just as LI solutions for VoIP systems today.
7.2.1 Lack of a Central Entity for Interception
The most fundamental problem for Lawful Interception in a P2PSIP system is the lack of
a central entity on the signalling path. This has two important implications: First, there
is technically no single point in the network to intercept all outgoing call establishment
attempts for a specific target identity. Second, there is legally no body with whom a Law
Enforcement Agency can have a trustworthy and legally binding relationship for sending
authorised interception requests to.
No server involved in call-setup Since there is no server involved in call-setup, for a
specific target identity it cannot be determined prior to a call which nodes will be on the
signalling path for outgoing calls. In contrary, for client-server SIP the first signalling hop
for outgoing calls can be determined prior to a call based on the domain of the target’s
SIP-URI. Thus, for Lawful Interception the problem arises where to intercept signalling
traffic for a target identity at all in the network.
No service provider to receive interception requests from LEA Lawful Inter-
ception as specified within the ETSI reference model [35] assumes an operator (e.g. the
Network Operator, Access Provider, or Application Service Provider such as a VoIP Ser-
vice Provider) in order for the LEA to be able to trigger a Lawful Interception activity for
a specific target identity through the administration function provided by such an opera-
163
tor (compare with Figure 7.2). Further, it is assumed that there will be legal agreements
or requirements forcing the provider to cooperate with Law Enforcement Agencies. With
P2PSIP, the role of an operator can only vaguely be estimated and depends to a large
extent on the use case and actual deployment of P2PSIP. As envisioned by the IETF
P2PSIP working group [13], it may be the case that an operator merely fulfils the role of
secure node-ID assignment, i.e. enrolment in the system. In this case, the LEA has no
legal agreement with nodes involved in routing signalling messages through the network.
Figure 7.5: Incoming Signalling Messages Take a Different Routing Path
7.2.2 P2P-Routing
Routing in P2PSIP differs from routing in client-server SIP drastically. Essentially, for
every call there is a unique routing path for signalling messages.
Inbound and outbound signalling messages take different paths In contrary
to client-server SIP, with P2PSIP the last signalling hop of an incoming call is usually
different from the first signalling hop of an outgoing call for a specific target identity. As
an example, Figure 7.5 shows the example-DHT from Figure 2.13. However, this time
Bob tries to call Alice, assuming that Alice’s key-ID (i.e. the hash of her SIP-URI) is
55 and that she has stored the corresponding location previously in the network. It can
be observed that in this case routing traverses a completely disjoint set of nodes than
when Alice called Bob (compare to Figure 2.13). Note that the value of Alice’s key-ID
determines the signalling routing when Bob tries to call her, not the location of her node
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(i.e. her node-ID as the hash of her current IP-address). For LI this implies that in order
to intercept outgoing and incoming calls there needs to be more than one interception
point for signalling messages for each target identity.
Different outgoing signalling node for different callee With client-server SIP,
there is a static relationship between a target identity and the first signalling hop for
outgoing calls. With P2PSIP, the SIP-URI of the callee determines the first signalling
hop. For instance, in the example displayed in Figure 2.13 if Alice would call a different
callee, say Carol whose key-ID is 88, there would be a single routing hop to node 89
which stores the current location for key-ID 88. Thus, there is potentially a different first
signalling hop for every callee. For LI this means that even for outgoing messages there
is no single point in the network where all signalling messages for a target identity can
be intercepted.
These radical differences in routing compared to client-server SIP (where a single SIP
server can be used for intercepting many target identities of a single domain) demand a
per target identity solution and possibly a per callee solution for LI in P2PSIP.
7.2.3 Dynamic Nature of P2P Systems
Because P2P systems are highly dynamic, network membership and routing paths change
as the network state (i.e. the nodes in the network, the routing links between them,
and data items stored in the network) changes. Overall, this characteristic makes the
previously analysed properties even worse for LI because the network state can change
at any time, resulting in different routing paths and key-ID responsibility.
Joining and leaving of nodes In a P2P network, participating nodes join and leave
the network frequently. As a consequence, the signalling routing path between a specific
caller and a specific callee cannot be determined prior to call-setup time because it changes
frequently over time. Thus, any LI attempt must derive the first signalling hop for an
outgoing call attempt of a target identity dynamically in real-time.
Figure 7.6 displays again the example network from Figure 2.13. However, in this
example a node with node-ID 164 has joined the network. As a consequence, if Alice
calls Bob again her first lookup message would be sent to the newly joined node 164.
Also, node 170 which was previously on the routing path between Alice and Bob does
not receive routing messages anymore if Alice calls Bob.
Figure 7.7 shows the same DHT as in Figure 7.6 after node 202 and node 170 have
left the network (e.g. because their users went oﬄine). Note that in this case node 215
takes over the responsibility for key-ID 181 from node 202. Also, routing changes and
node 164 directly routes to node 215 (2).
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Figure 7.6: Node Join in a P2PSIP Network
Responsibility for user registrations changes frequently The node storing the
location binding for a particular SIP-URI changes frequently (if a new node is responsible
for a particular SIP-URI the location/identifier-binding is transferred to this node). For
instance, in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 it can be observed that by joining the network, node
164 has also taken over the responsibility for storing the SIP-registration for key-ID 137.
Similarly, when node 202 left the network, data responsibility for key-ID 181 was taken
over by node 2154.
Hence, joining and leaving of nodes affects the signalling routing path between a caller
and a callee dynamically as the network state changes as well as the responsibility among
nodes for certain key-IDs and corresponding data items. For LI this implies that even if
there would be a relationship (or legal agreement) between the LEA and the node storing
the registration data in the DHT this would be of very limited value because at any time
the registration responsibility may get transferred to another node due to nodes joining
and leaving the network.
7.2.4 P2P Nodes are not Trustworthy
In general, it cannot be guaranteed that P2P nodes follow the DHT operations properly.
In any large network with regular hosts or even VoIP terminals it must be considered that
4These changes are handled by regular DHT maintenance operations to cope with the case when a
node fails or leaves the network without transferring data items previously.
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Figure 7.7: Node Leave in a P2PSIP Network
some nodes have been compromised or act maliciously. This complicates LI because with
P2PSIP such potentially compromised nodes are part of signalling and store location-to-
URI bindings in the DHT.
User registrations are stored at peers/terminals With P2PSIP, location bindings
of users (i.e. SIP-registrations that bind the current location of a user to a SIP-URI)
are distributedly stored at all participating nodes in the network, potentially at users’
terminals. However, P2P nodes cannot be considered trustworthy. Also, it is possible
that attackers launch a chosen-location attack in the DHT, trying to place a node under
their control at a specific location in the virtual DHT routing structure (e.g. the Chord
routing ring). Because user registrations are stored at potentially compromised and
generally non-trustworthy nodes or terminals, the integrity of user registrations stored in
the network cannot be guaranteed [239]. Consider the example in Figure 2.13: Bob has
no means of preventing node 215 to forge the location stored for his SIP-URI.
Difficult to authenticate user registrations Besides not being trustworthy, a node
storing registrations for some SIP-URI has no means of authenticating the corresponding
data item due to the lack of a shared secret or trust relationship with the owner of a
SIP-URI. Consider again the example in Figure 2.13: Node 215 has no means of authen-
ticating a store-message for Bob’s SIP-URI in order to detect attacks by intermediate
nodes that route the store-message and replace Bob’s location with a forged one.
167
Thus, unless cryptographic add-ons are used (e.g. self-certifying SIP-URIs, compare
Chapter 5), user registrations stored in a P2PSIP network can be forged, possibly mis-
leading Lawful Interception operations.
7.3 Potential Solutions
As highlighted in the previous section, the paradigm of P2P computing imposes signifi-
cant challenges for Lawful Interception of real-time communications signalling and media
that seem almost unachievable technically. Nevertheless, there are some approaches to in-
corporate LI even in highly decentralised systems like P2PSIP. In this section, we discuss
these potential solutions on a general level, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages
of each potential approach for Lawful Interception in a P2P-based SIP system.
The primary problem for Lawful Interception in P2PSIP systems is the lack of a
centralised entity in the network through which all signalling traffic traverses. Thus,
to still render Lawful Interception feasible, any solution needs to solve the problem of
where to intercept communications in a highly dynamic system. Considering the dynamic
network structure and routing in P2P systems described previously, it seems an option to
move the interception point in the network for Lawful Interception from the network core
towards the edge. In the discussion of possible P2PSIP LI solutions, we will therefore
inspect solutions at the network edge first and then look at solutions that intercept closer
to the network core.
7.3.1 Footprint in Devices
One solution that has been suggested for Lawful Interception of IP-traffic and VoIP
communication in server-based systems is to implant a footprint—i.e. software that is
secretly running on the user’s hardware and controlled by the LEA5—in devices. Such a
footprint could intercept all outgoing traffic at the source and would also have access to
all incoming traffic for the target identity. Currently, many countries are considering this
option. For instance, in Germany there is a discussion about trojan horses developed by
government agencies to be secretly installed on hosts of target identities [38]. Of course,
such footprints can also be installed prior to deployment of devices.
Advantages Since signalling and media are correlated in terminals, one key advantage
of a footprint in devices would be that there is no need to trigger the interception of
media traffic (at another location in the network) from the intercepted signalling, hence
coping with user-mobility. For P2PSIP, this solution could also handle the constantly
changing structure of a DHT. In general, having a footprint in the device of the target
5Technically, this approach essentially means that the LEA installs a Trojan Horse on the device of
the user.
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identity would solve the problem where to intercept in the network and also mitigate the
problem of a dynamic network structure and routing.
Disadvantages The core problem with this approach is forcing terminals to incorporate
such a footprint in their code. With hardphones, it might be feasible to enforce this
legally prior to deployment. Still, hackers might find solutions to break firmware and
thus circumvent LI. But even worse, with softphones and open standards like SIP (or
potentially P2PSIP once it is standardised by the IETF) almost anyone can change the
behaviour of terminals or even write a new P2PSIP application. Thus, it seems impossible
to enforce a mandatory LI footprint in open systems with open standards. Future work
in this direction might explore trusted computing and smartcards as hardened platforms
that could protect the integrity of P2PSIP applications including a pre-installed footprint
(still not preventing self-written applications).
7.3.2 Intercepting at IP-Layer
Because P2PSIP essentially replaces SIP servers with a highly dynamic and unpredictable
interconnection of P2P-nodes, a possible solution for LI could be to intercept all traffic
of the target identity at the IP-layer. This would assume stateful packet inspection
on the IP-layer, filtering SIP messages, and then extracting signalling information in
order to trigger interception of the CC. Further, it would assume that the LEA knows
the network operator of the target in order to authorise LI through the administration
handover interface.
Advantages In a setting where the target identity always uses the same network op-
erator this may be a feasible approach. In such a setting, the target identity might get
assigned a different IP-address frequently (as is common for home users connected via
an ISP) which would result in a new DHT position on the signalling layer (remember
that most DHTs compute a node-ID by hashing the node’s current IP-address). Since
the network operator usually authenticates the target identity on the IP-layer, it seems
more practical to intercept at the IP-layer in this setting as described above.
Disadvantages In a scenario where the target of a Lawful Interception operation
changes its network operator frequently (due to mobility on the IP-layer as specifically
offered by SIP), this approach becomes very challenging. First, in order to intercept on
the IP-layer in this case the LEA would need to inform virtually all network operators in
its legislative domain and provide them with the target identity (i.e. the SIP-URI of the
target). Second, all network providers must have the technical ability to correlate CC
interception with SIP signalling extracted from filtered SIP messages.
Overall, it seems that this approach is hard to deploy in practise. If users change the
IP access provider (e.g. by using wireless networking hotspots) frequently, this approach
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demands for a completely correlated surveillance of users on the IP-layer among network
operators. Such a comprehensive Lawful Interception system would be very expensive,
possibly imposing large costs to network/access providers.
7.3.3 Infiltrating the Peer-to-Peer Network
In order to make LI feasible not at edge nodes but in the network core, the only option
seems to infiltrate the network with nodes under control of the LEA. Note that this
would imply an important paradigm shift to LI carried out today where the LEA does
not actively conduct LI but rather sends authorised LI requests to operators which are
legally bound to carry them out.
It is well known that this approach is pursued by the music industry in order to track
illegal uploading of music in P2P file-sharing networks. However, there is an important
difference to Lawful Interception: the goal of the music industry is to find some illegal
file-sharing activity, whereas the goal of Lawful Interception is to intercept all traffic for
a specific target identity. Since even the control of a very large amount of nodes cannot
guarantee being on every possible signalling path, effectively the LEA would need to
place itself at specific locations (depending on the DHT structure and properties of the
particular P2PSIP network) in relation to the target identity’s node-ID and key-ID in
the network. Essentially this meant that the LEA becomes a kind of attacker carrying
out chosen-location attacks for the target identity.
Intercepting incoming signalling messages by guarding the key-ID For in-
stance, with an unidirectional DHT such as Chord [267], the LEA could control all access
to a specific key-ID by controlling a node6 with a node-ID marginally smaller then the
key-ID (i.e. very close in the unidirectional DHT routing structure). For other DHT pro-
tocols (e.g. CAN [210] or Pastry [223]), the DHT structure determines closeness to a key,
respectively. As an example, Figure 7.8 shows the DHT from the previous figures after
a new node (assumed to be under the control of the LEA) has joined with node-ID 209.
By becoming the direct predecessor of the node responsible for storing data for key-ID
210, due to routing properties specific to Chord (i.e. unidirectional greedy routing) [247]
the LEA can control all queries for key-ID 210 (i.e. all incoming signalling messages for
Bob’s SIP-URI). This would enable the LEA to intercept incoming signalling messages
for a specific target identity. Because the key-ID depends on the SIP-URI of the target,
such an approach is relatively independent of network dynamics as long as the target
does not change its SIP-URI.
Intercepting outgoing signalling messages by infiltrating routing tables To
intercept all outgoing messages from a target identity on the signalling layer, the LEA
would need to infiltrate all DHT routing table entries of the target identity’s node in
the DHT. Since the target identity gets assigned a new node-ID whenever the target
6e.g. by joining the network with such a node-ID
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Figure 7.8: A Node Under the Control of a Law Enforcement Agency Joining a DHT in
order to Intercept All Incoming Signalling Messages for a Target Identity
obtains a new IP-address, this seems unjustifiable effort. Additionally, for some DHTs
such routing table poisoning attacks [84] are hard to conduct due to constrained routing
tables [251] (see Chapter 3). Hence, due to the rapidly changing network structure in
P2P-systems, it is almost impossible for a LEA to infiltrate all routing table entries of a
target identity’s DHT-node.
Using an enrolment server of the operator If an enrolment server is operated
by an operator which has a legal agreement with a LEA, joining the network at some
specific location and infiltrating routing table entries of a target identity may become
feasible for the LEA. An enrolment server could take out the effects of network dynamics
by assigning the same node-ID to a target identity even in the case of mobility on the
IP-layer (in [63] an approach for such a special DHT enrolment-service is presented),
assuming participants authenticate themselves at the enrolment server. Potentially, this
could enable a LEA to intercept all outgoing calls for an identity even in a highly dynamic
network because a particular target identity would have the same node-ID in the DHT
even if it changed its IP-address. Therefore, using an enrolment server could mitigate
some of the problems in infiltrating a P2P network mentioned previously. This opens
an opportunity for bootstrapping Lawful Interception with specific nodes that infiltrate
the network at specific locations as demanded by the LEA (with respect to the target
identity).
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7.4 Summary and Contribution
This chapter provided a technical analysis of Lawful Interception in P2P-based real-time
communication systems. The key properties of P2P systems that impose challenges for
Lawful Interception have been inspected in detail: The lack of a central entity, chang-
ing participants and varying data responsibility, P2P-routing characteristics, and the
non-trustworthiness of nodes. Further, potential solutions to these problems have been
presented and examined, including a Lawful Interception footprint in devices, intercept-
ing all communication on the IP-layer, and actively infiltrating the P2P network. The
presented case study contributes a detailed technical analysis of Lawful Interception in
P2P-based multimedia communication systems.
Existing Lawful Interception architectures have been designed with traditional telecom-
munication networks in mind. This model maps to IP-based networks, as long as there
is a service provider with central signalling entities that know about the locations of its
users. With P2P systems, this model may change. Potentially, the P2P network will
not be controlled by an operator. Instead, the P2P overlay may form itself, and change
highly dynamically all the time.
None of the presented solutions seems to be a very promising and satisfactory approach
for implementing Lawful Interception in P2PSIP networks at large, each having its own
drawbacks as well as practical issues. Therefore, at the current state, providing a general
solution for Lawful Interception in P2P-based real-time communication systems must be
regarded as technically highly challenging and it is an open research problem how to
circumvent the problems inspected in this chapter.
The preferable approach for Lawful Interception in a P2PSIP network largely depends
on the exact properties and use case of the system. It remains to be seen which type
of service architecture will prevail for P2PSIP and to what extent a potential operator
will be involved in signalling at all. If a P2PSIP network is operated by a provider
which is in charge of enrolment and node-ID assignment, there is an opportunity for Law
Enforcement Agencies to bootstrap Lawful Interception from this procedure. Further
research needs to be done in order to investigate precise requirements for such an approach
and its feasibility.
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Proof-of-Concept Prototype of
Security-Enhanced P2PSIP System
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In this chapter, we present a prototype implementation of a P2PSIP system which has
been enhanced by some of our proposed security mechanisms1. We implemented several
of our secure DHT routing algorithms and investigated through experiments their effect
on the success rate of lookups and the number of DHT routing hops in an infiltrated
P2PSIP network. In particular, our proof-of-concept prototype enables the use of Chord
DHT routing enhancements such as backtracking and Direct Replica Routing (DRR) (as
presented in Chapter 4). Further, we implemented self-certifying SIP-URIs (as presented
in Chapter 5) and the corresponding verification of data items by P2PSIP nodes. In
addition to these previously presented techniques, our prototype enables the evaluation
of an application-intrinsic social network as a countermeasure to adversary nodes on
lookup paths.
1Parts of this chapter (including figures) have originally been published in [248]. See also Appendix
A.
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There exist other P2PSIP prototypes [18] [59] as well as general simulation studies of
DHT-based P2P networks under attack [84] [106] [247]. Different from these works, we
present a P2PSIP system that can emulate malicious nodes. Our prototype constitutes a
P2PSIP implementation that enables to emulate adversary nodes in an automated way.
Further, our emulation setup allows the injection of large amounts of automatically gener-
ated SIP traffic (i.e. SIP-Invite requests) into the network. This enables the measurement
of the corresponding success rate of reaching the desired callee as well as estimating the
average call-setup time while the network is under attack in an actual P2P network.
Overall, the prototype architecture we present provides the ability to study a P2PSIP
network during a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on the DHT-routing layer and the effect
of corresponding security techniques in a real environment. As a general benefit, our sys-
tem provides the ability to analyse attacker behaviour as well as novel security techniques
in an actual P2PSIP environment with comparably low effort.
Section 8.1 presents the rationale that led to our emulated system and an overview
of our implementation. The security techniques we implemented to test their effects on
lookup success in an actual P2PSIP network are described in Section 8.2. The experiments
we conducted and the corresponding results are detailed in Section 8.3. Section 8.4
discusses advantages and limitations of our prototype architecture and concludes this
chapter with a summary of our prototype implementation work and the experimental
results we obtained.
8.1 Design and Implementation
8.1.1 Design Considerations and Requirements
The goal of our prototype is to evaluate security techniques. Thus, in contrary to other
approaches [18] [59], we do not put special focus on SIP-protocol details or current stan-
dardisation proposals for P2PSIP and DHT messages [140]. Instead, we envision a simple
P2PSIP implementation which follows the generic architecture depicted in Figure 8.1: To
use a DHT for locating SIP users, the SIP-URI is the key and the corresponding data
item stored in the network is the current location of the corresponding user.
The example in Figure 8.1 displays a Chord DHT in a schematic view where a user
Alice wants to call another user Bob whose key-ID (i.e. the hash of his SIP-URI) is 206;
Alice’s and Bob’s user agents have joined the network with node ID 33 and 231, respec-
tively2. Note that in such a general architecture, DHT routing (step 3 in Figure 8.1) and
retrieving a SIP registration from the DHT root node (step 4 in Figure 8.1) are indepen-
dent from SIP session establishment with the callee (step 5 in Figure 8.1). This enables
to implement DHT routing independently from SIP messages in our implementation.
Most importantly, we do not assume any specific protocol for the DHT routing layer, nor
do we impose any specific way of how DHT routing interacts with the SIP-layer of the
2See Subsection 2.3.3 for more details on P2PSIP.
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Figure 8.1: Generic P2PSIP Architecture Followed by Prototype
caller. Therefore, our results are of general nature and apply to any P2PSIP approach
that follows the schematic signalling flow depicted in Figure 8.1.
To study P2PSIP security in a generic way, we envision an architecture where every
node in the DHT represents a single SIP-client (i.e. SIP user agent) with a single SIP-
URI. This setting enables us to generate uniformly distributed session establishment
attempts and to statistically measure lookup success. This is not a limitation because
other architectures where each DHT-node represents more than one SIP user agent can
be seen as an extension of this setting.
To assure proper functioning of the prototype, the establishment of a SIP session and
corresponding phone call between two regular SIP clients must be possible and tested.
However, in order to run experiments with a large number of phone calls (to measure
the average success rate of lookups), it is not feasible to start calls by hand. Thus, a key
requirement is that a large amount of SIP call establishment attempts can be generated
automatically. Further, to have realistic non-biased experiments, it is necessary that
generated calls are triggered distributed uniformly over all participating nodes (as origin)
and all participating keys (as target) in the network. While it is questionable if P2P
IP Telephony calls are distributed uniformly among users, this enables to measure the
success rate as the average lookup success rate in relation to all nodes in the network.
175
Figure 8.2: Architecture of P2PSIP Security Testing System
8.1.2 Implementation
Similar to P2PSIP standardisation [140], our implementation is based on Chord [267].
We used OpenChord [12] as the core DHT and implemented a DHT/SIP-Adaptor with
Jain-SIP [9]. Figure 8.2 displays the overall architecture of our system. As depicted,
the single DHT/SIP-Adaptor can send and receive overlay messages to/from all nodes
currently in the network. Thus, the adaptor controls an experiment which consists of a
multitude of SIP-requests from various callers to various callees. Messages are generated
with SIPp [24] and sent to the adaptor which triggers the corresponding DHT request.
The result of a DHT lookup as well as statistical data is stored in a MySQL database
by the adaptor before it passes the corresponding SIP message on to the SIP user agent
client (SIPp) which initiated the location lookup.
The adaptor model allows for testing of new security techniques without changing
the SIP-stack or firmware of phones3. Additionally, with this setup the single adaptor
can measure results and statistical data for analysis of the behaviour of the system. We
also tested several regular SIP hard-/softphones with this setup and could successfully
establish calls, demonstrating the overall functionality of the system.
Figure 8.3 shows the message flow for a SIP Invite request and the interaction between
SIPp and the DHT-Adaptor. When the adaptor receives a SIP Invite request, it fetches
the callee’s SIP-URI from the To-header, hashes it to determine the corresponding DHT
key-ID, and starts a DHT-lookup at a node randomly selected among the non-adversary
3After having initially proposed SIP as the DHT-routing protocol, the IETF P2PSIP working group
also has agreed on not having SIP as the DHT message format [140], as in our architecture.
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Figure 8.3: Message Flow between Message Generator and SIP/DHT-Adaptor
DHT-nodes. If the DHT successfully returns the node responsible for storing the callee’s
location, the adaptor retrieves the location of the callee and signals this location to the
caller (SIPp in our setup) via a SIP 302-moved temporarily response code. Using a
302-moved temporarily response code ensures compatibility with existing SIP-clients
and at the same time cleanly encapsulates the DHT-lookup service for measurements. If
the lookup does not succeed, a 404-not found response code gets returned to the caller.
In both cases, success/failure of the lookup, the total time needed, and the number of hops
used get stored in a MySQL database by the adaptor. More details on the architecture
of the prototype and its implementation can be found in Appendix B.3.
8.2 Security Techniques Evaluated
To evaluate how potential countermeasures can positively affect lookups in a real P2PSIP
network under attack, we implemented some of our security enhancements to Chord as
well as self-certifying SIP-URIs as a cryptographic solution for protecting the integrity
of SIP registrations in the SIP/DHT-adaptor. In addition, we implemented a variant
of Social Path Routing (SPROUT) [167] that exploits the application-intrinsic social
network among P2PSIP users. These techniques can be turned on/off during individual
experiments to evaluate each technique’s merit individually.
The main goal of our prototype is to investigate attacks on DHT routing. We are
interested in the availability of the lookup service under real-time constraints, i.e. the
ability for a caller to receive the current location for a particular callee during a Denial-
of-Service attack on routing on the DHT layer by participating nodes in the network. In
addition, our prototype intends to confirm the concept of self-certifying SIP-URIs and to
show that this concept incurs very low performance overhead.
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Attacker model We assume a P2PSIP network where secure node-ID assignment is
deployed against Sybil-attacks [109] (e.g. where a single attacker tries to generate mul-
tiple virtual node IDs) and against so-called chosen location attacks (in which attackers
deliberately choose a location in the DHT to cut off traffic from specific target nodes).
This property can be achieved through a central authority like an enrolment server. As
an alternative, there exists formal work to achieve this property [114] [53] as well as other
more practical solutions [98] (compare Chapter 4).
Secure node-ID assignment prevents some important attacks on DHTs. However, it is
important to acknowledge that even under this assumption adversary nodes can degrade
the availability of a DHTs lookup service significantly [247]. For instance, consider the
case were nodes that had been previously authenticated by an enrolment server are in-
fected with malicious software such as a trojan horse or as part of a bot-net. In this case,
a single attacker can launch a Denial-of-Service attack on the DHT’s lookup service by
having all nodes under his control block legitimate lookup requests in the network. In this
scenario, secure node-ID assignment merely assures that attacker nodes are distributed
uniformly in the network [98]. In general, an enrolment server (or similar solutions)
prevents an attacker from joining the network with a large amount of nodes or at some
specific location but it does not prevent nodes that have successfully joined the network
from acting maliciously.
Under these assumptions, we consider the following attacker model: A P2PSIP net-
work of N nodes has been infiltrated by f × N (f < 1) malicious nodes (e.g. because
they have been compromised) which drop messages instead of routing them to their des-
tination. Malicious nodes not only drop messages but also do not return data items
(for keys under their responsibility) upon request. Adversary nodes may be controlled
by a single external attacker, but they do not actively collude with each other during
DHT operation. Attacks on the IP-layer are outside the scope of our implementation; we
concentrate solely on the DHT-routing layer.
Iterative routing and backtracking Iterative routing enables the query node to
verify that queries make progress towards the key and is thus preferable from a security
perspective [235]. We implemented an extension of iterative routing where at each routing
step the whole routing table and direct successor list (instead of just a single next-hop
node) of the hop node gets returned to the query node. We refer to this extension as
Complete-knowledge iterative routing, as described in Section 4.3. This technique has the
advantage that at each routing step the query node can decide on the next hop based on
an advanced secure routing strategy (e.g. use Direct Replica Routing [247] or Social Path
Routing [167], see below).
Further, we enhanced iterative Chord routing with backtracking. When a node does
not reply to a routing request after a certain time-out, it is assumed to be malicious (in
our prototype). In this case, the lookup continues by choosing the second best node from
the previous routing hop according to the current routing strategy.
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Direct Replica Routing In Chord, data items for keys are replicated at r − 1 nodes
directly succeeding the node responsible for the key-ID in the ring structure. However,
in regular Chord this replication is used only for reliability in the case that the node
responsible for the data item fails or does not leave the network properly. In particular,
if the responsible node for a key is malicious it can deny any access to the corresponding
data item. Even worse, due to Chord’s unidirectional greedy routing not only the node
responsible for storing some content but also its direct predecessor in the Chord-ring can
deny access to data items4 [246].
To circumvent these problems we have proposed Direct Replica Routing (DRR) [247]
(see Chapter 4). With this extension, nodes can route directly to nodes storing replicated
data items without depending on the node responsible for a particular data item. This
is achieved by using the direct successor list nodes maintain for reliability in routing. If
during an iterative routing hop the direct successor list received contains a node larger
than the key-ID, this node might store replicated content (depending on the replication
parameter r) for the key and can thus be contacted directly by the query node to get the
corresponding data item.
Self-Certifying SIP-URIs In a P2PSIP network with untrustworthy nodes it is cru-
cial that the integrity of content retrieved from the network (i.e. a SIP-URI/location
binding) can be verified. Otherwise, adversary nodes on the routing path or responsible
for storing data items can manipulate content. In P2PSIP this means that attackers
could redirect phone calls to hosts under their control by replacing the IP-address which
is returned as a result of a lookup.
We have proposed self-certifying SIP-URIs [239] as a decentralised solution to ensure
the integrity of content in P2PSIP (see Chapter 5). With this approach, SIP-URIs are
cryptographically generated by hashing a public key. This enables the owner of a SIP-
URI to cryptographically sign location-bindings stored in the DHT with the corresponding
private key. By appending the public key to registrations stored in the DHT, any node
that retrieves data items can verify that the public key belongs to the SIP-URI requested
(by hashing the public key) and then use the public key to verify the location stored for
that SIP-URI.
In our prototype system all participating nodes use self-certifying SIP-URIs and are
capable of verifying content retrieved from the network cryptographically. Only signed
registration bindings are stored in the DHT. This ensures that the integrity of SIP reg-
istrations stored in the P2P network can be cryptographically verified by any node,
rendering man-in-the-middle attacks on data items stored in the DHT infeasible.
Application-intrinsic social network routing Marti et al. have suggested to use
an external social network in conjunction with DHT-routing [167]. The assumption is
that nodes with whom the query node has a transitive link in the social network can
be assumed (at least with higher probability than the average DHT node) not to be
4We refer to this as the Shield Problem in Chord, extensively discussed in Chapter 4.
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malicious and behave according to the DHT protocol. With this approach (called Social
Path ROUTing, SPROUT ) lookups try to route along nodes with whom the query node
has a transitive relationship in the social network, as these hop nodes are considered to
be non-adversary.
Instead of an external (in the sense that the social network application is independent
of the DHT application) social network (such as Facebook [25] or Xing [26]), we assume
that P2PSIP nodes build an application-intrinsic social network over time. Often times
social relationships exist between real-time communication partners. For instance, some
VoIP users may frequently call known friends or family members. This enables to create
social links based on the interaction among users within the P2P application itself (e.g.
VoIP calls). These social links could either be created manually by users (e.g. by pressing
a button during a phone call with a known and trustworthy callee) or automatically (e.g.
based on certain criteria such as exceeding a minimum calling time or a certain calling
frequency for a callee). In either case, the social network is created based on transactions
within the application. We use the term application-intrinsic social network for these
kinds of application-interaction based social links among nodes. Figure 8.4 exemplarily
shows social relationships among users that use a P2P network5. Note that users B and
C have a direct link on the social layer, but not on the DHT layer (they are connected
by node D on the DHT layer).
In our prototype, we implemented two variations of an application-intrinsic P2PSIP
social network. The underlying DHT-routing of both schemes is based on the SPROUT
algorithm published in [167]: Nodes route preferably to the social link which is closest to
the key-ID on the DHT layer. If such a node does not exist (i.e. there is no social link node
closer to the key), regular Chord routing is resumed. First, we implemented application-
intrinsic social network routing where at each experiment a uniformly distributed social
network is generated on top of the DHT. Each non-adversary node maintains links to
φ randomly chosen non-adversary nodes in the social network, maintained in a routing
table Tsoc() at each non-adversary node. These social links are preferred in routing as
long as queries make progress towards the key (i.e. we preserve a unidirectional DHT
routing structure). We refer to this as static application-intrinsic social network routing
(AISNR-s).
One underlying assumption for static AISNR is that nodes can maintain connections
to their φ social links despite leaving and re-joining the DHT by these nodes. To maintain
social links despite churn, nodes could frequently lookup the corresponding SIP-URIs in
the DHT. Churn is not emulated in our prototype, so the φ links in Tsoc() at each non-
adversary node remain valid during the course of one experimental run.
Second, we enhanced AISNR-s such that nodes add other nodes to their routing
table Tsoc() over time. We refer to this as dynamic AISNR (AISNR-d). With AISNR-
d, after each successful DHT lookup, the query node, nq, adds the callee’s DHT node,
ncallee, as well as the root node (or replica root node in case of DRR), rootk(callee) (which
returned a correct data item for the callee’s key, kcallee), to its social routing table Tsoc(nq).
Further, also the callee’s DHT node (i.e. ncallee) adds the caller’s DHT node (i.e. nq) to
5Figure 8.4 is a modified version of the original figure published in [241].
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its social routing table Tsoc(ncallee). This simulates a successful call establishment where
both parties (either manually or automatically triggered) add each other to their social
routing table. In addition, the caller adds the DHT root node (or replica root node in
case of DRR) to its social routing table, to account for the fact that this node returned
a correct data item for the lookup.
Note that in case a malicious node is inadvertently added to Tsoc() not much harm
is done to future lookups. First, such a node can merely delay lookups (by a single hop
in the attacker model of our prototype). Second, in case a node nm ∈ Tsoc(nq) does
not answer to messages or returns falsified data items (i.e. turns out to be malicious), a
query node nq can delete it from Tsoc(nq) at any time. In our prototype implementation,
only non-adversary nodes are added to Tsoc(), as only calls to non-adversary nodes are
emulated and only non-adversary nodes return correct data items to DHT requests.
Figure 8.4: Application-Intrinsic Social Network in P2PSIP
8.3 Experiments and Results
Using the emulated P2PSIP system described previously, we conducted a multitude of
experiments with various attacker rates. We investigated the success rate of regular Chord
routing as well as different combinations of security techniques as add-ons to iterative
routing. Additionally, we looked at the effect of the implemented techniques on the
average hop count for lookups. Below we present aggregated results that visualise and
summarise the effects of our algorithms that we observed. Additional and more detailed
results can be found in Appendix B.3.
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8.3.1 Experimental Setup
The emulated system we designed can in principle be distributed on several physical
machines with many DHT-nodes running on different ports on each host. All our ex-
periments were conducted with all nodes running on one or two Windows-XP 64-bit
machines6. Node-IDs were computed by hashing the combination of IP-address, port,
and a random number. By using a random number we emulated secure node-ID assign-
ment and thus uniformly distributed node-IDs in our system.
In our experiments a network consisting of N (N = 200, 400, 600) random nodes was
generated with non-adversary nodes and adversary nodes distributed uniformly over the
node-ID space. As each node in the DHT represents a SIP user agent in our model,
additionally N arbitrary self-certifying SIP-URIs were generated, each of these was asso-
ciated with a DHT-node, and then stored in the network (i.e. the IP-address/port of the
corresponding DHT-node was stored for each SIP-URI). After the network had been built
and keys had been stored, a multitude of arbitrary key lookups (i.e. SIP-Invite requests
with a key randomly selected from the previously stored values) were generated and sent
to the adaptor. These Invite-messages were only sent out from SIP-URIs belonging to
non-adversary nodes and contained an existing (self-certifying) SIP-URIs as the callee.
For each setting, we conducted 10 experiments (each with a randomly generated network
and SIP-URIs) consisting of at least 100 random lookups (we conducted 100 lookups to
evaluate AISNR-s and 500 lookups to evaluate AISNR-d).
The following settings were used in all experiments (our implementation allows chang-
ing each of these parameters): We set r = s and m = 160 (using SHA-1 as the hash func-
tion). All our experimental runs were conducted using key lookup and with a scarcely
utilised key space (compare with our recommendations for Chord simulations in Section
4.6). We varied the following parametrisations in our experiments:
 s, the size of the successor list used for Direct Replica Routing
 N , the total number of nodes in the network
 f , the attacker rate
 φ, the number of application intrinsic social links each node has initially in the
network
Our prototype logs the total time needed for each lookup. However, since in our
experimental setup a DHT consisting of several hundred nodes is emulated on just a few
hosts connected on a local area network, the absolute time we measured is unrealistic to
assume for wide area network deployments. Our time measurements therefore cannot be
used to estimate real-world lookup times for DHTs where nodes are distributed over a
wide area network or even the Internet. Instead, we use the number of hops a lookup
takes to succeed (also measured by our prototype) as a metric for lookup time. Depending
6See Appendix B.3 for more details regarding our experimental setup.
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Figure 8.5: Success Rate for DRR and DRR Combined with AISNR-s for Different
Values of s (N = 200)
on the properties and node distribution of an actual DHT, our hop count can roughly be
mapped to lookup time by multiplying it with the estimated average Round Trip Time
(RTT) in a given setting. For instance, for an Internet-scale DHT, one DHT hop can
very roughly be estimated with 200ms (i.e. the average Round Trip Time on the Internet
[7]). Thus, an average hop count of less than 10 hops (as in all our experiments where
f ≤ 0.4, see Appendix B.3 for detailed results) is acceptable for real-time communication
session establishment even on an Internet scale (as it could very roughly be estimated
with a session establishment time of 2s, i.e. less than 8s as regarded to be acceptable by
the ITU-T for phone call setup delay [30]).
In each experiment we conducted, self-certifying SIP-URIs have been used and the cor-
responding cryptographic operations (i.e. signature generation before storing data items
in the DHT and verification of signatures after retrieval of data items from the DHT) have
been performed by nodes. Our experiments thus confirm the practicality of this concept
in a running system. The time needed for the cryptographic operations was measured
in initial experiments and turned out to be very negligible. Further, these operations do
not depend on any of the parametrisations we varied in our experiments. We thus did
not log the time needed for self-certifying operations individually for the experiments we
conducted.
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Figure 8.6: Success Rate for DRR and
DRR Combined with AISNR-s Compared
to Regular Chord (s = 8, N = 400)
Figure 8.7: Success Rate for DRR and
DRR Combined with AISNR-s Compared
to Regular Chord (s = 8, N = 600)
8.3.2 Results
Figure 8.5 shows the average lookup success rate we measured for DRR and DRR com-
bined with AISNR-s in a network of 200 nodes, for different settings of s and different
attacker rates (f). Further, the figure displays the analytical bound for different values of
s (compare equation 4.27; the analytical bound for s = 8 can hardly be seen in the figure
because the value is essentially 100% for f = 0.1, . . . , 0.5). It can be observed that our
algorithms come close to analytical bounds in our emulation prototype. It is noteworthy
to point out that the average lookup success rate we measured is slighty higher than the
analytical bound for s = 2 and f = 0.2. Since the analytical bound concerns the average
lookup success rate this slight deviation seems tolerable. The success rate is essentially
100% for s = 8 and attacker rates of f ≤ 0.4.
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 show similar results for networks of size N = 400 and N = 600
where s = 8, comparing Regular Chord (enhanced with iterative backtracking), DRR,
and DRR combined with AISNR-s. Again, it can be observed that a combination of
DRR and AISNR can achieve 100% lookup success for f ≤ 0.4. Further, note that
regular Chord performs poorly in the presence of adversary nodes.
Reducing the hop count with AISNR The results in Figures 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 show
that DRR with s = 8 suffices to achieve a very high lookup success rate (essentially 100%
or nearly 100%) for attacker rates up to f = 0.4. Application-intrinsic social network
routing can be used in conbination with DRR in order to achieve a similar success rate
with a lesser hop count. The results in Figure 8.8 demonstrate this effect of AISNR-
s on the average hop count. The figure displays the hop count distribution for DRR
compared to DRR combined with AISNR-s in a network with 400 nodes and f = 0.3.
Notice that with AISNR-s and φ = 8 lookups succeed with less hops compared to just
using DRR. For DRR combined with AISNR-s(φ = 8), the 95-percentile for the hop
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Figure 8.8: Hop Count Distribution for DRR and DRR Combined with AISNR-s in a
Network with 400 Total Nodes of which 30% are Adversary Nodes (f = 0.3, s = 8, N =
400)
count is 10, whereas for DRR only, the 95-percentile for the hop count is 14 in the same
scenario (N = 400, f = 0.3). Similar results have been obtained for different network
sizes (N = 200, N = 600) and other attacker rates. The reader is referred to Appendix
B.3 for those results.
To investigate the effect of φ, the number of initial (and constant in the case of
AISNR-s) social links each node has, on the hop count distribution, we ran experiments
with different values of φ. Figure 8.9 shows the results for f = 0.3 and N = 200 (results
regarding the average hop count for different attacker rates are contained in Appendix
B.3). The higher φ, the less hops are needed for lookups to succeed. This is an intuitive
result: The more social links each node has, the higher is the probability that it can
make good progress towards a key in each routing hop. Notice, however, that the gain of
φ = 12 compared to φ = 8 is not significant. From these results we can infer that for the
network sizes we emulated, φ = 8 a sufficient for hop count reduction.
The effect of dynamic AISNR over time So far, we have shown that static AISNR,
i.e. a fixed number of social links used by each node, can reduce the hop count for lookups.
To investigate dynamic AISNR (AISNR-d), we ran experiments where nodes add links to
their routing table Tsoc() during the experiment (as described in Section 8.2). We set the
initial number of social links to 0 (φ = 0). This setting emulates the complete evolution of
an application-intrinsic social network over time, where initially each node has no social
links. We executed 500 lookups during each run, and studied the hop count distribution
for different intervals of lookups in the run. Figure 8.10 visualises the effect of AISNR-d
on the hop count distribution over time in a network of N = 200 nodes and f = 0.4
(more results for AISNR-d for different attacker rates can be found in Appendix B.3).
It can be observed that during the first 100 lookups, lookups tend to need more hops to
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Figure 8.9: Hop Count Distribution for DRR Combined with AISNR-s for Different
Values of φ in a Network with 200 Total Nodes of which 30% are Adversary Nodes
(f = 0.3, s = 8, N = 200)
succeed than in the last 100 lookups of the experiment. As nodes add more and more
social links to their routing table Tsoc(), the application-intrinsic social network builds
itself over time, thereby more and more reducing the hop count.
8.4 Discussion and Summary
We have presented a P2PSIP prototype system which can emulate adversary nodes. This
system enabled us to study a real implementation of a P2PSIP network during Denial-of-
Service attacks on the DHT-routing layer. We analysed the effect of several secure routing
techniques on the lookup success rate as well as on the estimated hop count (which in
the end amounts to call-setup time) under different settings.
Our experiments demonstrate that without the use of countermeasures (i.e. when
using regular Chord routing), attackers can significantly degrade the service of locating
a callee. More importantly, our results verify the effectiveness of our mechanisms for
securing P2PSIP networks. In summary, our algorithms enable a success rate of largely
100% for s = 8 in networks with up to N = 600 nodes and up to 40% adversary nodes.
Moreover, our experiments demonstrate that an application-intrinsic social network can
be exploited within DHT routing to reduce the average hop count. This enables the
timely establishment of real-time communication settings. Moreover, such an application-
intrinsic social network can evolute as part of regular P2PSIP operations, thereby making
the overall network more and more secure over time.
The results we presented in this chapter have been obtained from the emulation of
rather moderately-sized P2PSIP networks, consisting of less than 1000 nodes. Note that
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Figure 8.10: The Effect of AISNR-d on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time (f = 0.4,
s = 8, N = 200)
some of the P2PSIP use-cases envision application scenarios with network sizes in this
range (e.g. “Emergency First Responder Networks” or “Ad-Hoc and Ephemeral Groups”
[77]). For such scenarios our results are directly applicable and valid. In addition, our
system could easily be run on multiple hosts with bigger memory, emulating networks in
the range of several 1000 nodes. Our architecture could hence be used to emulate larger
networks.
Another potential drawback of our experiments is the fact that our results originate
from a local setup. This prevents to determine realistic lookup delays for Internet scale
scenarios. To mitigate this drawback, we used the hop count which can be used to
estimate Internet-scale round trip times and thus realistic call setup delays. Finally, a
condition of our experiments is that we emulated a static network without nodes joining
or leaving the network (so-called churn) during experimental runs.
While admittedly these limitations but some constraints on the transferability of our
results to large Internet-scale P2PSIP networks, it is important to realise that our results
provide an upper bound on lookup success for any larger network: Analytically it can
be shown that as network size increases the average lookup success rate may decrease in
networks under attack due to longer path lookup lengths (see equation 4.13 and [246]),
possibly even worsened by churn. Thus, any algorithm that provides unsatisfactory out-
come in small networks in our system must be regarded as not useful in larger networks.
In summary, our system provides the ability to study P2PSIP-security in a real en-
vironment. It can easily be extended to test new secure routing algorithms. Thus, our
prototype architecture enables to analyse different attacker models and to study future
novel security techniques in an actual P2PSIP network with relatively small effort. By
emulating random traffic, our system offers short-term estimations regarding the useful-
ness of algorithms in an actual network without the need to deploy nodes Internet-wide,
e.g. via planetlab [14].
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This chapter concludes this thesis. We summarise our work and highlight our contri-
butions. Further, we assess our contributions by contrasting them with our initial goals.
Finally, we discuss open issues and provide an outlook on future work.
9.1 Discussion and Assessment of Contributions
9.1.1 Main Contributions in Summary
Our security analysis for Decentralised Service Location—exemplified with P2P-based
real-time communication session establishment (P2PSIP)—identified several security re-
quirements. Our study of prior art revealed that the following security challenges have not
been sufficiently addressed by existing work: On the DHT Routing Layer, the availability
of the lookup service needs to be maintained. Further, the integrity of location-bindings
stored as data items in the DHT needs to be protected. On the application layer—
considering specifically session establishment for real-time communication—assessment
of unknown identities is necessary for decentralised protection against unsolicited com-
munication (Spam). For each of these challenges, we have developed decentralised mech-
anisms to address them. Further, Lawful Interception is a legal requirement in many
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countries for multimedia communication session establishment. We provided a detailed
technical investigation for this challenge.
Availability of the DHT lookup service We have proposed algorithms to increase
the success rate of DHT lookups (see Chapter 4 for details). Our algorithms extend
Chord [266] in order to maintain availability of the lookup service in the presence of
attackers in the DHT. We enhanced Chord with complete-knowledge iterative routing.
In addition, we designed essentially three techniques as enhancement to regular Chord
routing. Independent/Alternate Multipath Routing (CMR) enables to cope with failed
lookup paths by either restarting an independent path or by using backtracking. Direct
Replica Routing (DRR) ensures that data items can be retrieved even if the root node
for a given key or its predecessor are adversary nodes. Density Checks can detect attacks
on node-ID suppression in routing tables. Our algorithms are truly decentralised: Each
node makes its own routing decision autonomously, without relying on any central entity.
We have analysed the proposed algorithms analytically and evaluated them through
simulation. Our experiments show that our combined algorithms can come very close to
theoretical bounds on the DHT lookup success rate. For instance, our solution can in
principle achieve 99.9% success rate in the case of 40% adversary nodes in the network.
To account for the fact that lookups are expected to succeed within a certain amount
of time, we conducted additional experiments with varying hop thresholds. Our results
show that even with a limited hop threshold our algorithms are still effective and can
provide availability of the DHT lookup service.
Our contribution is the design and evaluation of algorithms that constitute effective
and efficient measures to enable DHT lookup availability for Chord. Moreover, we have
discovered several methodology flaws in the evaluation of prior work and hence shown
the insufficiency of such solutions. In contrast, we have shown that our algorithms are
effective under realistic and appropriate conditions. Therefore, we consider our work an
important and considerable contribution.
Integrity of location-bindings We have designed a mechanism using self-certifying
SIP-URIs to protect the integrity of location-bindings stored in a DHT (see Chapter 5
for details). With this approach, any node in the network can verify the integrity of
location-bindings it receives (or forwards), without relying on a central authority. We
have presented detailed schemes on how to generate a self-certifying SIP-URI and how
to apply this approach to P2PSIP. Further, we have discussed potential attacks on our
scheme and how to mitigate them.
We have assessed this approach qualitatively by discussing its benefits and drawbacks.
As advantages, our approach does not rely on a central certification authority, can be used
by any node in the network to check the integrity of arbitrary messages, is independent
of the DHT used or any particular routing strategy, and is compatible with regular
SIP-URI’s as specified in RFC 3261 [222]. However, our approach also entails some
disadvantages. First, self-certifying SIP-URIs are not human-readable. Second, key-
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revocation is cumbersome because essentially revoking a cryptographic key implies the
generation of a new SIP-URI. Further, the cryptographic primitives we introduce result
in minor computational overhead. Finally, our solution does not solve the problem of
associating a physical entity (i.e. a user) with a SIP-URI.
Compared to prior art, our contribution is the design of a self-certifying scheme for
SIP-URIs in conjunction with P2P-based session establishment. We believe the advan-
tages of our approach and its truly decentralised nature outweigh its drawbacks. In
summary, our solution is cryptographically secure, efficient, and decentralised.
Assessment of unknown identities Existing mechanisms to assess incoming VoIP
calls based in the identity of the caller are based on centralised entities which assert
identities. A consequence of Decentralised Service Location is that such solutions are not
applicable. Hence, any decentralised mechanism to detect unsolicited communication
(e.g. Spam-over-IP-Telephony, SPIT ) must reside on terminals. We have designed a
decentralised alternative based on a Web-of-Trust model (see Chapter 6 for details). Our
approach exploits the social relationships between end-users to detect solicited incoming
messages. Users can cryptographically sign the identity of another user, based on the
perceived past behaviour regarding such an identity. Our solution enables to derive and
cryptographically verify in real-time a certificate chain from a callee to a given caller.
The length of the derived certificate chain helps the callee to judge the trustworthiness
of an incoming message.
We have evaluated this approach through prototype implementation using a modified
SIP proxy and the existing PGP Web-of-Trust. Our implementation enables to evaluate
our approach for client-server SIP as well as for P2PSIP. We have analysed various sce-
narios and degrees of decentralisation of applying our approach to P2PSIP. Our results
show that our approach is feasible for real-time communication setup establishment. De-
pending on the concrete setting, the additional call setup delay is in the order of several
100ms. We regard this an acceptable performance penalty for the gained ability to assess
incoming messages.
Our approach relies on centralised entities (Web-of-Trust key servers) for storing—
verified or unverified—certificate chain graphs. However, these servers only need to be
contacted infrequently by P2PSIP nodes. Further, the identity assertion process itself
is completely decentralised. For verification of certificate chains or incoming calls the
callee does not rely on nor need to trust a centralised entity. Our approach contributes
the integration of a Web-of-Trust into real-time communications such as VoIP. In addi-
tion, our scheme can be used as a decentralised SPIT prevention mechanism suitable for
P2PSIP. Thus, our contribution is the design and implementation of adapting a Web-of-
Trust model for securing decentralised real-time communication systems in a decentralised
fashion, i.e. with as little involvement of centralised entities as possible during session es-
tablishment.
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Lawful Interception Our technical analysis of Lawful Interception in P2PSIP net-
works (see Chapter 7 for details) revealed that several key characteristics of P2P networks
make targeted interception of communications very challenging: First, P2P systems lack
a central entity for interception. Second, routing paths are unique for every call. This
fact is even worsened by the frequently changing membership of nodes, rendering the
routing structure and key responsibility (on which communication setup is based) highly
dynamic. Finally, P2P nodes must be regarded as arbitrary, non-trustworthy entities.
They can thus not be relied upon following any protocol or mechanism correctly.
Our main contribution is the precise and detailed analysis of technical challenges for
Lawful Interception in DHT-based service location. In addition, we have outlined and
discussed technical difficulties for potential solutions. Our study contributes a detailed
technical analysis of applying Lawful Interception in P2PSIP networks.
9.1.2 Revisiting Initial Objectives and Research Questions
The objectives of this thesis have been threefold: First, to provide a security analysis
for Decentralised Service Location; second, to contrast the derived security requirements
with existing, decentralised solutions and their applicability; and third, to design and
evaluate innovative, decentralised mechanisms that properly address the identified secu-
rity challenges.
We have analysed the security requirements and research challenges for Decentralised
Service Location (exemplified with multimedia communication session establishment) in
detail (see Chapter 3). In addition, we have examined existing work and derived the
remaining research gap as challenges for designing innovative solutions (see also Chapter
3). We thus consider our first two objectives as achieved.
Our main contribution is the design of individual, decentralised solutions to secure
Decentralised Service Location. The solutions we have developed each tackle one of the
identified security challenges. The solutions are decentralised in nature. Moreover, we
have evaluated them extensively and shown their effectiveness. We have thus achieved
our initial aim of devising appropriate decentralised solutions and securing Decentralised
Service Location.
Furthermore, our individual solutions can be used in conjunction for a holistic protec-
tion of Decentralised Service Location. Our proof-of-concept prototype implementation
demonstrates this (see Chapter 8 for details). It enables to concatenate some of our al-
gorithms for lookup availability with self-certifying SIP-URIs to protect the integrity of
location bindings. These techniques secure the availability and the integrity of a DHTs
lookup service. For instance, it enables a P2PSIP caller to securely retrieve the location
of a callee. We have demonstrated the practical feasibility of these solutions combined
in a running system. In addition, our Web-of-Trust approach for decentralised identity
assessment enables to protect against unsolicited incoming communication requests. It
can therefore be used independently of—or in conjunction with—our other solutions.
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In summary, all of our initial goals have been satisfactorily attained. During the course
of our work, we have also been able to answer our initial research questions (compare with
1.2). In principle, all our solutions are decentralised in the sense that their security does
not depend on a central authority. Therefore we can conclude that it is indeed possible
to secure Decentralised Service Location with decentralised mechanisms. Moreover, our
algorithms for maintaining DHT lookup availability are truly decentralised: Each node
makes its routing decision solely based on information retrieved from other P2P nodes
and no entity has a special role in the network.
However, some of our approaches involve—in a very limited way, but nonetheless—
central components. Self-certifying SIP-URIs enable fully decentralised authentication
of location-bindings, i.e. without relying on any central authority. But in order to be
useful for establishing real-time communication among users, a mapping between a URI
and a physical identity must be available. As an example, we have suggested using an
https based website for such a mapping, i.e. a server. Strictly speaking, the functionality
of providing such a physical-identity-to-URI mapping is outside the scope of our work:
Service Location assumes that a name for a service has been acquired previously to
finding the location for a given service. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the need for such a
mapping. We did not develop a decentralised solution to this problem. Providing a fully
decentralised mapping of physical identities to SIP-URIs has not been answered by our
work.
Similarly, our Web-of-Trust based approach for decentralised identity assessment relies
loosely on central entities. We assume the presence of key-servers to compute and provide
certificate chain graphs. However, it is important to acknowledge that these entities need
to be contacted only infrequently and are not needed for every session establishment.
Also, these entities are not necessarily required to verify certificate chains. Most impor-
tantly, these key-servers do not act as central authorities (i.e. certificate authorities) in
our system; the process of asserting identities is truly decentralised among P2P nodes.
In conclusion, we have been able to design fully decentralised solutions for preserv-
ing the availability of the DHT lookup service and for integrity protection of location-
bindings. We acknowledge that our integrity protection approach probably requires a
centralised service for securely mapping a physical user onto a SIP identity1. Our de-
centralised identity assessment approach requires central entities to compute and provide
certificate chain graphs. We have thus not in all cases been able to design completely
decentralised solutions. In those cases where this was not possible, we still regard the
degree of decentralisation as rather high because the centralised entities we assume a) do
not act as authorities, i.e. the security of our approaches does not depend on them, and
b) are not needed for every session establishment but rather infrequently.
For our lookup availability algorithms we have studied (by means of simulation) the
effect of various parametrisations on the attainable lookup success rate and lookup delay
(measured in DHT hops). We have hence comprehensively answered the research ques-
tion what application performance is possible with these algorithms. Our results show
1Since this functionality is outside the scope of Decentralised Service Location we did not investigate
finding a decentralised solution further.
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that for small to medium attacker rates our algorithms can provide high lookup success
rates and acceptable lookup delay. Our proof-of-concept implementation confirms these
insights. Further, our prototype experiments verified that our proposed approach using
self-certifying SIP-URIs delays session establishment insignificantly.
For our proposed decentralised identity assertion approach, we have extensively anal-
ysed the trade-offs involved between performance and decentralisation. We analysed
different scenarios quantitatively regarding their reliance on a trustworthy key server for
pre-verification of identity assertion paths and the corresponding call setup delay at the
callee and caller in a P2PSIP scenario (see 6.3.2 for details). Our conclusion has been
that a higher degree of decentralisation implies less reliance on central entities but a
performance penalty in the form of an additional, but still acceptable call setup delay.
9.2 Open Issues and Future Work
The outcome of our work are effective, decentralised security approaches for Decentralised
Service Location. However, some open issues exist. Future work may possibly address
some of these issues or the minor shortcomings of our solutions.
As highlighted previously, not all our proposed solutions are fully decentralised in
the sense that they do not require any central components at all. In particular, it is an
open research issue whether it is possible to compute a Web-of-Trust certificate chain
graph deterministically in a completely decentralised fashion. Also, further research may
investigate the question how to bind a physical entity onto a communication identity
without using trusted, central entities.
Further, it is still an open research question whether it is possible to design secure
DHT routing algorithms (i.e. ones that provide protection against attacks on availability
of the lookup service) that scale logarithmically. We have shown that density checks
enable our algorithms to scale with increasing network size. However, our algorithms do
not scale logarithmically as the network size, and consequently the average path length,
increases.
For our Web-of-Trust based approach to assert SIP identities, we have proposed to
use the length of the smallest identity assertion path as a metric to judge incoming
messages. However, we did not investigate what a proper threshold would be to consider
an incoming message as trustworthy. In addition, more sophisticated metrics, such as
the number of existing assertion paths to the caller’s identity where the length is below
a certain threshold, could prove more useful and more robust against certificate chain
infiltration by attackers. Further, we did not study how to combine our approach with
other, existing Spam-prevention mechanisms. Finally, due to the lack of an existing large-
scale Web-of-Trust, we could not verify our approach for networks in the range of several
100.000 users. Further research is needed to investigate these open issues. However, it
is likely that proper answering of these research questions would require real datasets of
users using our approach, or at least call data records (CDRs) from existing VoIP traffic
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which include clearly marked Spam messages. At this point in time, such datasets are
hard to obtain, largely due to the fact that Spam-over-IP-Telephony is not a widespread
phenomenon yet.
Within the scope of our P2PSIP prototype implementation, we have proposed the
novel idea of using an application-intrinsic social network for DHT-layer security. How-
ever, we have only investigated this approach in principle and shown its effectiveness
rudimentarily. Further research could study this approach in more depth. For instance,
interesting research would be to explore the applicability of this approach in conjunction
with realistic data about the application-intrinsic social relationships among VoIP users
(i.e. using centroid and clustering models obtained from VoIP CDRs) and considering
realistic call patterns and online time of users (also obtained from CDRs).
Finally, we have only touched the surface of finding a proper solution for Lawful
Interception of P2PSIP traffic. We have studied potential approaches incipiently and not
in detail. However, our analysis of the problem has clearly revealed that it is technically
very challenging to solve and most existing mechanisms are not applicable. Existing
Lawful Interception architectures have been designed with a service provider in mind,
which is trustworthy and knows the locations of users. With P2PSIP, this service provider
is essentially replaced with a dynamically changing overlay network. Thus, the mapping
of identities to locations is stored at untrustworthy—and potentially at each point in time
different—nodes. We therefore regard it an interesting open research problem to find a
scalable, efficient, and real-time solution for Lawful Interception in P2PSIP networks.
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Appendix A
Previously Published and Related
Publications
A considerable part of this thesis including figures has been originally published in con-
ferences, journals, or by other means. Below we list these associated publications which
have been published prior to the publication of this thesis, and explain how they relate
to this thesis.
A.1 Peer-reviewed Publications in Scientific Confer-
ences or Journals
 J. Seedorf, “Using Cryptographically Generated SIP-URIs to Protect the Integrity
of Content in P2P-SIP,” in 3rd Annual VoIP Security Workshop, Jun. 2006, last
visited on June 4th, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.89.3742&rep=rep1&type=pdf [239];
This publication describes the approach of self-certifying SIP-URIs and how this
concept can protect the integrity of data items in a P2PSIP DHT. The content of
the paper is to large extent contained in Chapter 5 of this thesis, where self-certifying
SIP-URIs and the applicability of this approach for integrity protection of data items
in P2PSIP are being presented. The paper was solely written by the author of this
thesis.
 J. Seedorf, “Security Challenges for Peer-to-Peer SIP,” IEEE Network, vol. 20, no.
5, pp. 38–45, Sep. 2006. [235];
This article investigates the security challenges of using a P2P network as a sub-
strate for SIP communication. It identifies the security implications of using a
structured overlay network for SIP registration and location lookup and examines
possible solutions for securing P2PSIP. The content of this article is largely con-
tained in Chapter 3 of this thesis, where a security analysis of P2PSIP is being
provided and the corresponding research gap is being derived. This publication was
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erations for Simulation and a new Bound on Lookup Success,” in Proceedings of
the 12th Nordic Workshop on Secure IT-Systems (Nordsec). Reykjavik University,
Reykjavik, Iceland, Oct. 2007, pp. 23–34, (Reykjavik University Technical Report,
ISBN: 978-9979948346). [246];
This paper contributes analytical bounds for lookup availability in Chord, analyses
the simulation methodology used in publications on previous approaches for lookup
availability in Chord, and proposes considerations for simulating unidirectional Dis-
tributed Hash Tables like Chord. These contributions are contained in Chapter 4
of this thesis, where Chord is being analysed analytically and previous approaches
for lookup availability in Chord are examined. The paper is the result of a Diploma
thesis of the second author of the paper under the supervision of the author of this
thesis. In the Diploma thesis a DHT security simulator was developed, and sev-
eral Chord security extensions were developed and implemented in the simulator.
The paper was written by the author of this thesis; the second author conducted the
simulations for the results published in the paper.
 J. Seedorf, “Lawful Interception in P2P-Based VoIP Systems,” in Principles, Sys-
tems and Applications of IP Telecommunications (IPTComm), ser. LNCS, no.
5310. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 2008, pp. 217–235. [240];
This paper provides a technical analysis of applying Lawful Interception to P2P-
based Voice-over-IP systems, highlighting the characteristic properties of such an
approach and the corresponding implications that complicate Lawful Interception.
Further, potential solutions for implementing Lawful Interception in a P2PSIP sys-
tem are examined. The content of this paper is to large extent contained in Chapter
7 of this thesis, where a technical analysis of Lawful Interception in the context of
P2PSIP is provided. This publication was solely written by the author of this thesis.
 J. Seedorf and C. Muus, “Availability for DHT-Based Overlay Networks with Uni-
directional Routing,” in Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Con-
ference on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence
and Next Generation Networks (WISTP), ser. LNCS, no. 5019. Springer, Heidel-
berg, Germany, 2008. pp. 78–91 [247];
This paper contributes concrete algorithms for maintaining lookup availability in a
Chord DHT in the presence of adversary nodes. These contributions are contained
in Chapter 4 of this thesis, where these Chord extensions are being presented and
analysed in detail. The paper is the result of a Diploma thesis of the second author
of the paper under the supervision of the author of this thesis. In the Diploma the-
sis a DHT security simulator was developed, and several Chord security extensions
were developed and implemented in the simulator. The paper was written by the
author of this thesis; the second author conducted the simulations for the results
published in the paper.
 J. Seedorf, K. Beckers, and F. Huici, “Testing Dialog-Verification of SIP Phones
with Single-Message Denial-of-Service Attacks” in 4th International Conference on
224
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(CCIS), no. 12. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 2008, pp. 61–64. [242];
This paper presents experimental results of testing several SIP terminals against de-
ficient verification of SIP dialog-IDs. This research is not directly related to the core
contribution of this thesis. The content of this paper is merely summarized as rele-
vant background to our work in Subsection 2.2.3.2 (re-using one figure from [242]).
The paper was written by the first and third author; the second author provided the
prototypical implementation of the test environment as part of his Diploma thesis
under the supervision of the author of this thesis.
 J. Seedorf, F. Ruwolt, M. Stiemerling, and S. Niccolini, “Evaluating p2psip un-
der attack: An emulative study,” in IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
(GLOBECOM). IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2008. [248];
This paper presents the prototypical implementation of a security-enhanced P2PSIP
system and emulation results obtained with this prototype. The content of the paper
is contained in Chapter 8, where this prototype (and corresponding results obtained
with it) are being presented in this thesis. The paper is the result of the Diploma
thesis of the second author. During the course of that Diploma thesis, the P2PSIP
prototype described in the paper was developed under the supervision of the author
of this thesis. The paper was written mostly by the author of this thesis, with advise
from the third and fourth author.
 J. Seedorf, K. Beckers, and F. Huici, “Single-Message Denial-of-Service Attacks
Against Voice-over-Internet Protocol Terminals,” Inderscience International Jour-
nal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 29–34, Mar.
2009. [243];
This paper presents experimental results of testing several SIP terminals against
deficient verification of SIP dialog-IDs and is an extended version of [242]. This
research is not directly related to the core contribution of this thesis. The content of
this paper is merely summarized as relevant background to our work in Subsection
2.2.3.2. The paper was written by the first and third author; the second author pro-
vided the prototypical implementation of the test environment as part of his Diploma
thesis under the supervision of the author of this thesis.
 J. Seedorf, “Security Issues for P2P-Based Voice- and Video-Streaming Applica-
tions,” in Open Research Problems in Network Security (iNetSec), ser. Interna-
tional Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) AICT, no. 309. Springer-
Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 2009, pp. 95–110. [241];
This paper discusses new, interesting security challenges imposed by P2P-based voice
and video streaming systems. The paper presents a summary of existing work in the
area, derives and discusses open research problems, and outlines approaches towards
potential solutions for securing P2P-based voice and video streaming applications.
Several figures from this publication are used in Chapter 2 in this thesis. Also, the
idea of an application-intrinsic social network is being discussed in this paper and
also appears in Chapter 8 of this thesis (also re-using a figure from the paper), where
an application-intrinsic P2PSIP social network is being proposed. This publication
was solely written by the author of this thesis.
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 J. Seedorf, N. d’Heureuse, S. Niccolini, and M. Cornolti, “Detecting Trustworthy
Real-Time Communications Using a Web-of-Trust,” in IEEE Global Telecommuni-
cations Conference (GLOBECOM). IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, USA, 2009. [244];
This paper describes a Web-of-Trust-based approach for decentralised identity as-
sertion. Parts of this paper are contained in Chapter 6 of this thesis, where this
Web-of-Trust approach is being presented in this thesis. However, the paper only
covers the application of the approach in client-server systems whereas Chapter 6
also provides a detailed design and analysis of applying this approach in P2P-based
systems. This application of the approach to P2PSIP was developed solely by the
author of this thesis. The general Web-of-Trust approach was developed and the
paper was written mostly together by the first and second author. The third author
contributed advise in the design and paper writing. The fourth author contributed
the prototypical implementation of the approach as part of an internship under the
supervision of the first and second author of the paper.
A.2 Other Pre-published Publications
 J. Posegga and J. Seedorf, “Voice over IP: Unsafe at any Bandwidth?” in Proceed-
ings of Eurescom Summit 2005 Ubiquitous Services and Applications. VDE Verlag,
Berlin/Offenbach, Germany, Apr. 2005, pp. 305–314. [203];
This paper provides a technical analysis of the security aspects of VoIP, focusing
on the SIP protocol. The major differences and implications of VoIP, in particular
compared to circuit-switched voice are being discussed. Parts of this paper are con-
tained in Section 2.2 of this thesis, where VoIP, SIP, and the related security issues
are being introduced. The paper was written together by the first and second author.
 J. Seedorf, “SIP Security - Status Quo and Future Issues,” in Proceedings of 23rd
Chaos Communication Congress, Nov. 2006, last visited on June 4th, 2012. [On-
line]. Available: http://events.ccc.de/congress/2006/Fahrplan/events/1459.en.
html [238];
This paper provides an overview of VoIP security issues, focusing on SIP. In ad-
dition, an overview on research activities and standardisation efforts in the field of
VoIP security is given. The paper also contains a high-level overview on P2PSIP
security issues. Parts of this paper are contained in Section 2.2 of this thesis, where
VoIP, SIP, and the related security issues are being introduced, and in Chapter 3 of
this thesis, where a security analysis of P2PSIP is being provided. This paper was
written solely by the author of this thesis.
 S. Niccolini, J. Seedorf, and N. d’Heureuse, “Method and System for Verifying the
Identity of a Communication Partner,” Patent PCT/EP08/03 508, 2008, patent
application (grant pending) [189];
This patent application relates to the Web-of-Trust-based approach for decentralised
identity assertion published in [244]. The content of this patent application is in
part contained in Chapter 6 of this thesis, where this Web-of-Trust approach is being
presented in this thesis.
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Appendix B
Implementation and Experiment
Details
B.1 Algorithms for Increased Lookup Availability:
Detailed Simulation Results
B.1.1 Experimental Setup
Our simulator is an extension of the Java-based planetsim [15] DHT simulation frame-
work. Java classes for modelling our attacker model (e.g. adversary nodes routing ex-
clusively to adversary nodes) and for routing with our DHT-extensions have been imple-
mented and added to planetsim (or existing classes have been modified). All our sim-
ulations have been carried out according to our proposed simulation methodology (see
Section 4.6): We simulated key lookup (see 4.5.1.2) in a hardly utilised node-ID space.
Further, each parametrisation has been simulated for different network sizes. All our
experiments have been conducted on one of two physical hosts (AMD Phenom Quadcore,
8GB Ram; AMD Athlon II Quadcore, 16GB Ram) under Debian Linux (AMD 64-bit).
For all our experiments, we set s = 16 and r = 8 and executed 100 random lookups
each in 10 randomly created Chord DHT networks (i.e. 10 experimental runs each con-
sisting of 100 lookups). The average results for lookup success and hop count provided
below and in Chapter 4 are obtained by averaging the 100-lookup average of each indi-
vidual run over the 10 executed runs. The standard-deviation of the lookup success refers
to the overall average among the 10 runs.
B.1.2 Additional and Detailed Results
Figure B.1 shows the success rate for MRR-r with a hop count threshold, th, of 50 and
different density thresholds, td, in a network of N = 1000 nodes. Figure B.2 shows
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Figure B.1: Success Rate for MRR-r with Different Density Thresholds td (th = 50,
N= 1000)
Figure B.2: Success Rate for MRR-b with Different Density Thresholds td (th = 50,
N= 1000)
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Figure B.3: Success Rate for MRR-r with Different Density Thresholds td (th = 50,
N= 2000)
similar results for MRR-b. Figure B.3 shows the success rate for MRR-r with a hop
count threshold, th, of 50 and different density thresholds, td, in a network of N = 2000
nodes. Figure B.4 shows similar results for MRR-b. Figure B.5 shows the success rate
for MRR-b with a hop count threshold, th, of 50 and different density thresholds, td, in
a network of N = 4000 nodes (a similar figure for N = 4000 and MRR-r is shown in
Subsection 4.4.2).
Figure B.6 visualises the effect of an increased hop count threshold, th, of 100 in
comparison to th = 50. The figure shows results for MRR-r, MRR-b, and MRR-r with
the best density threshold for moderate attacker rates, td = 2.0, in a network of N =
1000 nodes. Figure B.7 displays similar results for MRR-r and MRR-b in a network of
N = 4000 nodes.
Figures B.8, B.9, B.10, B.11, B.12, B.13, B.14, B.15, and B.16 show detailed results of
our experiments. In particular, for each parametrisation we simulated, the average lookup
success rate (and standard deviation) as well as the average hop count we obtained is
provided.
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Figure B.4: Success Rate for MRR-b with Different Density Thresholds td (th = 50,
N= 2000)
Figure B.5: Success Rate for MRR-b with Different Density Thresholds td (th = 50,
N= 4000)
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Figure B.6: Effect of Increased Hop Threshold th for Different Algorithms (N= 1000)
Figure B.7: Effect of Increased Hop Threshold th for Different Algorithms (N= 4000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
1000 MRR-b 0.1 100.00 0.00 10.38
MRR-b 0.2 100.00 0.00 28.11
MRR-b 0.3 99.90 0.31 65.06
MRR-b 0.4 99.85 0.37 100.60
MRR-b 0.5 99.45 1.00 159.03
MRR-b 0.6 97.85 1.93 227.47
MRR-b 0.7 91.94 3.70 326.05
MRR-b 0.8 71.30 6.34 491.64
MRR-b 50 0.1 94.50 1.58 8.27
MRR-b 50 0.2 81.00 3.06 15.54
MRR-b 50 0.3 67.80 4.80 22.97
MRR-b 50 0.4 53.70 5.38 29.51
MRR-b 50 0.5 39.10 4.93 35.42
MRR-b 50 0.6 25.90 3.93 41.23
MRR-b 50 0.7 16.80 3.71 44.15
MRR-b 50 0.8 8.80 2.35 47.08
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.1 84.90 5.11 12.88
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.2 84.40 3.37 13.13
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.3 83.90 4.43 13.94
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.4 80.10 6.15 16.64
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.5 73.30 7.23 20.82
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.6 60.10 5.36 28.49
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.7 25.70 3.92 42.40
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.8 8.80 4.10 47.20
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.1 94.30 2.98 7.75
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.2 93.00 2.58 8.78
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.3 92.50 2.92 9.33
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.4 91.00 2.62 11.25
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.5 82.00 4.45 17.82
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.6 57.10 6.71 29.94
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.7 27.20 8.13 41.31
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.8 9.30 2.31 47.12
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.1 98.60 1.50 5.45
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.2 99.30 1.17 5.47
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.3 98.25 1.41 6.94
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.4 90.15 3.67 12.94
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.5 66.35 5.28 25.33
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.6 42.95 6.62 35.39
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.7 19.25 4.15 43.86
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.8 8.95 2.89 47.25
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.1 99.70 0.48 4.93
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.2 99.80 0.42 5.15
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.3 96.00 1.89 8.76
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.4 76.10 5.30 19.97
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.5 53.30 6.67 30.36
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.6 28.80 6.29 40.40
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.7 17.20 4.21 44.45
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.8 8.30 3.33 47.51
MRR-b 100 0.1 100.00 0.00 10.71
MRR-b 100 0.2 86.10 2.08 22.51
MRR-b 100 0.3 76.20 5.18 35.53
MRR-b 100 0.4 62.40 4.40 51.53
MRR-b 100 0.5 50.20 5.12 62.01
MRR-b 100 0.6 34.10 5.55 75.69
MRR-b 100 0.7 25.60 4.45 83.45
MRR-b 100 0.8 13.00 3.80 92.59
Figure B.8: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-b, N = 1000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
1000 MRR-r 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.98
MRR-r 0.2 100.00 0.00 13.71
MRR-r 0.3 99.85 0.37 35.59
MRR-r 0.4 100.00 0.00 69.39
MRR-r 0.5 99.25 1.16 136.77
MRR-r 0.6 98.00 1.65 209.51
MRR-r 0.7 89.00 4.83 341.01
MRR-r 0.8 69.50 5.60 498.73
MRR-r 50 0.1 99.90 0.32 5.89
MRR-r 50 0.2 96.10 1.29 10.18
MRR-r 50 0.3 83.50 3.37 17.29
MRR-r 50 0.4 66.10 5.99 26.02
MRR-r 50 0.5 49.20 8.07 33.52
MRR-r 50 0.6 32.50 3.89 39.56
MRR-r 50 0.7 19.30 5.23 44.06
MRR-r 50 0.8 9.80 4.29 46.80
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.1 85.80 5.55 12.23
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.2 83.60 4.84 14.07
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.3 81.40 3.53 15.51
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.4 81.80 5.59 16.23
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.5 73.60 6.72 22.37
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.6 53.00 4.29 32.64
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.7 26.60 6.40 41.97
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.8 8.30 2.16 47.44
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.1 94.00 2.75 8.10
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.2 93.70 2.95 8.88
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.3 94.00 3.20 9.53
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.4 93.20 1.23 11.83
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.5 80.00 5.70 20.41
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.6 54.00 4.94 32.26
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.7 24.50 4.79 42.19
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.8 11.10 3.87 46.35
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.1 98.80 1.40 5.51
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.2 99.30 1.06 6.07
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.3 97.80 1.32 7.72
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.4 91.30 2.98 14.17
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.5 73.80 2.49 24.12
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.6 43.90 4.63 35.45
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.7 22.50 2.68 42.84
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.8 9.90 2.56 46.50
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.1 99.90 0.31 5.05
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.2 99.90 0.45 5.60
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.3 97.50 1.32 9.07
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.4 83.50 3.83 18.21
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.5 60.95 4.87 29.18
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.6 37.30 4.13 37.78
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.7 18.95 3.35 43.97
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.8 9.35 2.52 47.13
MRR-r 100 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.86
MRR-r 100 0.2 97.90 1.91 12.05
MRR-r 100 0.3 89.60 3.89 24.01
MRR-r 100 0.4 74.50 4.97 40.21
MRR-r 100 0.5 55.80 5.47 58.69
MRR-r 100 0.6 43.70 5.33 69.36
MRR-r 100 0.7 23.30 3.62 84.77
MRR-r 100 0.8 13.00 2.87 91.39
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.1 95.18 2.29 10.62
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.2 94.25 2.53 11.86
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.3 93.48 3.11 13.42
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.4 91.80 3.54 17.33
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.5 86.00 4.31 28.21
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.6 65.35 5.58 51.99
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.7 35.38 5.07 77.27
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.8 13.31 3.60 91.66
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.1 99.37 0.93 5.68
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.2 99.47 0.78 6.08
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.3 98.57 1.25 8.46
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.4 95.73 1.80 16.26
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.5 80.50 3.49 37.03
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.6 54.80 6.74 61.92
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.7 29.30 5.44 81.39
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.8 13.29 3.38 91.49
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.1 99.70 0.47 5.35
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.2 99.85 0.49 5.85
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.3 99.20 0.70 9.55
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.4 89.35 2.89 25.44
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.5 69.90 4.14 47.26
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.6 46.80 6.07 67.08
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.7 27.65 4.12 82.02
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.8 12.95 3.47 91.77
Figure B.9: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-r, N = 1000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
2000 MRR-b 0.1 100.00 0.00 17.45
MRR-b 0.2 100.00 0.00 55.29
MRR-b 0.3 100.00 0.00 126.18
MRR-b 0.4 99.90 0.32 192.24
MRR-b 0.5 99.70 0.48 316.25
MRR-b 0.6 97.00 1.56 483.94
MRR-b 0.7 94.30 3.20 629.24
MRR-b 0.8 74.30 5.50 991.83
MRR-b 50 0.1 91.00 3.50 10.51
MRR-b 50 0.2 76.00 7.62 18.47
MRR-b 50 0.3 61.70 3.80 25.86
MRR-b 50 0.4 41.90 3.84 33.97
MRR-b 50 0.5 29.60 4.77 39.31
MRR-b 50 0.6 16.60 4.45 44.17
MRR-b 50 0.7 9.00 3.09 47.03
MRR-b 50 0.8 5.20 2.15 48.24
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.1 87.80 3.22 12.08
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.2 85.30 4.16 13.51
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.3 82.00 4.35 15.48
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.4 81.90 3.87 15.99
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.5 74.10 4.58 21.53
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.6 51.20 5.85 32.98
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.7 19.90 3.38 43.97
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.8 4.30 2.75 48.67
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.1 95.00 2.05 8.07
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.2 94.20 2.66 8.91
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.3 90.80 6.16 10.71
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.4 88.60 3.92 13.32
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.5 75.50 3.44 21.10
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.6 43.10 7.78 35.95
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.7 18.20 3.74 44.14
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.8 5.90 2.47 48.25
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.1 99.30 1.08 5.67
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.2 98.60 1.39 6.36
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.3 97.55 1.64 7.88
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.4 84.70 4.16 16.16
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.5 59.20 4.47 28.11
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.6 31.90 5.86 39.45
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.7 13.20 4.69 45.93
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.8 4.10 2.08 48.64
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.27
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.2 99.40 0.97 6.02
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.3 94.90 1.73 10.03
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.4 71.90 4.33 21.70
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.5 42.20 5.96 34.77
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.6 22.50 3.87 42.30
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.7 11.70 2.45 46.11
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.8 4.90 2.51 48.35
MRR-b 100 0.1 91.00 1.76 15.66
MRR-b 100 0.2 80.20 4.05 28.74
MRR-b 100 0.3 65.90 5.76 44.28
MRR-b 100 0.4 51.60 5.83 58.69
MRR-b 100 0.5 36.10 5.30 73.18
MRR-b 100 0.6 24.30 5.25 82.93
MRR-b 100 0.7 15.20 4.85 90.52
MRR-b 100 0.8 6.40 3.63 95.77
Figure B.10: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-b, N = 2000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
2000 MRR-r 0.1 100.00 0.00 8.01
MRR-r 0.2 100.00 0.00 23.39
MRR-r 0.3 100.00 0.00 70.57
MRR-r 0.4 100.00 0.00 155.90
MRR-r 0.5 99.80 0.42 272.93
MRR-r 0.6 98.90 1.20 436.26
MRR-r 0.7 93.20 1.75 655.29
MRR-r 0.8 75.71 3.77 993.36
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.1 98.70 0.95 5.86
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.2 98.90 1.29 6.55
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.3 95.90 2.56 8.14
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.4 78.60 3.27 12.31
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.5 47.10 5.47 18.11
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.6 22.80 5.39 21.80
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.7 11.10 4.82 23.48
MRR-r 25 2.00 0.8 3.60 2.07 24.47
MRR-r 50 0.1 98.90 0.99 7.33
MRR-r 50 0.2 92.40 2.50 12.74
MRR-r 50 0.3 77.50 3.57 20.92
MRR-r 50 0.4 55.90 4.01 30.52
MRR-r 50 0.5 37.90 3.00 37.65
MRR-r 50 0.6 22.80 6.41 43.10
MRR-r 50 0.7 11.40 2.59 46.59
MRR-r 50 0.8 4.70 1.77 48.46
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.1 85.00 2.94 13.21
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.2 84.40 3.95 13.96
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.3 81.60 3.03 16.02
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.4 78.00 5.12 18.83
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.5 70.20 4.73 24.46
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.6 42.70 7.47 36.18
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.7 19.00 4.03 44.40
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.8 5.30 1.70 48.22
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.1 94.80 2.10 8.53
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.2 94.30 2.98 9.29
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.3 91.50 1.65 11.45
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.4 88.90 3.63 14.95
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.5 73.90 6.92 23.65
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.6 43.30 4.47 36.02
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.7 16.80 5.55 45.16
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.8 4.20 1.69 48.70
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.1 98.60 0.97 6.37
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.2 99.20 0.92 6.88
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.3 97.30 1.89 8.90
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.4 86.90 3.00 16.85
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.5 59.10 4.01 29.74
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.6 30.10 6.28 40.72
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.7 13.80 2.82 45.91
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.8 4.80 2.53 48.67
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.55
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.2 99.80 0.52 6.53
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.3 96.85 1.79 10.31
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.4 78.60 3.53 20.84
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.5 46.00 5.36 34.98
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.6 26.56 4.77 41.58
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.7 13.10 2.81 46.10
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.8 5.10 1.91 48.45
MRR-r 100 0.1 99.70 0.48 7.35
MRR-r 100 0.2 94.00 2.00 16.82
MRR-r 100 0.3 81.20 5.59 32.00
MRR-r 100 0.4 63.10 3.51 49.90
MRR-r 100 0.5 43.10 5.84 68.01
MRR-r 100 0.6 26.90 4.72 81.41
MRR-r 100 0.7 16.60 3.24 89.18
MRR-r 100 0.8 8.40 2.27 94.69
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.1 94.63 2.58 11.39
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.2 94.63 2.33 12.23
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.3 93.50 3.32 14.14
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.4 91.30 3.03 19.18
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.5 80.45 4.07 34.75
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.6 54.40 3.62 61.48
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.7 25.85 5.43 83.03
MRR-r 100 1.50 0.8 7.70 2.79 95.25
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.1 99.50 0.83 6.13
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.2 99.40 0.75 6.87
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.3 99.05 1.19 9.01
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.4 92.10 2.86 21.40
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.5 70.50 6.44 45.19
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.6 39.85 4.90 71.73
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.7 18.05 3.75 87.93
MRR-r 100 2.00 0.8 7.95 3.98 94.83
Figure B.11: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-r, N = 2000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
2000 MRR-r 100 2.50 0.1 99.85 0.37 5.67
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.2 99.90 0.31 6.38
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.3 98.15 1.63 11.71
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.4 84.80 4.12 30.32
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.5 58.95 4.11 55.31
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.6 34.15 4.65 76.27
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.7 15.35 3.84 89.82
MRR-r 100 2.50 0.8 7.85 2.01 95.00
Figure B.12: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-r, N = 2000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
4000 MRR-b 0.1 100.00 0.00 31.04
MRR-b 0.2 100.00 0.00 125.06
MRR-b 0.3 100.00 0.00 256.54
MRR-b 0.4 99.90 0.32 461.27
MRR-b 0.5 99.80 0.42 664.07
MRR-b 0.6 97.27 1.79 962.93
MRR-b 0.7 94.50 3.50 1,259.07
MRR-b 0.8 76.30 9.86 1,931.95
MRR-b 50 0.1 87.60 3.86 12.49
MRR-b 50 0.2 71.20 4.21 20.95
MRR-b 50 0.3 51.83 6.48 29.81
MRR-b 50 0.4 35.40 6.15 36.87
MRR-b 50 0.5 22.65 4.15 42.00
MRR-b 50 0.6 12.25 3.89 45.67
MRR-b 50 0.7 7.30 3.16 47.47
MRR-b 50 0.8 2.80 2.35 48.97
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.1 84.70 3.62 14.07
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.2 85.20 4.05 14.24
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.3 81.80 4.10 15.51
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.4 81.10 3.00 17.26
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.5 70.30 4.42 23.69
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.6 45.90 5.26 35.22
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.7 17.40 4.58 45.13
MRR-b 50 1.25 0.8 2.70 1.64 49.07
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.1 94.10 2.92 8.96
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.2 93.10 2.64 9.95
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.3 94.00 2.62 10.23
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.4 91.00 2.05 12.76
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.5 73.20 4.44 23.18
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.6 39.10 4.12 37.43
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.7 13.40 3.44 45.85
MRR-b 50 1.50 0.8 3.30 1.16 48.97
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.1 99.00 1.21 6.38
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.2 99.30 0.73 6.70
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.3 98.20 1.42 8.40
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.4 82.50 4.28 17.68
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.5 54.30 6.90 30.63
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.6 25.20 3.22 41.88
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.7 10.30 3.71 46.70
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.8 2.40 1.43 49.29
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.1 99.90 0.32 5.90
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.2 99.70 0.48 6.55
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.3 91.90 2.13 12.25
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.4 65.00 3.89 25.02
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.5 34.10 5.84 37.77
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.6 15.30 4.64 44.97
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.7 7.30 2.45 47.66
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.8 2.30 1.89 49.28
MRR-b 100 0.1 89.10 3.57 17.99
MRR-b 100 0.2 76.00 6.34 33.06
MRR-b 100 0.3 58.70 4.55 51.96
MRR-b 100 0.4 39.00 5.16 68.98
MRR-b 100 0.5 25.60 4.97 81.06
MRR-b 100 0.6 16.70 2.75 88.83
MRR-b 100 0.7 9.80 3.46 94.28
MRR-b 100 0.8 3.20 1.93 97.98
Figure B.13: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-b, N = 4000)
237
N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
4000 MRR-r 0.1 100.00 0.00 9.90
MRR-r 0.2 100.00 0.00 48.78
MRR-r 0.3 99.90 0.32 136.29
MRR-r 0.4 100.00 0.00 304.28
MRR-r 0.5 99.80 0.42 576.58
MRR-r 0.6 97.60 1.26 927.67
MRR-r 0.7 92.90 1.66 1,358.69
MRR-r 0.8 76.90 4.86 2,025.85
MRR-r 50 0.1 98.70 0.95 8.11
MRR-r 50 0.2 87.90 3.95 15.80
MRR-r 50 0.3 68.70 5.61 25.33
MRR-r 50 0.4 51.75 4.90 32.52
MRR-r 50 0.5 29.05 4.86 40.72
MRR-r 50 0.6 16.95 3.52 44.77
MRR-r 50 0.7 7.50 2.42 47.79
MRR-r 50 0.8 2.85 1.87 49.04
MRR-r 50 0.9 0.50 0.53 49.84
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.1 85.40 3.08 13.69
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.2 83.10 3.45 15.49
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.3 78.86 6.10 17.95
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.4 78.60 4.50 19.51
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.5 67.90 6.81 26.18
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.6 41.10 9.55 37.57
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.7 12.50 2.92 46.28
MRR-r 50 1.25 0.8 2.30 1.89 49.33
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.1 94.10 1.45 9.13
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.2 93.00 1.83 10.62
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.3 93.20 1.55 11.89
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.4 88.70 4.22 15.49
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.5 69.60 4.90 26.03
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.6 39.00 4.42 38.12
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.7 11.20 4.02 46.76
MRR-r 50 1.50 0.8 3.70 1.70 48.71
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.1 99.15 0.93 6.63
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.2 99.17 1.11 7.63
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.3 98.10 0.99 9.39
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.4 85.00 4.27 18.55
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.5 54.20 5.55 31.75
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.6 27.00 5.23 41.71
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.7 9.80 2.94 47.22
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.8 2.50 1.08 49.17
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.1 99.80 0.42 6.21
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.2 99.40 0.97 7.38
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.3 95.20 2.44 12.03
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.4 67.30 2.67 26.13
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.5 41.10 3.00 36.92
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.6 17.20 3.65 44.83
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.7 8.30 2.67 47.27
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.8 3.30 1.64 48.76
MRR-r 100 0.1 99.10 1.10 9.09
MRR-r 100 0.2 92.10 3.54 20.18
MRR-r 100 0.3 77.40 4.74 36.18
MRR-r 100 0.4 53.80 3.74 57.73
MRR-r 100 0.5 37.50 5.17 72.62
MRR-r 100 0.6 21.60 5.85 85.26
MRR-r 100 0.7 10.40 3.20 92.90
MRR-r 100 0.8 4.40 1.96 97.28
Figure B.14: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-r, N = 4000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
8000 MRR-b 50 0.1 87.10 2.92 13.17
MRR-b 50 0.2 65.10 6.40 24.03
MRR-b 50 0.3 49.60 5.50 31.02
MRR-b 50 0.4 30.20 5.14 39.28
MRR-b 50 0.5 16.80 3.58 43.80
MRR-b 50 0.6 6.50 2.46 47.61
MRR-b 50 0.7 2.60 1.71 49.30
MRR-b 50 0.8 0.80 1.32 49.74
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.1 99.30 0.82 6.80
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.2 99.40 0.70 7.19
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.3 97.20 1.81 9.60
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.4 78.40 4.58 19.74
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.5 48.10 2.38 33.26
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.6 17.90 3.14 44.42
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.7 6.20 2.70 48.12
MRR-b 50 2.00 0.8 1.30 1.16 49.65
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.1 99.80 0.42 6.48
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.2 99.70 0.48 7.25
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.3 90.60 2.46 13.33
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.4 58.80 3.36 27.67
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.5 28.63 4.64 40.24
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.6 11.87 4.60 45.87
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.7 5.17 2.29 48.29
MRR-b 50 2.50 0.8 1.20 1.00 49.63
MRR-b 100 0.1 86.80 2.82 20.81
MRR-b 100 0.2 69.10 4.04 39.52
MRR-b 100 0.3 46.00 5.94 60.88
MRR-b 100 0.4 33.00 3.94 73.95
MRR-b 100 0.5 20.70 4.60 84.01
MRR-b 100 0.6 10.00 3.74 92.90
MRR-b 100 0.7 5.60 2.55 96.18
MRR-b 100 0.8 2.30 1.25 98.42
Figure B.15: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-b, N = 8000)
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N Algorithm hop-
threshold
density-
threshold
f Average 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Success Rate)
Average 
Hop Count
8000 MRR-r 0.1 100.00 0.00 13.55
MRR-r 0.2 100.00 0.00 92.23
MRR-r 0.3 100.00 0.00 300.72
MRR-r 0.4 99.70 0.67 654.61
MRR-r 0.5 99.70 0.48 1,175.73
MRR-r 0.6 98.90 0.88 1,865.61
MRR-r 0.7 93.50 3.03 2,716.67
MRR-r 0.8 76.67 4.50 4,001.78
MRR-r 50 0.1 97.85 1.21 9.89
MRR-r 50 0.2 85.30 3.30 18.27
MRR-r 50 0.3 61.10 4.09 28.70
MRR-r 50 0.4 37.40 6.24 37.63
MRR-r 50 0.5 22.59 4.73 42.92
MRR-r 50 0.6 11.54 2.13 46.53
MRR-r 50 0.7 4.36 2.60 48.66
MRR-r 50 0.8 1.43 1.22 49.54
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.1 99.32 0.95 7.02
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.2 99.80 0.42 7.84
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.3 96.00 2.71 11.63
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.4 80.70 3.40 21.05
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.5 42.90 4.72 35.81
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.6 18.40 3.27 44.43
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.7 7.10 1.73 47.91
MRR-r 50 2.00 0.8 1.90 0.74 49.43
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.1 99.70 0.67 6.66
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.2 99.80 0.63 7.70
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.3 90.10 2.08 15.07
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.4 64.40 6.96 27.53
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.5 32.60 6.57 39.74
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.6 13.60 2.67 46.04
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.7 5.50 2.17 48.33
MRR-r 50 2.50 0.8 1.75 1.14 49.50
Figure B.16: Detailed Simulation Results (MRR-r, N = 8000)
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B.2 Web-of-Trust Prototype Implementation and Ex-
periment Details
Prototype details and experimental setup In our WoT prototype implementation,
the OpenCDK library [8] is used for all PGP related functions. All experiments were
performed on an AMD Athlon 2800 XP system with 2GB of RAM running Linux 2.6.
All software libraries and algorithms were written in C/C++ in order to assess a fast
and realistic implementation. As SIP proxy, the VoIP SEAL prototype [245] was used
and extended with the functionality as described in Subsection 6.3.1. SIP messages have
been generated with SIPp [24] and then been sent to the SIP proxy according to SIPp
XML-files which specify the performance measurement scenarios we executed.
B.3 Implementations Details of P2PSIP Security Pro-
totype and Detailed Results of Emulation Ex-
periments
B.3.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiments were conducted on either a physical host (AMD Phenom Quadcore,
8GB Ram) running Windows-XP 64-bit or in virtual machines (created by cloning the
physical host with Microsoft’s disk2vhd tool [5]) which were run inside Oracle’s Virtual
Box [11] with Debian Linux (AMD 64-bit) as host system on a second physical host
(AMD Athlon II Quadcore, 16GB Ram). All experiments with N = 200 were run on
a single machine (physical host or virtual machine); all experiments with N = 400, 600
were run on two connected virtual machines.
We executed 100 random lookups each in 10 randomly created P2PSIP networks
(i.e. 10 experimental runs each consisting of 100 lookups). For the dynamic AISNR
experiments, 500 lookups were executed in each run. The average lookup success and
hop count results provided below and in Chapter 8 are obtained by averaging the 100-
lookup average of each individual run over the 10 executed runs. The standard-deviation
of the lookup success refers to the overall average among the 10 runs. In addition, we
provide the average over the 10 runs of the standard-deviation of the hop count average
obtained in each individual run.
B.3.2 Additional and Detailed Results
Figure B.17 shows the hop count distribution for DRR compared to DRR combined with
AISNR-s in a network with 200 nodes and f = 0.3. Figure B.18 shows results for the
same settings but in a network of 600 nodes.
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Figure B.17: Hop Count Distribution for DRR and DRR Combined with AISNR-s (f =
0.3, s = 8, N = 200)
Figures B.19, B.20, B.21, B.22, and B.23 show hop count distributions for our exper-
iments of dynamic AISNR (AISNR-d) in a network with 200 nodes for different attacker
rates f (s = 8 and φ = 0). In particular, each figure shows for a given attacker rate f the
hop count distribution for the first 100 lookups, lookups 200-300, and lookups 400-500.
Figures B.24 and B.25 provide detailed results of all our experiments. Specifically,
for each combination of algorithm and parameter setting, the average lookup success
rate and the average hop count we measured in our experiments is given. Additionally,
standard-deviations of these averages are provided. Note that also for AISNR-d, the hop
count results in Figures B.24 and B.25 refer to the average of 100 lookups, i.e. only to
the first 100 lookups in the case of AISNR-d.
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Figure B.18: Hop Count Distribution for DRR and DRR Combined with AISNR-s (f =
0.3, s = 8, N = 600)
Figure B.19: The Effect of Dynamic AISNR on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time
(f = 0.1, N = 200)
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Figure B.20: The Effect of Dynamic AISNR on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time
(f = 0.2, N = 200)
Figure B.21: The Effect of Dynamic AISNR on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time
(f = 0.3, N = 200)
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Figure B.22: The Effect of Dynamic AISNR on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time
(f = 0.4, N = 200)
Figure B.23: The Effect of Dynamic AISNR on the Hop Count Distribution Over Time
(f = 0.5, N = 200)
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N Algorithm s phi f Average Lookup 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Lookup Success Rate)
Average Hop 
Count
Average(stddev 
Hop Count)
200 DRR 2 0 100.00 0.00 5.03 1.53
DRR 2 0.1 98.00 2.11 5.51 1.87
DRR 2 0.2 96.80 3.61 6.12 2.43
DRR 2 0.3 88.30 6.68 6.56 2.65
DRR 2 0.4 79.60 4.86 7.33 3.02
DRR 2 0.5 59.80 9.82 7.89 3.68
DRR 4 0 100.00 0.00 4.76 1.34
DRR 4 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.20 1.74
DRR 4 0.2 100.00 0.00 5.63 2.09
DRR 4 0.3 97.20 3.19 6.24 2.36
DRR 4 0.4 95.70 3.89 7.35 3.11
DRR 4 0.5 84.80 6.11 8.18 3.61
DRR 8 0 100.00 0.00 4.27 1.19
DRR 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.86 1.57
DRR 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 5.37 2.02
DRR 8 0.3 100.00 0.00 6.16 2.71
DRR 8 0.4 100.00 0.00 7.07 3.12
DRR 8 0.5 99.80 0.63 8.37 3.85
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0 100.00 0.00 4.27 1.27
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.81 1.65
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0.2 100.00 0.00 5.17 1.96
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0.3 100.00 0.00 6.06 2.49
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0.4 100.00 0.00 6.67 2.95
DRR, AISNR-d 8 0 0.5 99.70 0.95 7.92 3.67
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0 100.00 0.00 4.04 1.16
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.37 1.41
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0.2 100.00 0.00 4.84 1.76
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0.3 100.00 0.00 5.13 1.84
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0.4 100.00 0.00 5.99 2.53
DRR, AISNR-s 8 4 0.5 98.20 3.55 6.73 3.23
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0 200.00 0.00 3.74 1.09
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.09 1.28
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 4.43 1.61
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.3 100.00 0.00 4.78 1.78
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.4 100.00 0.00 5.21 1.95
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.5 98.20 3.01 6.01 2.71
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0 100.00 0.00 3.60 1.03
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0.1 100.00 0.00 3.76 1.13
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0.2 100.00 0.00 4.21 1.37
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0.3 100.00 0.00 4.52 1.68
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0.4 98.70 2.75 4.99 1.98
DRR, AISNR-s 8 12 0.5 100.00 0.00 5.62 2.36
Figure B.24: Detailed P2PSIP Prototype Results (N = 200)
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N Algorithm s phi f Average Lookup 
Success Rate
stddev(Average 
Lookup Success Rate)
Average Hop 
Count
Average(stddev 
Hop Count)
400 DRR 8 0 100.00 0.00 4.73 1.30
DRR 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.33 1.66
DRR 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 6.11 2.29
DRR 8 0.3 100.00 0.00 7.38 3.17
DRR 8 0.4 99.00 3.16 9.35 4.59
DRR 8 0.5 98.00 2.75 11.31 5.71
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0 100.00 0.00 4.27 1.18
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.51 1.39
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 4.97 1.80
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.3 99.60 1.26 5.81 2.26
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.4 100.00 0.00 6.36 2.77
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.5 99.00 1.76 7.26 3.31
Regular Chord 0 100.00 0.00 4.75 1.29
Regular Chord 0.1 91.10 4.61 5.33 1.73
Regular Chord 0.2 81.90 4.91 5.91 2.23
Regular Chord 0.3 70.90 8.14 7.08 3.19
Regular Chord 0.4 62.80 9.11 8.32 4.06
Regular Chord 0.5 45.40 6.60 10.86 5.74
600 DRR 8 0 100.00 0.00 4.98 1.27
DRR 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 5.57 1.83
DRR 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 6.74 2.58
DRR 8 0.3 99.80 0.63 8.06 3.59
DRR 8 0.4 99.20 1.48 9.80 4.52
DRR 8 0.5 94.40 3.44 12.10 5.82
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0 100.00 0.00 4.46 1.26
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.1 100.00 0.00 4.91 1.57
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.2 100.00 0.00 5.57 2.02
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.3 100.00 0.00 6.33 2.59
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.4 99.90 0.32 7.04 3.20
DRR, AISNR-s 8 8 0.5 98.80 1.32 8.42 3.93
Regular Chord 0 100.00 0.00 4.83 1.36
Regular Chord 0.1 90.50 4.22 5.52 1.78
Regular Chord 0.2 78.40 3.69 6.46 2.49
Regular Chord 0.3 70.60 5.36 7.67 3.45
Regular Chord 0.4 58.60 7.17 8.98 4.59
Regular Chord 0.5 45.00 2.58 11.87 6.21
Figure B.25: Detailed P2PSIP Prototype Results (N = 400, 600)
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